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ABSTRACT
United States Policy and the Diplomacy of Limited War
In Korea: 1950-1951 (September 1974)








University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Directed by: Dr. John M. Maki
This dissertation attempts to study the nature and problems of limited
war in Korea as they are reflected in United States policy and diplomacy with
respect to: (1) the decision to intervene militarily at the outbreak of the
Korean War; (2) the decision to cross the 38th parallel in September and October
of 1950; (3) the policy on Chinese Commimist intervention in Korea; and
(4) America's initial reactions and responses to Communist China's full-scale
counteroffensives in Korea from later November 1950 through February 1, 1951.
The study takes the approach of an examination of how and v/hy these
policy decisions were made. For the question of "how, " the viewpoint of the
policy-mal^ers, particularly at the time of their decisions, is emphasized. For
the assessment of "why" certain decisions were made, various uiterpretations and
explanations by scholars and experts were consulted, and assumptions behind
the policies were examined. These assumptions are not necessarily
restricted to
those of which the policy-makers were conscious.
/vii
In summary, the major problems surrounding the policy of limited war
in Korea and its maintenance were: (1) America's exclusive control of the
international force for field operations, which reduced the restraining influence
of other members of the United Nations in some important tactical moves;
(2) America's allies, whose cooperation and support were needed to continue
the collective UN action in Korea, but who were eager to seek peace at a Mgh
price to the United States, even though their influence was significant in opposing
the expansion of the war to China; (3) General Douglas MacAtthur, who demanded
a total victory over, first, the North Korean forces, then, over the Chmese
troops in Korea, even advocating extending hostilities to China after their full-
scale intervention in Korea; (4) America's traditional approach to war, which
once asserted its influence to change the policy of limited war with respect to
North Korea.
Because of these problems. United States policy of limited war in Korea
had to go through various stages before it was finally worked out and maintained.
At first the war was limited with respect to the Soviet Union and
Communist
China in terms of geography and military contact: non-violation of
Siberian
and Manchurian borders and no provocation to bring their forces
into Korea.
With respect to North Korea, the war was also limited in its
objective to
restore South Korea's border at the 38th parallel with
no intention of destroying
enemy forces completely. Soon, due to the lack of any
indication of Soviet
intention to intervene and due to American military
tradition, the ; abjective was
viii
changed to a total victory over North Korean forces with the consequent
necessity of crossing the 38th parallel and driving to the Yalu. The change of
policy also produced Chinese reaction and limited military contact with China
in Korea. The policy objective further became the destruction of all the enemy
forces, including the Chinese, in Korea, but without attacking Manchuria.
Finally, China's full-scale intervention and attacks in Korea forced the United
States to abandon the goal of a total victory over North Koreans or a victory
over the Chinese in Korea, since this would necessarily expand the war to
involve the Soviet Union. First and foremost, the United States wanted to
prevent Soviet intervention in Korea and over Korea, and managed to do so
throughout the war.
The policy of limited war succeeded in preventing a general war and
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This dissertation attempts to study the nature and problems of limited
war in Korea as they are reflected in United States policy and diplomacy with
respect to: (1) the decision to intervene militarily at the outbreal< of the ICorean
War; (2) the decision to cross the 38th parallel in September and October of
1950; (3) the policy on Chinese Communist intervention in Korea; and
(4) America's initial reactions and responses to Communist China's full-scale
counteroffensives in Korea from late November 1950 through February 1, 1951.
For the purpose of this study, it is determined that limited war, as
compared to all-out war, has at least four elements: (1) limited use of
available resources and weapons for the prosecution of war; (2) limited objective
with respect to a particular enemy, especially with no attempt to win a total
victory over all of the enemy forces by either destroying them or forcing
their surrender; (3) confinement of hostilities to a limited area even though
other areas may be used as bases to support war; and (4) no contact with the
forces of a real enemy in war. As war goes on, one or more of these
elements
may change in the policy with respect to a certain nation.
For a better understanding of the nature and extent of
limited war in
Korea from the beginning tlirough February 1, 1951 this study
takes the
Xlll
approach of an examination of how and why the above-mentioned policy decisions
were made. An effort is made to separate the analysis of the manner in which
policies were formulated from the assessment of why they were made, even
though both were closely connected and related. For the question of "how,
"
the viewpoint of the policy-makers, particularly at the time of their decisions,
is emphasized. Thus official documents, papers, statements, and military
histories which contain original telegrams and papers, are used and quoted as
much as possible. These are supplemented by the policy-makers' memoirs
and interviews. Special mention may be made of three recent publications:
James F. Schnabel's Policy and Directions: The First Year is the
third
volume in the series United States Armv in the Korean War , published
by the
Office of the Chief of Military History, United States
Army, Wasliington, D.C.
in 1972. This book is very valuable because it
identifies the sources of
primary materials in great detail and uses them in a rather
complete form
which often camiot be found elsewhere. Especially
significant are numerous
exchanges of telegrams and cables between
Washington and General Douglas
MacArthur's Headquarters in ToLto, and the
utilization of tiie file in the
Department of the Army regarding National Security
Council studies and the
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two
memoirs are also indispensable to
this study, though, as with all memoirs,
they must be used with care. Dean
Acheson's Presentatjh^^ and J. Lawton Collins' miMnPe^
xiv
both published in 1969, present their personal perceptions and assessments from
the viewpoints of a civilian and a military leader who had participated intimately
in the Korean policy-maldng process.
For the assessment of why certain decisions were made, various inter-
pretations and explanations by scholars and experts were consulted and assumptions
behind the policies were examined. These assumptions are not necessarily
restricted to those of which the policy-maimers were conscious. Since the time
sequence is very important for the subject under investigation, the treatment in
this study follows generally a chronological order.
A word about terminology. Since the United States Government at the
time often used "Communist China" or "the Chinese Communists'' and "Formosa"
in their public statements and official documents to refer to the People's Republic
of China and Taiwan, the less correct but more familiar terms are also used
throughout the text of this dissertation.
CHAPTER I
THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR: THE FIRST TWO DAYS
Official Commimication of the News of
the North Korean Attack
The North Korean Army invaded South Korea at four o'clock in the
morning of June 25, 1950—3:00 P.M. Eastern Daylight Saving Time, June 24,
1950, in Washington, D. C. Communist units burst across the 38th parallel
swiftly and in strength.
About six and a half hours after the attack, at 9:26 P. M. , June 24
(Washington time), the Department of State received the first official report
from the American Ambassador in Seoul, John J. Muccio, on the Korean
fighting.
Seoul, June 25, 1950
According to Korean Army reports which are partly
confirmed by Korean Military Advisory Group field advisor
reports, North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea
territory at several points this morning. Action was
initiated about 4 a. m. Ongjim was bkisted by North Korean
artillery fire. About 6 a. m. North Korean infantry commenced
crossing the [38th] parallel in the Ongjim area, Kaesong area.
^U. S. Departm.ent of State, United States Policy in the Korean
Cri sis,
1950 Far Eastern Series, No. 34, Dept. of State Publication 3922
(Washingto:
5^rnm3nt Printing Office, 1950), p. 1. Also, Harry S. Truman, Memoirs,
Vol n- Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p.
.
2and ChuDchm area and an amphibious landing was reportedly
made south of Kangnung on the east coast. Kaesong was
reportedly captured at 9 a. m. , with some ten North Korean
tanks participating in the operation. North Korean forces,
spearheaded by tanks, are reportedly closing in on Chunchon.
Details of the fighting in the Kangnimg area are unclear,
although it seems that North Korean forces may cut the
highway. I am conferring with Korean Military Advisory
Group advisers and Korean officials this morning concerning
the situation.
It would appear from the nature of the attack and the
manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-
out offensive against the Republic of Korea. 2
It was Saturday night. Some of America's most important policy-makers were
out of town. The President, Harry S. Truman, was in Independence, Missouri;
the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was at his farm in Sandy Spring,
Maryland; Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, who was also
Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military operations in the
Far East, including Korea, ^ was at his retreat cottage on the
Chespeal^e
Bay at Scientists' Cliffs, Maryland; America's chief delegate to the
United
Nations, Ambassador Warren Austin, was at his home in Burlington,
Vermont.
Among the key officials who first got hold of Ambassador Muccio's
report were the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs, Dean
Rusk, and the Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, Jr.
They met at the State




Also reprinted in U. S. Dept. of State,
TheRecor^
H'cLn, 1943-1960, Far Eastern Series 101, Dept. of State Publ-a.on
.084
^^^^^[si^^^^ I960), pp. 86-87. Also
Truman, II, 33o-31.
^Joseph Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1969), p. 6.
3Department. Dean Rusk immediately telephoned.Secretary Acheson in Sandy
Spring, Maryland and read him the text of Ambassador Muccio's cable.
Acheson regarded Muccio as an "experienced and level-headed officer, ""^
so his report carried considerable weight.'^
The telephone call from Dean Rusk to Secretary Acheson was purely
informational in nature; no recommendations were made or agreed upon.
However, they both agreed that an attack had apparently come in force imd
that the situation was "serious. "^
John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations
Affairs, and Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, were soon called to
the Department of State. When Hickerson telephoned Secretary Acheson,
Acheson asked for his recommendation. "Hickerson suggested a meeting of
the UN Security Council the next morning (Sunday) to call for a cease-fire,




^Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 19G9),
p. 402.
^See also Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision
(New York: Free
Press, 1968), pp. 91-92.
^Interview with Rusk, Aug. 22, 1955; and interview
with Acheson,
Oct. 25, 1955; see Paige, pp. 91-92.
'^Acheson, p. 402.
4The Secretary approved, and authorized Ernest Gross, Ambassador
Austin's deputy, to ask Secretary-General of the United Nations Trygve Lie to
call the Security Council.
Then Secretary Acheson telephoned President Truman in Independence:
"Mr. President, I have very serious news. The North Koreans have invaded
South Korea. Acheson reported the situation and the President's first
reaction was to get back to the capital immediately. Acheson dissuaded him from
taking a hurriedly arranged night flight and urged him to wait for a further report
next morning, when the information should be more complete, and then return
to Washington later in the day. President Truman agreed and approved Acheson 's
suggestion of holding a meeting of the UN Security Council to call for a cease-fire.
Secretary Acheson then made a call of confirmation to Hickerson.^
Meanwhile, Army duty officers in the Pentagon had notified appropriate
senior staff members, the other services, and kept in touch with the State
Department. Secretary Pace returned to his office in the Pentagon. A
special map room and message center was established, and a teletype
conference with Major General Charles A. Willoughby in Tokyo, the Far
Truman, H, 332.
Acheson, p. 404; Truman, II, 332.
5East Command's Intelligence Officer, G-2, provided further information confirming
the scale of the North Korean Attack.
North Korea's invasion of South Korea took American political and military
leaders by surprise. One of the reasons was that American intelligence evalua-
tions and estimates, prior to June 25, 1950, had all discounted the probability of
such a full-scale attack being launched in the summer of 1950, even though some
alarming reports had been received. Acheson later testified before the Senate
hearings:
Intelligence was available to the Department [of
State] prior to the 25th of June, made available by the
Far East Command, the CIA, the Department of the Army,
and by the State Department representatives here and
overseas, and shows that all these agencies were in agree-
ment that the possibility for an attack on the Korean
Republic existed at that time, but they were all in agree-
ment that its laimching in the summer of 1950 did not
appear imminent.
The view was generally held that since the Communists
had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their
objectives through guerrilla and psychological warfare,
political pressure and intimidation, such means would
probably continue to be used rather than overt military
aggression.
It was fully realized that the timing of any move in
Korea would be ordered from the Kremlin.
"Collins, p. 9.
ISee Paige, p. 98.
6Now, the same situation that existed in Korea existed in
a number of other places, where the possibility of attack existed,
but it was not believed that the attack would take place at that
time. •'2
Acheson gave an example of how an intelligence report was not believed.
On March 10, 1950, a joint weekly intelligence cable from the Commander in
Chief, Far East, noted: "Report received that People's Army will invade South
Korea in June 1950. " To that cable was attached the following:
Comment: The People's Army will be prepared to invade
South Korea by fall and possibly by spring of this year indicated
in the current report of armed-force expansion and major troop
movement at critical thirty'-eighth parallel areas. Even if future
reports bear out the present indication, it is believed civil war
will not necessarily be precipitated; so that intentions in Korea
are believed closely related to Communist program in Southeast
Asia. Seems likely that Communist overt military measures in
Korea will be held in abeyance, at least until further observations
made by Soviets of results of their program in such places as
Indochina, Burma, and Thailand. If the Soviets are satisfied
they are winning the struggle for these places they probably will
be content to wait a while longer and let South Korea ripen for
future harvest. If checked or defeated in their operations in
these countries in Asia they may divert large share of their
effort to South Korea, which could result in a People's Army
invasion of South Korea.
^^
U S Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and
Committee
on Foreign Relations, Mimnrv Situation in the Far East.
Ee^^, ^"^"^
Committ^ on Armed S^^^^^T^iT^d the Committee on Forei^
Relations, United
"senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, to Conduct an
Inquiry into
the Military Situation in the Far East and the
^-^s Surrounding «.e Re lef of
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from H-
Assignmentsm That Are^ (5
parts; Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1951),
Pt. 3, 1990-91. Hereafter
cited as Hearings.
^^Hearings, Pt. 3, 1991.
7Fifteen days after this report was sent in, the G-2 of the Far East Command
stated his conclusion on March 25, 1950:
It is believed that there will be no civil war in Korea
this spring or summer. The most probable course of North
Korean action this spring or summer is furtherance of its
attempt to overthrow the South Korean Government by the
creation of chaotic conditions in the Republic through
guerrilla activities and psychological warfare.
However, even if it had been forecast accurately to the very day of the
attack, the United States still had no plans to counter an invasion in Korea. The
15
only reaction was to evacuate U. S. nationals from Korea. This was a
significant aspect of American Policy-makers' surprise in the first few days of
the Korean War.
Perception of the Situation by America's
Policy-Malcers, Juno 25, 1950
On Sunday morning, June 25, Amry Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins was
awakened in his retreat cottage by his driver, Sergeant Ed Davis, who told him
the "startling" news: "General, the North Koreans have attacked, and you have
to get to the Pentagon as fast as you can. " In a few minutes, Collins was heading
toward Washington. He tliought of another Sunday morning when he heard word
of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He reflected:
^^
Ibid. , Pt. 3, 1991-92.
15james F. Schnabcl, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington:
Officeof the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972), p.
G5. Also, Collms,
p. 77.
8This time, unlike 1941, the United States was not
being attacked directly; we had no troops imder fire in
Korea and no commitment to come to the aid of South
Korea in the event of attack. Nonetheless, I felt certain
that we would not stand idly by in the face of this nnked
aggression against a country we had helped to liberate in
World War n from Japanese domination.
As Sergeant Davis and I rolled on toward Washington,
I thought how fortunate it was for us that the Soviets had
picked for this venture the one area in the world v/here the
United States military forces of all arms were well positioned
if we should decide to intervene. We had in Korea only a
training mission, the Korean military Advisory Group,
advisory to the newly created army of the Republic of Korea,
but in near-by Japan our Eighth Army, on occupation duty,
had four infantry divisions, with eighteen flight squadrons,
a light-bomber wing, and a troop-carrier wing of the Air
Force availabl e for support. Our Navy ships in the Far
East consisted of one cruiser, four destroyers, and a number
of amphibious and cargo vessels. We had also in the western
Pacific the more powerful Seventh Fleet, including the aircraft
carrier Valley Forge
, a heavy cruiser, and a number of
destroyers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels. All these
forces except the Seventh Fleet were under the command of
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East,
with headquarters in Tokyo. Nowhere else abroad did we have
such forces of all arms immediately available for employment.
Acheson arrived at the State Department shortly after 11:00 A.M. , June
25. The news was bad. A full-scale attack centering around a tank column
was driving toward Seoul and Kimpo airport. South Korean arms were clearly
outclassed. Acheson also learned that a cable had been received at 10:30 A. M.
'Collins, pp..l, 4.
New York Herald Tribune , June 26, 1950, p. 2; see Paige, p. 110.
'Acheson, p. 404.
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from Ambassador John Foster Dulles and Mr. John M. Allison in Japan.
Dulles had been at work for some time for the State Department on the
preparation of the peace treaty with Japan. The cable said:
It is possible that South Koreans may themselves
contain and repiilse attack, and, if so, this is the best way.
If, however, it appears they cannot do so then we believe
that US force should be used even though this risks Russian
counter moves. To sit by while Korea is overrun by un-
provoked armed attack would start disastrous chain of events
leading most probably to world war. We suggest that Security
Council might call for action on behalf of the organization
under Article 106 by the five powers or such of them asOA
are willing to respond.
Before noon, at 11:30 A.M. , officials of the Departments of State and
Defense met at the State Department to prepare recommendations for action
in the light of present knowledge and to draft a resolution for
presentation to
the UN Security Council. Secretary of the Army Pace and General
Collins
joined this group after the discussion had started.
22 Acheson arrived at the
meeting at 12:15 P. M. 23 it was an impromptu session. Department
of State
representatives outlined a plan for supporting the ROK with munitions and
^^Paige, p. 111.
^^Truman, II, 336.





equipment and with U. S. naval and air forces. 24
General Collins later Avrote that "the available records at present are
insufficient and do not make clear everything that transpired at this staff
meeting. "25 However, relevant conclusions of this State-Defense meeting
were transmitted to General MacArthur in the afternoon or early evening.
Shortly before the President arrived in Washington from his home in Missouri,
on this Simday , June 25, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a teletype conference with
General MacArthur. They notified him of the tentative plans made by Defense
and State officials to ship supplies and equipment, and to extend his responsi-
bility to include operational control of all U. S. military activities in Korea.
They said he might also be directed to commit certain forces, principally
naval and air, to protect the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area to assure the safe
evacuation of American nationals and to gain time for action on the measures
then before the United Nations. Most significantly, they alerted him to be
ready to send U. S. ground and naval forces to stabilize the combat situation
24
Report to Senate Committee on Armed Services and Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Record of Action Tal^en by JCS Relative to the U.N.




and, if feasible, to restore the 38th parallel as a boundary. This action, they
said, might be necessary, if the United Nations asked member nations to employ
Of)
military force.
Meanwhile, at 2:45 P.M. , June 25, Washington time , Acheson had tele-
phoned Truman in Independence. ^'^ Acheson reported that the UN Security
Council had been called into emergency session and he secured the President's
approval of the resolution to be introduced. He told the President that the
Security Council would probably adopt the resolution calling for a cease-fire, but
in view of the complete disregard the North Koreans and their "big allies" had
shown for the United Nations in the past, the United States had to expect that the
UN order would be ignored. Some decision would have to be made at once as to
the degree of aid or encouragement which the American Government was willing
to extend to the Republic of Korea. 29 Acheson said that additional reports had
^^Telecon, TT 3417, CINCFE and JCS 2330 Z, 25 Jun 50, see Schnabel,
p. 67; also Collins, pp. 11-12. Collins wrote that this teleconference
was with
MacArthur's Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Edward M. Almond, and his G-2, Gen
Willoughby, p. 12.
2'^Based on the Sp ecial Collection of Materials on the Korean Decision in
the Historical Office, Dept. of State (hereafter cited as SCDS), see Paige, p. 113,
Truman recalled, "Acheson's next call came through around eleven-thirty
Sunday morning I Independence time], just as we were getting ready to
sit do\vn to
an early Sunday dinner. " See Truman, H, 332. This would be 12:30
P. M.
,
Washington time. There would be a gap of about two hours and fifteen
minutes m







been received from Korea, and there was no doubt that an all-out invasion was
underway there. The President instructed Acheson to have the available people
from State and Defense meet with him at Blair House that evening and prepare
recommendations for him. ^0 xhe President informed the Secretary of State
that he was returning to Washington at once . Later he sent a message from the
plane to Acheson saying that the group should come to Blair House for a dimier
conference. Blair House was the President's temporary residence in Washington
while the White House was being reconstructed.
As President Truman was flying from Missouri to Washington for about
three hours, he "had time to think aboard the plane. " In his memoirs, he
recounted his thought at this point:
In my generation, this was not the first occasion
when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some
earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I
remembered how each time that the democracies failed
to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead.
Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini,
and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years
earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to
fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override
nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were
permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea
without opposition from the free world, no small nation
would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by
stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go
unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as
similar incidents had brought on the second world war.
30
Acheson, p. 404; Truman, II, 332.
13
It was also clear to me that the foundations and the principles
of the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked
O -1
attack on Korea could be stopped. "^^
Acheson had also conferred at the State Department with Philip Jessup,
Dean Rusk, and Doc (H. Freeman) Matthews, later joined by George Kennan.
They were now considering what the American reaction should be. Kennan took
the position that "we would have to react with all necessary force to repel this
attack and to expel the North Korean forces from the southern half of the
peninsula. " Kennan also took occasion to emphasize
. .
.on that first occasion and on a number of others,
that we would now have to talce prompt steps to assure that
Formosa, too, did not fall into Communist hands; for two
such reverses coming one on the heels of the other, could
easily prove disastrous to our prestige and to :ur entire
position in the Far East. 32
Later that afternoon, Acheson had everyone and all messages kept out c
his office for an hour or two while he "ruminated" about the situation. His
perception and estimates were recorded in his memoirs:
"Thought" would suggest too orderly and purposeful a
process. It was rather to let various possibilities, like
glass fragments in a kaleidoscope, form a series of patterns
of action and then draw conclusions from them. Our
recommendations for the President dealt with the next
twenty -four hours or so, which was as far as we could see
SlTruman, II, 332-33.




at the time. But what must we contemplate beyond that?
One possibility was that the attack woiild be called off;
the other, that it would not be. For some months, as
tensions had mounted again after the Berlin blockade, we
had run exercises on danger spots for renewed Soviet
probing of our determination. Korea was on the list but
not among the favorites. Berlin, Turkey, Greece, Iran--
all seemed spots where the balance of convenient operation
dipped in favor of the Soviets. Korea was too near major
forces and bases of ours in Japan and too far from any of
theirs to offer a tempting target, though they could have
judged our interest in it less than in the other places. But
now the attack had come there. What was likely to happen
next and how should we determine our response? It seemed
close to certain that the attack had been mounted, supplied,
and instigated by the Soviet Union and that it would not be
stopped by anything short of force. If Korean force proved
unequal to the job, as seemed probable, only American
military intervention could do it. Troops from other sources
would be helpful politically and psychologically but unimportant
militarily. My two weeks in Europe left little doubt of that.
Plainly, this attack did not amount to a casus belli
against the Soviet Union. Equally plainly, it was an open,
undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position
as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance
to the security of American-occupied Japan. To back away
from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it,
would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the
United States. By prestige I mean the shadow cast by power,
which is of great deterrent importance. Therefore, we could
not accept the conquest of this important area by a Soviet
puppet under the very guns of our defensive perimeter with
no more resistance than words and gestures in the Security
Council. It looked as though we must steel ourselves for
the use of force. That did not mean, in words used later by
General Mark Clark, that we must be prepared "to shoot the
works for victory, " but rather to see that the attack failed.
S^Acheson, p. 405.
15
In the Pentagon, Army Chief of Staff Collins was reviewing, that same
afternoon, the strength and dispositions of United States and Soviet military
forces in the Far East; the missions that had been assigned to General MacArthur
as Commander in Chief, Far East; the duties of the Korean Military Advisory
Group; the military-aid agreement with the Republic of Korea and other existing
documents applicable toihe Korean situation. At 3:00 P.M. Collins briefed
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the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force on these items.
The Involvement of the United Nations Security Council
The first reaction of the United States Governm-cnt to the North Korean
attack was to activate the United Nations into the situation on an urgent basis.
As mentioned earlier, while the reports on the Korean fighting were still
incomplete, the State Department recommended, and President Truman approved
at once over the telephone, that the United States request an
immediate meeting
of the United Nations Security Council and that the United States
introduce a
UN resolution to call for a cease-fire in Korea. This proved to be a
decisive
first step for the United States to get the United Nations
involved in the Korean
War. America would subsequently take the initiative to put
its Korean actions
within the framework of the United Nations and provide
leadership and support




Less than six hours after the United States received its first officifil
report of the North Korean attack, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, Deputy
Representative of the United States to the United Nations, was instructed to
telephone Secretary-General of the United Nations Trygve Lie, at 3:00 A.M.
on June 25, 1950, officially asking him to call an emergency session of the UN
Security Council. Gross informed Lie of an attack upon the territory of the
Republic of Korea at several points by the forces of the North Korean regime,
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which constituted "a breach of the peace and an act of aggression. " Secretary-
General Lie arranged the requested meeting for 2:00 P.M. on the same date.
At mid-morning Secretary-General Lie received a cablegram dated 25
June from the United Nations Commission on Korea reporting the latest fighting.
The report concluded:
Commission wishes to draw attention of Secretary-
General to serious situation developing which is assuming
character of full-scale war and may endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security. It suggests that he
consider possibility of bringing matter to notice of Security
Council. Commission will communicate more fully considered
recommendation later.
As a result of the request by the United States, the UN Security Council
held its meeting at 2:00 P.M. , Sunday, June 25 at Lake Success, New York.
•^^See United Nations Security Council, Official Records , Fifth Year,
473rd Meeting, June 25, 1950, No. 15, p. 1, fn 1.
^^Ibid.
, p. 2, fn 2.
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Both the message from Ambassador Gross to Lie and the cablegram from the
UN Commission on Korea to the Secretary-General were included ia the agenda.
The representative of the Soviet Union, Jacob Malik, was absent from
this meeting. He had been boycotting the Council meetings ever since his
view of Chinese representation was not accepted in early January 1950. Malik
had argued that the Chinese seat in the Security Coimcil should be taken by a
representative of the Chinese Communist government in Peking instead of by
the Chinese Nationalist representative. Malik's absence relieved the United
States of the threat of a Soviet veto at his meeting. The President of the
Security Council in the month of Jime was Sir Benegal N. Rau of India. The
representatives of the follomng countries were present at this meeting: China,
Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Ladia, Norway, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Yugoslavia. After the agenda was adopted, Secretary-
General Lie made some remarks. He recalled the action taken by the UN
General Assembly on October 21, 1949 concerning Korea. He then stated:
The report received by me from the Commission,
as well as reports from other sources in Korea, make [sic]
it plain that military actions have been undertal^en by
North Korean forces. These actions are a direct violation
of the resolution of the General Assembly [of Oct. 21, 1949]
which had been adopted by a vote of 48 to 6 with 3 abstentions,
as well as a violation of the principles of the Charter.
The present situation is a serious one and is a threat to
international peace. The Security Council is, in my
opinion, the competent organ to deal with it. I
consider
18
it the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps
necessary to re-establish peace in that area. ^'^
Before Ambassador Gross made a statement of the U. S. Government's
position, he proposed that the representative of the Republic of Korea be
permitted to sit at the Council table during consideration of the case. With
no objection, the invitation w^as quickly extended.
Gross then remarked that the ag£;ression in K^orea was "clearly a
threat to international peace and security, " and as such, it was of "grave
concern" to the United States Government. He said that the full-scale attack
by North Korean forces was "an invasion upon a State which the United Nations
itself, by action of its Genera] Assembly, has brought into beiag. " He
continued:
It is armed aggression against the Government
elected under United Nations supervision. Such an
attack strikes at the fundamental purposes of the
United Nations Charter. Such an attack openly defies
the interest and authority of the United Nations. Such
an attack, therefore, concerns the vital interest which
all the Member nations have in the Organization.
After reviewing briefly the history of the Korean problem, Gross
introduced and read the American draft resolution. This draft resolution had
been worked on by Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs








emergency session of the UN Security Council to call for a cease-fire. Both
Ambassador Gross and David Wainhouse, acting head of the Office of Political
and Security Affairs in the State Department, had also participated in the
preparation and development of the draft resolution and the speech to be
presented with it. In the afternoon of June 25, the text of the draft
resolution was read by Secretary Acheson to President Truman over the
telephone and received Presidential approval. The essence of the American
draft resolution was:
Noting with grave concern the armed invasion of
the Republic of Korea by armed forces from North
Korea,




Call upon the authorities in North Korea
(a) To cease hostilities forthwith; and




An earlier draft of the resolution would have determined that the
"armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea" con-
stituted "an unprovoked act of aggression. " However, when this draft was
See Paige, pp. 106-08.
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Ibid.
, p. 113; Acheson, p. 404.
41see United Nations Security Council, Official Records , Fifth
Year,
473rd Meeting, June 25, 1950, No. 15, p. 7.
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shown to some members of the Security Coimcil, they were not sure that the
available information had established the conclusion. Nonetheless, they were
prepared to say that it "constituted a breach of the peace. " Their preference
for this statement was strengthened upon learning that the American representative
had not yet been instructed what the U. S. course would be should the North
Koreans disregard the call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a with-
drawal of their forces to the 38th parallel as provided in the resolution. In order
42
to meet these views the change was made.
Still, as the discussion continued in the Seciirity Council meeting, some
representatives, friendly to the United States, desired further drafting changes.
After a brief recess and consultations, the Security Council finally adopted a
revised draft resolution of the United States, by a vote of 9 - 0, with Yugloslavia
abstaining. The adopted resolution read:
The Security Council,
Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its
resolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 that the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established
government having effective control and jurisdiction over
that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary
Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and
in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside;
that this Government is based on elections which were
a
valid expression of the free will of the electorate
of that
part of Korea and which were observed by the
Temporary




Mindful of the concern expressed by the General
Assembly in its resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948 and
293 (TV) of 21 October 1949 about the consequences which
might follow unless Member States refrained from acts
derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United
Nations in brtngiag about the complete independence and unity
of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described
by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report
menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea
and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military
conflict there,
Noting with grave concern the armed attack on the
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,
Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the
peace; and
I
C all s^for the immediate cessation of hostilities;
Calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw
forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel;
II
Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea:
(a) To communicate its fully considered recommenda-
tions on the situation with the least possible
delay;
(b) To observe the withdrawal of North Korean forces
to the 38th parallel;
(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the
execution of this resolution;
Calls upon all Member States to render every assistance
to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to
refrain from givmg assistance to the North Korean authorities.
The American draft resolution which Ambassador Gross first read to
the Council meeting was revised in three aspects. First,
"armed invasion of"
was changed to "armed attack on. " Second, there was inserted
a general call
^^nited Nations Security Council, Official Records , Fifth Year,
Resolutions and Decisions, 1950, pp. 4-5.
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for the "immediate cessation of hostilities" directed at both parties to the
conflict just before the resolution's specific call upon the authorities in North
Korea to withdraw to the 38th parallel. Third, one item was added to request
that the United Nations Commission on Korea also "communicate its fully
considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay. "'^'^
The President of the Security Council proposed that the next meeting be
at 3:00 P.M. , on June 27 to consider the recommendations of the Commission,




When Truman's plaie landed at Washington National Airport at about
45
7:20 P. M. , he was met by Acheson, who reported the results of the UN
Security Council meeting, and by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. They
hurried to Blair House for the dinner conference.
Secretary Johnson and General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Jomt
Chiefs of Staff, had just made a thirteen-day inspection tour of the Far East.
4:6
They returned to Washington at about noon, June 24 (Washington time). When
the news of the North Korean attack reached Washington on Saturday night,
'^'^For Gross' original draft resolution, see UN Security Council,







June 24, Secretary Johnson first received the information from one of the wire
services, about an hour or two before midaight.^'^ Soon he was alerted by a
member of his staff over the telephone. When he received a telephone call from
Army Secretary Pace
, he told Pace that he was delegating to him temporary
responsibility for acting for the Defense Department in the matter. On Sunday
morning, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley decided to meet a long-standing
commitment to participate in a military conference at Norfolk, Virginia. They
returned later in the day but too late for the meeting at the State Department
between officials of State and Defense.
The First Blair House Conference
,
June 25, 1950
Time: dinner at 7:45 P.M. followed by major discussions until about
11:00 P.M.
Present: The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretaries of the three services, all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and other State Department officials. Their names: President Harry S. Truman,









Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews,
Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff of the Army J. Lawton Collins, Chief
of Naval Operations Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Hoyt
S. Vandenberg, Under Secretary of State James E. Webb, Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for
United Nations Affairs John Hickerson, and Ambassador at Large Philip C.
en
Jessup. " It may be noted that this group included all members of the National
Security Council except the Vice President and the Chairman of the National
Security Resources Board.
While the group was waiting for dinner to be announced. Secretary
Johnson brought up the subject of the strategic importance of Formosa (Taiwan)
to the security of the United States and asked General Bradley to read a memo-
randum on Formosa which had been prepared by General MacArthur. Secretary
Acheson "recognized this as an opening gun in a diversionary argument that
Truman, H, 333; Hearings , H, 1049.
Schnabel, p. 68; fn 24 (1).
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Johnson wished to start with me. " President Truman allowed Bradley to
finish his reading but then announced that discussion of the Far Eastern situation
h^d better be postponed until after dinner.
As the major discussions began, after the dinner, President Truman
first called on Secretary Acheson to give "a detailed picture of the situation.
"
Acheson initiated the talk by reading and summarizing the messages from
Ambassador Muccio. The Secretary "gave a darkening report of great
confusion" and then read three recommendations:
1. General MacArthur should be authorized and directed
to supply Korea with arms and other equipment over and above
that already allocated under the Military Assistance Program.
2. The U. S. Air Force should be ordered to protect Kimpo
airport during the evacuation of United States dependents by
attacking any North Korean ground or air forces approaching it.
3. The Seventh Fleet should be ordered to proceed from
the Philippines north and to prevent any attack from China on
Formosa or vice versa. ^"^
At this point, President Truman "interrupted to say that the Seventh
^^Acheson, p. 406.
Acheson, p. 406; Collins, p. 13; Schnabel, p. 68; Truman, H, 333.
According to Johnson's testimony, he, later in the evening, again asked to
discuss Formosa further before taking up the Korean question. And "the only
really violent discussion Secretary Acheson and myself ever had took
place for
a moment. ... The President at that time incUcated that he would tal<e
Formosa
up later. There was no further discussion in that meeting about
Formosa until
the motion was made the next night." Hearings, Pt. 4, 2580.




Fleet should be ordered north at once but that I [Truman] wanted to withhold
making any statement until the fleet was in position. "^^ In addition to the three
recommendations that Secretary Acheson read, he also urged that military
assistance to Indochina be stepped up. ^'^
Acheson's recommendation to move the Seventh Fleet north from the
Philippines to protect Formosa from attack by Communist China was probably
in response to George Kennan's initiative and urging, rather than influenced
by MacArthur's memorandum on the strategic importance of Formosa to the
United States, which was brought back by Secretary Johnson and read by General
Bradley at the beginning of the first Blair House dinner conference. Johnson
and Bradley had not attended the meeting between officials of the Departments
of State and Defense at noon. Acheson went to this noon meeting late. And from
Collins' account and James F. Sclmabel's record of the tentative plans made
at this noon meeting, which were later transmitted to General MacArthur in a
teleconference, the subject of moving the Seventh Fleet northward to the Formosa
Strait was not mentioned. It would seem that Acheson had not known Johnson's
view on Formosa until the dinner conference. At the same time, the Secretary
^^Truman, 11, 334. In his testimony at the MacArthur hearings, Louis
Johnson stated that it was he, as Secretary of Defense, who initiated in this
meeting the recommendation to start the fleet moving north from the Philippines
and that the President agTeed immediately. See Hearings , IV, 2580-81.
Acheson, p. 406.
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of State had to have his recommendations ready before the dinner conference
started. He wrote: "When I set off to meet the President, [at the airport] I had
no plan, but my mind was pretty clear on where the course we were about to
recommend would lead and why it was necessary that we follow that course. "^^
After Acheson made his report in this first Blair House meeting, Truman
"asked each person in turn to state his agreement or disagreement and any views
r Q
he might have in addition. " "No one demurred from Acheson's recommendation. "
6
1
"The recommendations were supported with varying degrees of detail. " Sherman
and Vandenberg felt that air and naval aid alone might suffice to halt the North
Koreans, but Collins stated that "if the army of the Republic of Korea was badly
hurt, United States ground forces would be needed. "^^ Collins suggested that
MacArthur be authorized to send a survey party to Korea to determine the actual
situation and the condition of the ROK Army.
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Acheson, p. 405. For some views, based on less complete records, on
the subject of who initiated the idea of sending the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa
Strait, and why, see Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 558-59; Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as
History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 208-12; Leland M. Goodrich,
Korea: A Study of United States Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council




^^Truman, H, 335; Collins, p. 14.
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On this occasion, the military chiefs were speaking rather as individual
members of the defense establishment than presenting a formal estimate by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. All members of the Joint Chiefs emphasized the wealcness
of the American forces in the Far East and the absence of a general plan for
defending South Korea.
As the discussion continued, President Truman stated that he "did not
expect the North Koreans to pay any attention to the United Nations. This. . .
would mean that the United Nations would have to apply force if it wanted its order
obeyed. " The President also said that he regarded the North Korean attack as
a further testing of U. S. determination to prevent the spread of the Communists'
areas of domination, like their tests in Iran, Turkey, Greece and Berlin.
General Bradley said that the United States would have to draw the line
somewhere. Russia, he thought, was not yet ready for war, but in Korea they
were obviously testing America, and the line ought to be drawn now. President
Truman agreed emphatically and "expressed the opinion that the Russians were





trying to get Korea by default, gambling that we would be afraid of starting a
67
third world war and would offer no resistance. "
The President discussed with the military chiefs the likelihood of the
Soviet Union's pushing the crisis to general war. He asked for information on
Russian forces in the Far East and called for urgent study to determine what
would be needed to destroy Soviet Far East air bases if Soviet planes intervened
in Korea. President Truman also asked about the dispotion of Ameri can forces
in the Far East and how long it would take to move the Seventh Fleet from the
Philippines to the Formosa Strait, to move two or three divisions from Japan
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to Korea, and to reinforce U. S. air units in the Far East.
The President "instructed the service chiefs to prepare the necessary
orders for the eventual use of American units if the United Nations should call
70
for action against North Korea. "
The consensus of the discussion was that it was unlikely that the Soviet






military balance was more favorable to the United States and unfavorable to the
Soviet Union than it was likely to continue in the longer run. ""^1
Finally, Truman accepted Acheson 's recommendations,
"although
reserving decision on what orders to issue to the Seventh Fleet until it should
reach the Formosa Strait about thirty-six hours later and be able to carry them
out. Truman also approved the authorization for General MacArthur to send a
survey party to Korea to make a first-hand appraisal and report. General
Vandenberg was instructed to initiate a concentration of jet aircraft on Formosa.
The President added two instructions of his own to Secretary Acheson:
"to make a survey of other likely spots for Soviet strikes and to prepare a state-
ment for him to make on Tuesday (perhaps to Congress) reporting what had
been done. " Before the group broke up at about eleven o'clock. President Truman
emphasized that no statement whatever was to be made by anyone until he spoke
on Tuesday, June 27. There must be no leaks, not even background statements
73
to the press.




"^Acheson, p. 406; Schnabel, p. 69.
"^^Acheson, p. 406.
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from Dulles in Tokyo. Truman thought that Dulles, too, seemed to have little
doubt about the course of action America had to take. '^'^
Immediately after the meeting at the Blair House, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff arranged a teleconference with MacArthur. Secretaries Pace and Finletter
sat in on this conference in the Army's communications center in the Pentagon.
MacArthur was advised that the shipment of arms and equipment needed by the
ROK Army to hold the capital city of Seoul, the Kimpo airfield ^ust across the
Han River from Seoul, and the nearby port of Inchon, was to be protected by
sufficient air and navel power to ensure its safe arrival. He was directed to
employ such naval and air forces needed south of the 38th parallel to prevent
the overrunning of the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area and to ensure the safe evacuation
of American dependents and other American noncombatants. In addition, he was
told to send to Korea a survey party of selected officers to check and report
back on the military situation and how best to assist the forces of the Republic
of Korea. MacArthur was informed that the Seventh Fleet had been ordered
from the Philippines and Okinawa to Sasebo, Japan, where it would pass to
operational control of the Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Far East. In this
teleconference, MacArthur was not made responsible for all operations in Korea.
The United States Military Training Mission (Korea Military Advisory Group
Truman, H, 336.
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[KMAG]) and the actual evacuation were still being supervised by Ambassador
Muccio, acting under instructions from the State Department. ^5 Thus the Joint
Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that the Secretary of State wished
KMAG liaison officers to stay with ROK units so long as these units remained
effective fighting forces.
General MacArthur was not placed in command of all U. S. military
activities in Korea until June 27, when his survey group entered Korea. '^'^
Summary
The response of America's policy-makers to the North Korean attack
in the first two days consisted mainly of two important steps: (1) commit the
United States to United Nations action by pressing for immediate adoption of the
UN Security Council resolution of June 25, 1950 to deal with the Korean
situation; (2) move the U.S. Seventh Fleet northward from the Philippines with
a view to protecting Formosa from Chinese Communist attack. Other measures,
such as the evacuation of American nationals and the provision of arms to the
Republic of Korea, were somewhat routine in nature.
'^^Collins, p. 15; Schnabel, pp. 69-70; Truman, H, 335-36.
"^^Schnabel, p. 70.
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Collins, pp. 15, 17; Schnabel, p. 71. Louis Jolinson testified that it
was toward the end of the Monday night conference at Blair House that he initiated
the proposal of putting General MacArthur in charge. See Hearings, Pt. 4, 2574.
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The United States could have acted alone in Korea without bringing in
the United Nations, since the attack was a direct challenge to the prestige of
the United States as the protector of South Korea. On the other hand, the
authority and the interest of the United Nations were also at stalce. There had
to be a response from the United Nations, too. Nevertheless, if the United
States had not taken the initiative and leadership in the United Nations for a
collective action, it was doubtful that the United Nations could respond, as it
did, with speed and confidence. The United Nations was only 5 years old at
the time and since the start the United States had been committed to trying
to mal^e the UN work as the Charter provided. Thus America's firm commit-
ment to UN action on Korea right from the beginning of the conflict would
vitalize the world body in its purpose of maintaining international peace and
security. At the same time the legal and moral position of the United States
with respect to Korea would be greatly strengthened by this commitment to
collective United Nations action. Subsequent U. S. actions in Korea would
follow in the same direction.
Soon after Ambassador Muccio in Korea reported "an all-out offensive
against the Republic of Korea," State Department official, Hickerson,
recommended the call for an emergency session of the United Nations Security
Council. Acheson and Truman promptly approved it. The Security Council
resolution of June 25 sponsored by the United States, callmg for a cease-fire
and calling upon the North Korean authorities to withdraw their armed forces
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to the 38th parallel, was adopted with the key absence of the Soviet delegate
from the Security Council meeting. The Soviet Union could have vetoed it.
It would seem that the State Department, rather than the Defense
Department, took the initiative to recommend the movement of the seventh
Fleet to prevent any attack from Communist China on Formosa or vice versa.
This action ran parallel to General MacArthur's view, supported by General
Bradley and Secretary of Defense Johnson, that Formosa was strategically
important to the security of the United States.
The North Korean attack was perceived by both Acheson and Truman
in the context of the Soviet Union's world-wide aggressive intentions and
ambitions, and in light of previous Communist challenges in Iran, Turkey,
Greence and Berlin. Even though U. S. military intervention in Korea was
not contemplated at this point, Dulles, Acheson and Truman had all considered
the possibility of the need to use American forces in Korea in conjunction with
United Nations efforts. Thus instructions were issued to plan for such an
eventuality.
CHAPTER II
UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION IN KOREA
The Second Blair House Conference and the
Decision to Intervene with U. S. Navy and Air Force s
South of the 38th Parallel
On Monday, June 26, reports from Korea continued to picture a de-
teriorating situation, forecasting the early fall of Seoul. ^ Acheson engaged in
a series of conferences with his advisers and with Department of Defense officers
throughout the day. He had a conversation with Counselor George F. Kennan on
overall Soviet intentions. According to Kennan, all the evidence available at
this time seemed to point to the conclusion that the North Korean invasion v/as
a "local affair, " not connected to a wider pattern and not indicative of a Soviet
desire to precipitate a third world war. Kennan and Charles Bohlen, both
experienced diplomats on Soviet affairs, also "bet" against the presence of a
Russian at the UN Security Council meeting on June 27. ^
After lunch, Acheson accompanied the South Korean Ambassador, who








Korea, Syngman Rhee, to Truman. The President told the Korean Ambassador
that "help was on the way.
At the State Department, a new resolution was drafted for the UN Security
Council. Later in the afternoon, Acheson wanted to be alone and completed a
draft paper at 6:30 P. M.
,
which eventually became the statement of the President,
issued on June 27 without any significant change. ^
After dinner and further conferences with State and Defense officers,
Acheson telephoned the President that "the" situation in Korea was becoming so
desperate that he would wish to hear about it firsthand and instruct us further.




The same group who attended the first conference on Sunday night was
again present except Navy Secretary Francis Matthev/s, while Deputy Under
Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews took the place of Under Secretary Webb.
First, General Bradlej^ presented General MacArthur's most recent
7
assessment of the battle condition:
4
Truman, E, 336; Acheson, p. 407.
5
Acheson, p. 407; Paige, p. 151.
6
Acheson, p. 407.
"^Beverly Smith, "The White House Story: Wliy We Went to War in Korea,
"
Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 10, 1951, p. 80. Also Collins, p. 15.
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. . .
Piecemeal entry into action vicinity Seoul by
South Korean Third and Fifth Divisions has not succeeded
in stopping the penetration recognized as the enemy main
effort for the past 2 days with intent to seize the capital
city of Seoul. Tanks entering suburbs of Seoul. Govt,
transferred to south and commvmication with part of KMAG
opened at Taegu. Ambassador and Chief KMAG remaining
in the city. FEC mil survey group en route to Korea has
been recalled, under this rapidly deteriorating situation.
South Korean units unable to resist determined
Northern offensive. Contributing factor exclusive enemy
possession of tanks and fighter planes. South Korean
casualties as an index to fighting have not show adequate
resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate
is that a complete collapse is imminent. ^
This message from MacArthur was alarming to Truman. He felt: "There
was now no doubt! The Republic of Korea needed help at once if it was not to
be overrun. The conferees agreed that the ROK Army was apparently in a
"rout"^'^ and would not be able to protect Seoul and Inchon and the Kimpo air-
field, from which Americans were being evacuated by sea and air. "More
seriously, " Truman thought, "a Communist success in Korea would put Red
troops and planes within easy striking distance of Japan, and Oldnawa and
12
Formosa would be open to attack from two sides. "
Truman, H, 337.
^Ibid.




The President told his advisers that what was developing in Korea
seemed to him like a repetition on a larger scale of what had happened in
Berlin: "The Reds were probing for weakness in our armor; we had to meet
their thrust without getting embroiled in a world-wide war. "-''^
The weight of opinion in the conference was that the invasion of South
Korea was part of a Soviet strategic master plan. ^'^ In response to Truman's
request for suggestions, Acheson recommended:
1. The Air Force and Navy should give all-out support
to the Korean forces, for the time being confining their efforts
to south of the 38th parallel.
2. The Seventh Fleet should be ordered to prevent an
attack on Formosa, the Nationalists told not to attack the
mainland, and the Fleet told to prevent their doing so, if
necessary.
3. U. S. forces in the Philippines should be strengthened
and aid to Philippine forces accelerated.
4. Aid to Indochina should be increased and we should
propose to the French that we send a strong military mission.
5. If the President approved the foregoing, he should
issue the statement I had prepared as directed and which
included actions recommended.
6. At the Security Council meeting called for the next
morning [sic] we should propose a new resolution (which
Hickerson read) calling on UN members to give Korea such
help as might be needed to repel the armed attack and
restore peace in the area. If Malik returned to the Security
Council and vetoed the resolution, we v/ould have to carry on
under the existing one. If he did not return, it would pass
without opposition.
Ibid.
'^^Based on SCDS, see Paige, p. 171.
l^Acheson, pp. 407-08.
39
No objection was raised to Acheson's recommendations and President Truman
promptly approved them. "The Army officers present doubted whether naval
and air support could save the Korean forces, though the Navy and Air Force
view was more optimistic. If it became necessary to commit ground forces
in Korea, they thought some degree of mobilization might become necessary.
The President asked that this be given immediate study. "
State Department records of the conference reportedly indicate that the
danger of all-out war was "not seriously' discussed" and was "not a deterrent
factor" in the decisions that were talcen.
Orders to carry out the decisions of the second Blair House conference
1
8
were issued at once and were immediately carried out. It was also decided
that there would be a meeting with congressional leaders on Tuesday morning,
»
June 27, to "inform them on the events and the decisions of the past few days.
'
20
After an hour, the meeting at Blair House adjourned. Within a few
minutes after adjournment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called General MacArthur
16
Acheson, p. 408; see also Paige, pp. 165-^56.




^^Schnabel, p. 73; Paige, p. 179.
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into teleconference. They removed restrictions against air and naval operations
against North Korean military targets below the 38th parallel. They informed
him about the new missions of the U. S. Seventh Fleet in Formosan waters.
They urged him to spread the news that American help was on the way to
South Korea in order to maintain South Korean morale. ^^ MacArthur's mission
was "to throw the North Koreans out of South Korea. "^^
On Tuesday morning, June 27, Truman and his advisers from the
State and Defense Departments met with congressional leaders. Nine Demo-
crats and five Republicans from Capitol Hill attended the meeting. Included
were Senate majority leader Scott W. Lucas of Illinois, House speaker Sam
Raybum of Texas, House majority leader John W. McCormack of Massachusetts.
From the Senate Foreign Relations Committee came its chairman. Senator
Tom Connally of Texas, and Senators H. Alexander Smith, Republican of
New Jersey; Elbert D. Thomas, Democrat of Utali; and Alexander Wiley,
Republican of Wisccnsin. On behalf of the Senate Armed Services Committee
^""Telecon, TT 3426, CINCFE and JCS, 270217 Z June 50, see Schnabel,
p. 73; see also Paige, pp. 184-86.
See Paige, p. 181. MacArthur was evidently given full responsibility
of all U. S. military activities in Korea from this time onward. See Louis
Johnson's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 4, 2574; also David Rees, Korea: The
Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 23; Walter Millis,
Arms and the State (New York; Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 262.
MacArthur's mission was again referred to on June 30 as "clearing South
Korea of North Korean forces. " See Hearings, Pt. 2, 1012.
41
came its chairman, Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, and Senator Styles
Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire. Representing the House Foreign
Affairs Committee were its chairman, Representative John Kee of West
Virginia; Representative Charles A. Eaton, Republican of New Jersey; and
Representative Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana. From the House Armed
Services Committee came its chairman. Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia,
and Representative Dewey Short, Republican of Missouri.
Truman asked Acheson to summarize the situation. Acheson reviewed
the desperate military situation and the necessity to take strong measure to
repel the aggression. He reminded the congressional leaders that aggression
unopposed would surely lead to World War HI. This was the crux of the problem,
he conclud,ed. "But Dean, you didn't even mention the U. N. !" the President
24
exclaimed as Acheson finished his remarks.
Truman then "pointed out that it was the United Nations which had acted
in this case and had acted with great speed. " He then read the statement
25
"which had already been prepared for release to the press later that day.
"
^^Paige, p. 187; Truman, II, 338; Acheson, p. 408. Both Truman and
Acheson also included Senator Walter F. George in the list. He was a Democrat
of Georgia in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
24
Interview with a participant, see Paige, p. 188.
Truman, H, 338.
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In Korea, the Government forces, which were armed
to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security,
were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The
Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading
troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel.
This they have not done but, on the contrary, have pressed
the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of
the United Nations to render every assistance to the United
Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circum-
stances, I have ordered United States air and sea forces to
give the Korean Government troops cover and support.
The attack upon Korea malces it plain beyond all doubt
that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to
conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion
and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of
the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and
security. In these circumsttmces, the occupation of Formosa
by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security
of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing
their lawful and necessary functions in that area.
Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent
any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am
calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all
air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh
Pleet will see that this is done. Tlie determination of the
future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security
in tlie Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration
by the United Nations.
I have also directed that United States forces in the
Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the
Philippine Government be accelerated.
I have similarly directed acceleration in the fumishmg
of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated
States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to
provide close worldng relations with those forces.
I know that all members of the United Nations vdll
consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression
in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations.
A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have
far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to
uphold the rule of law.
43
I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the represen-
tative of the United States to the Security Council, to report
these steps to the Council.
Truman then asked for the views of the congressional leaders. "Various
questions about military dispositions were asked and answered by the Chiefs,
including the fact that no ground forces had yet been committed. "^"^ Senator
Smith commented that "in Korea we would act as members of the U.N. rather
than as a single nation. " The President said this was correct but pointed out,
"so far as our action concerned Formosa, we were acting on our own and not
on behalf of the U. N. "28
There was also some discussion of the proposed Security Council
resolution. Acheson pointed out that since the U. S. S. R. had not yet publicly
committed itself, the United States was careful not to "engage" Soviet prestige
at this time. Congressman Eaton inquired whether the United States was now
committed to defend South Korea. "The President answered yes, as a member
of the United Nations and in response to the Security Council's resolutions. "^^
When the question was asked about help from other nations, Acheson replied that
Dept. of State Bulletin (Jul 3, 1950), p. 5; Also Truman, n, 338-39.
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Acheson, p. 409; see also Collins, pp. 16-17.
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not much could be expected since others either had their hands full, like the
French, or had little to spare.
At the conclusion of the meeting with the congressional leaders, the
prepared statement by Truman was released to the press around noon.
Prior to the release of the Presidential statement, President Chiaag
Kai-shek of the Republic of China on Formosa was notified of America's
decision concerning Formosa. On June 28, Formosan time, the Nationalist
Government announced its agreement.
The United States also informed and explained to her allies and friends
abroad about the actions that had been taken.
President Truman's public statement on June 27 was based upon a
fundamental assumption that the attack from North Korea was not an isolated
event, but was part of an overall attempt of global "communism" to "conquer
independent nations" by force. Thus, to help South Korea, even with air and
sea forces, was not enough. Formosa, Indochina, and the Philippines all
had to be defended against Communist forces. The belief was that Communist




See Paige, p. 184.
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See Truman, II, 339-40; Paige, pp. 191-92.
45
to realize a bigger master plan, which would be a threat to the security of
the U. S. and the free world, as well as a breach of international peace and
security.
Communist China reacted immediately and Gtrongly to President
Truman's statement of June 27, especially with regard to Formosa. In
Peking Foreign Minister Chou En-lai released a statement on June 28:
On behalf of the Central People's Government of
the People's Republic of China, I declare that Truman's
statement of June 27, and the actions of the American
Navy, constitute aggression against tlie territory of
China, and a total violation of the United Nations Charter.
. .
All that Truman's statement does is openly expose
his premeditated plan and put it into practice. In fact,
the attack by the puppet Korean government of Syngman
Rhee on the Korean Democratic People's Republic at the
instigation of the U. S. Government was a premeditated
move by the United States, designed to create a pretext
for the United States to invade Taiwan, Korea, Viet Nam
and the Philippines.
. .
... no matter what obstructive action the U. S.
imperialists may tals:e, the fact that Taiwan is part of China
will remain unchanged forever. This is not only an
historical fact— it has also been confirmed by the Cairo and
Potsdam declarations and by the situation since the surrender
of Japan. All the people of our country will certainly fight
to the end single -mindedly to liberate Taiwan from the
grasp of the American agi>ressors.'^^
33
Extract, New China News Agency, June 29, 1950. Cited in Sino-
Amerioan Relations, 1949-71
,
documented and introduced by Roderick
MacFarquhar (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972), pp. 83-84.
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On June 27 in Moscow, American Ambassador Alan G. Kirk had
communicated a note to Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko:
My Government has instructed me to call your
attention to the fact that North Korean forces have crossed
the 38th parallel and invaded the territory of the Republic
of Korea in force at several points. The refusal of the
Soviet Representative to attend the Security Council meeting
on June 25, despite the clear threat to peace and the
obligations of a Security Council member under the Charter
requires the United States to bring this matler directly to
the attention of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. In view of the universally known fact of the
close relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the North Korean regime, the United States Government
asks assurance that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
disavows responsibility for this unprovoked and unwarranted
attack, and that it will use its influence with the North
Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces
immediately. ^'^
Later the same day, the State Department told the press of the content of
this note to the Soviet Union. ^ Even though the note signified a direct approach
to the Soviet Union, the State Department did not expect significant results from
it. America's policy concerning Korea was still focused on the United Nations.
34
Dept. of State, U. S. Policy in the Korean Crisis
, p. 65. This
note was drafted on June 25,
"
^^Dept. of State Bulletin (Jul 3, 1950) , p. 5; Acheson, p. 410.
^^See Paige, pp. 201-02.
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The United Nations Security Council Resolution
of June 27 , 1950
The UN Security Council met at 3:00 P. M.
,
Tuesday, June 27. The
representative of the Soviet Union was again absent from the meeting. The
Council had received four cablegrams from the UN Commission on Korea, which
were all dated June 26. One of them (S/1505) was a summary report on back-
ground events, preceding the outbreak of hostilities on June 25.^'^ Another
cablegram (S/1504) expressed "unanimous gratification at Securitj^ Council
move," but pointed out that the Com^tnission's "efforts to contact North during
last eighteen months met only with negative response. "^^
Still another cablegram (S/1503) stated:
North Korean advances have created dangerous situation
with possibilities of rapid deterioration. Impossible estimate
situation which will exist tomorrow in Seoul. In view Commission's
past experience and existing situation Commission convinced
North Korea will not heed Council resolution nor accept UNCOK
good offices. Suggest have Council give consideration either
invitation both parties agree on neutral mediator to negotiate
peace or requesting Member Governments undertake immediate
mediation. Commission decided stand by in Seoul. Danger is
that critical operations now in progress may end in matter of
days and question of cease fire and withdrawal North Korean
forces suggested Council resolution prove academic. ^9
The texi-. of the last report (S/1507) from the Commission followed:
S7
See UN Security Council, Offical Records, Supplement for June-Aug.
1950, pp. 23-26.
^^UN Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year 474th Mtg. , June
27, 1950, No. 16, p. 2.
^^Ibid.
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Commission met this morning 10 o'clock and considered
latest reports on hostilities and results direct observation along
parallel by UNCOK military observers over period ending forty-eight
hours before hostilities began. Commission's present view on
basis this evidence is first that, judging from actual progress
of operations, Northern Regime is carrying out well-planned,
concerted and full-scale invasion of South Korea; secondly,
that South Korean forces were deployed on wholly defensive
basis in all sectors of the parallel; and thirdly, that they were
taken completely by surprise as they had no reason to believe
from intelligence sources that invasion was imminent.
Commission is following events and will report further develop-
ments. '^^
Ambassador Austin, before introducing a new American draft resolution.
remarked:
We now have before us the report of the United Nations
Commission for Korea, which confirms our fears. It is clear
that the authorities in North Korea have completely disregarded
and flouted the decision of the Security Council. ... It is the
plain duty of the Security Council to invoke stringent sanctions
to restore international peace. '^•^
He then read the prepared draft resolution and the statement by Truman, which
had been released earlier at noon ia Washington.
The Security Council adopted the draft resolution of the United States by
seven votes to one (Yugoslavia), Egypt and India not voting, since neither
delegation could obtain instruction from their government in time. Later India
announced its acceptance of this resolution, and Egypt said that it would have
Fold.
^^Official Records, 474th Meeting, No. 16, pp. 3-4.
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abstained from voting had the Egyptian representative been able to participate
in the voting.
Following is the text of the adopted resolution of June 27
:
The Security Council
Having determined that the armed attack upon the
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitute
a breach of the peace,
Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities,
Having called upon the authorities in North Korea to
withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel.
Having noted from the report of the United Nations
Commission on Korea that the authorities in North Korea have
neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to
the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are
required to restor international peace and security.
Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to
the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure
peace and security,
Recommends that the Members of the United Nations
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international
peace and security in the area."^^
As Acheson later analyzed the resolution, "the words were not pregnant with
significance in themselves. " They had been taken from Article 42 of the United
Nations Charter, which empowered the Security Council, if it found "the existence
of. . . any breach of the peace or act of aggression"--as it had here--to "take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
^^
Official Records, 475th Meeting, Jun 30, 1950, No. 17, pp. 2-3.
'^''^83 (1950), S/1511, Official Records , Fifth Year, Resolutions and
Decisions, p. 5.
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restore international peace and security. "44 ^hus the resolution was subject
to interpretations. In General Collins' view, it "confirmed actions already
taken by the United States and laid the groundwork for subsequent United
States moves and the later active participation of other member countries. "45
The explicit recommendation of military assistance to repel the armed
attack in the new resolution was a stronger measure against the North Korean
forces than the urging of a cease-fire and troop withdrawal in the June 25
resolution. The Soviet Union could have helped the North Koreans, at least
legally and diplomatically, by vetoing the Security Council resolution of June
27. Yet, once more, the continued absence of the Soviet representative from
the Coimcil meeting enabled the United States to press successfully for a stronger
UN resolution. America's position had also been strengthened by the judgment
of the UN Commission on Korea in their report to the United Nations on June
26 that the North Korean regime was carrying out "well-planned, concerted
and full-scale invasion of South Korea. "





Collins, p. 16; see also Sclinabel, pp. 73-74.
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The international communist bloc later charged that
the South Korean Army had invaded North Korea, thus
triggering a North Korean counter-attack. Two documents
captured following the fall of North Korea have been
authenticated as official attack orders issued by North
Korean military authorities to their commanders several days
before the assault. Both documents, Reconnaissance Order
No. 1, issued in Russian to the Chief of Staff of the North
Korean 4th Division and discovered in Seoul on 4 October 1950,
and Operations Order No. 4, North Korean 4th Division, were
'
issued on 22 June 1950. See ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts,
Issue 2. (Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression),
Part 2.46
Also, in the Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea covering
the period from December 15, 1949 to September 4, 1950, which was trans-
mitted to the United Nations General Assembly on September 4, 1950, the
finding of the Commission with regards to the fact of aggression was:
The events now taking place in Korea did not breal^ out
on 25 June as the result of a provocative attack by the troops
of the Republic of Korea, much less as a result of the launching
of an invasion force across the parallel by the Republic of Korea,
as has been alleged. The Commission, having had free access
to all areas in South Korea, has been at all times aware of the
military situation in the South. Particularly regarding the
period immediately preceding the invasion, the Commission had
before it the report, referred to in paragraph 8 above, which
was submitted by the Commission's field observers on 24 Jmie 1950.
The team was composed of two observers, Squadi^on Leader
R. J. Rankin, RAAF, and Major F. S. B. Peach, RAI. . . .
The report of the observers was completed on 24 June
1950, the eve of the invasion from the North. The events of
the following day conferred upon the observation regarding
the defensive positions of the South Korean forces a significance
of which the observers when they drafted tlieir report could not
46
Schnabel, p. 61, fn 1, (2).
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have been aware. This very imawareness gives to their
observations a special value, which the Commission has
taken into due consideration.
. .
On the basis of this report and of its Imowledge of the
general military situation, the Commission is unanimously
of the opinion that no offensive could possibly have been
launched across the parallel by the Republic of Korea on
25 June 1950.47
Further, the conclusion of the report of the UN Commission on Korea
stated in part:
The invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea
by the armed forces of the North Korean authorities, which
began on 25 June 1950,- was aa act of aggression initiated
without warning and without provocation, in execution of a
carefully prepared plan.
The Deteriorating Situation and the Extension of
Air and Naval Operations to North Korea
On Wednesday afternoon, June 28, Truman held a meeting of the
National Security Council. He told the departments concerned that he wanted
a complete restudy made of all U. S. policies in areas adjoining the U. S. S.R.
See UN General Assembly, Official Records
,
Fifth Session, Supp.
No. 16 (A/1350), p. 4.
48
See Ibid.
, p. 32. For a view which raises questions about common
explanations on the outbrealc of the war, see I. F. Stone, The Hidden History
of the Korean War
,
2nd ed. (New York: Montlily Review Press, 1969), pp.
1-66; 349-52. For some recent discussion, see Karunalmr Gupta, "How Did
the Korean War Begin?" China Quarterly
,
No. 52 (Oct-Dec. 1972), pp. 699-
716; and three comments on the article and Gupta's replies in China Quarterly
,
No. 54 (Apr-June 1973), pp. 354-68. For the problem of defining "aggression"
in international law, especially in the context of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial,
see Richard H. Minear, Victors' Justice (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,
1971), pp. 55-60.
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Acheson pointed out that "we could not count on the continuance of
the enthusiastic support that our staunch attitude in Korea had evoked in the
country and in the world. Firm leadership would be less popular if it should
involve casualties and taxes "^^ "For what had been done in the last three
days might ultimately involve us in all-out war. "^^
Acheson's purpose was to prepare for criticism and hard sledding.
But the President replied "that the danger involved was obvious but that we
should not back out of Korea unless a military situation elsewhere demanded
such action.
Army Secretary Pace reported that instructions had been issued to
military intelligence to be alert for any evidence of Soviet participation in
the Korean fighting. Pace asked if there were any other special intelligence
targets. President Truman thought that Soviet activities in the vicinity of
Yugoslavia, in Bulgaria especially, and in the vicinity of northern Europe
52
should be given special attention.
49
Acheson, p. 411. For examples of public reactions to Truman's
announcement of June 27, see Paige, pp. 193-201 and Eric F. Goldman,
The Crucial Decade and After: America, 1945-60 (New York: Random House,





On the Korean front, the capital city of Seoul fell to the North Korean
forces by the nightfaU of June 28 (Korean time). ^3 At the same time, Major
General John H. Church, who had entered Korea as head of MacArthur's survey
group, was convinced that below Seoul a reasonable defense of the Han River line
from the south bank could be held for a while by the ROK Army. But if the 38th
parallel were to be restored, he believed, American ground forces would have to
be used. That evening, he radioed tliis opinion to General MacArthur together
with an admittedly fragmentary report of the situation. ^'^ MacArthur decided to
fly to Korea on June 29 (Korean time) in order to judge personally the military
situation and to bolster the sagging ROK Army morale.
During the flight to Korea, according to Lt. Colonel Anthony F. Story,
MacArthur's pilot, at about 0800, June 29 (Korean time). General MacArthur
dictated a radiogram to Major General Earl E. Partridge, commanding FEAF in
Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer's absence. General Stratemeyer,
who was aboard with MacArthur, wrote it out and handed it to Story to send by
the plane's radio. The order said: "Partridge from Stratemeyer. Take out
North Korean airfields immediately. No publicity. MacArthur approves. "
^^Schnabel, p. 71.
^"^Schnabel, p. 72; Collins, p. 18; Acheson, p. 411.
^^Schnabel, p. 74; Collins, p. 18.
^^Roy E. Appleman, South to Naldong, North to the Yalu (Washington:
Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 19G0), p. 44.
Also Schnabel, p. 77, fn 51; Collins, p. 18.
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The bombing action was taken twenty-four hours before MacArthur received
such authorization from the JCS, with the President's approval.
MacArthur and his party landed at Suwon Airfield. They met with
General Church, Ambassador Muccio, President Syngman Rhee, and Chief of
Staff of the ROK Army, General Chae Byong Duk. Then MacArthur insisted on
driving up to the south bank of the Han River below Seoul, where they could see
the enemy firing from the city at targets near them. On the trip to and from the
Han River, MacArthur saw thousands of refugees and disorganized ROK soldiers
moving away from the battle area. MacArthur retiirned to Suwon Airfield and
57departed about 1600 the same day for Japan.
In Washington, on June 29, reports reaching the Joint Chiefs of Staff
direct from the Far East were so threatening that Secretary Johnson, who kept
in touch with the situation, advised the President at noon that further United
States action might be necessary. President Truman called a meeting of the
58
"Blair House Group" for 5:00 P.M.
At the meeting, Johnson introduced a proposed directive to MacArthur.
After some discussion, the approved directive, which was received by the Far
57
Schnabel, p. 74; Appleman, p. 45.
^^Collins, p. 19: Smith, p. 86; Ache son, p. 411. Truman characterized
this meeting as a National Security Coimcil meeting, attended also by Chairman
Symington of the National Security Resources Board and Executive Secretary
Lay ofVe NSC staff; see Truman, II, 341; Paige, pp. 244-45; Smith, p. 86.
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East Commander on June 30, Tokyo time, authorized him to (1) employ U. S.
Army service forces in South Korea to maintain communications and other
essential services; (2) employ Army combat and service troops to ensure the
retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan-Chinhae; (3) employ
naval and air forces against military target/s in North Korea but to stay well
clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union; (4) defend Formosa
through naval and air action against invasion by the Chinese Communists and,
conversely, prevent Chinese Nationalists from using Formosa as a base of
operations against the Chinese mainland; (5) send to Korea any supplies and
munitions at his disposal and submit estimates for amounts and types of aid
required outside his control. It also assigned the Seventh Fleet to MacArthur's
operational control, and indicated that naval commanders in the Pacific would
support and reinforce him as necessary and practicable. The directive ended
with a statement that the instructions did not constitute a decision to engage in
war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervened in Korea, but that there
was full realization of the risks involved in the decisions with respect to Korea.
"If Soviet forces actively oppose our operations in Korea, your forces should
defend themselves, should take no action to aggravate the situation and you
should report the situation to Washington.
See Appleman, p. 46; Schnabel, pp. 76-77; Collins, pp. 19-20.
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While discussing Johnson's proposal, Truman felt that the fmal
paragraph of the draft directive "permitted an implication that we were planning
to go to war against the Soviet Union. " The President "stated categorically
that I did not wish to see even the slightest implication of such a plan. I
wanted to take every step necessary to push the North Koreans back behind the
38th parallel. But I wanted to be sure that we would not become so deeply
committed in Korea that we could not take care of such other situations as might
develop. "^^ The President also pointed out that "operations above the 38th
parallel should be designed only to destroy military supplies, for I wanted it
clearly understood that our operations in Korea were designed to restore peace
there and to restore the border. " Acheson stated that the Air Force should not
be restricted in its tasks by a rigid application of the 38th parallel as a re-
straining line, but he wanted to be sure that precautions would be taken to keep
the air elements from going beyond the boundaries of Korea. Acheson also
su^ested what MacArthur should do in case of Soviet intervention. The
President accepted this suggestion.
Acheson reviewed the reply from the Soviet Union concerning America's




Moscow had been read the following statement by Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko earlier in the day, June 29:
In connection with the statement of the Government of
the United States of America transmitted by you on June 27,
the Soviet Government has instructed me to state the following:
1. In accordance with facts verified by the Soviet
Government, the events taldng place in Korea were provoked
by an attack by forces of the South Korean authorities on border
regions of North Korea. Therefore the responsibility for these
events rests upon the South Korean authorities and upon those
who stand behind their back.
2. As is known, the Soviet Government v/ithdrew its
troops from Korea earlier than the Government of the United
States and thereby confirmed its traditional principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states. And now
as well the Soviet Government adheres to the principle of the
impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the
internal affairs of Korea.
3. It is not true that the Soviet Government refused to
participate in meetings of the Security Council. In spite of its
full willingness, the Soviet Government had not been able to
take part in the meetings of the Security Council in as much as,
because of the position of the Government of the United States,
China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has not
been admitted to the Council which has made it impossible for
the Security Council to take decisions having legal force.
Acheson expressed the belief that a statement which had been released
in Peking, talcen together with the Russian reply, seemed to indicate that while
the Chinese Communists might intervene, the Russians would not. Truman
said, "That means that the Soviets are going to let the Chinese and the North
62
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Koreans do their fighting for them. "63 ^cheson suggested, and Truman
approved, the public release, on June 29, of America's note to the U. S. S. R.
and the latter 's reply.
Shortly after the meeting on June 29, Acheson returned to the Wliite
House. Among other things, he and the President discussed an offer by
President Chiang Kai-shek to contribute 33,000 Nationalist ground troops to
the Korean action, to be transported and supplied by the United States. Truman
told Acheson that his first reaction was to accept this offer because he wanted
to see as many of the members of the United Nations as possible take part in
the Korean action. Acheson argued against it on the ground that these troops
would be much more useful defending Formosa than Korea. The President
asked the Secretary to bring up the matter the next day at a meeting with the
Defense Secretary and the Joint Chiefs.
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General MacArthur's Recommendations and the Commitment
of U. S. Ground Combat Forces to Korea
A message from General MacArthur concerning the result of his
personal visit to Korea reached Washington an hour before midnight on June
29.^^ It stated:
I have today inspected the South Korea battle area from
Suwon to the Han River. My purpose was to reconnoiter at
first hand the conditions as they exist and to determine the
most effective way to further support our mission.
The South Korean forces are in confusion, have not
seriously fought, and lack leadership. Organized and equipped
as a light force for maintenance of interior order, they were
unprepared for attack by armor and air. Conversely, they
are incapable of gaining the initiative over such a force as
that embodied in the North Korean Army.
The Korean Army had made no preparations for a defense
in depth, for echelons of supply or for a supply system. No
plans had been made, or if made, not executed for the
destruction of supplies or material in event of a retrograde
movement. As a result, they have either lost or abandoned
their supplies and heavier equipment and have absolutely no
means of intercommunication. In most cases, the individual
soldier, in his flight to the south, has retained his rifle or
carbine . They are gradually being gathered up in rear areas
and given some semblance of organization by an advanced group
of my officers I have sent over for this purpose. Without
artillery, mortars and anti-tank gims, they can only hope to
retard the enemy through the fullest utilization of natural
obstacles and under the guidance of example of leadership of
high quality.
The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly and prosperous,
according to their scale of living. They have retained a high
degree of national spirit and firm belief in the Americans. The
roads leading south from Seoul are crowded with refugees




South Korean military strength is estimated at not more
than 25,000 effectives. North Korean military forces are as
previously reported, backed by considerable strength in armor
and a well-trained, well-directed and aggressive air force
equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that this force
has been built as an element of comm.unist military aggression.
I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a
flow of supplies through the air-head at SUWON and in the southern
port of PUSAN. The air-head is most vital, but is subject to
constant air-attack. Since air-cover must be maintained over
all aircraft transporting supplies, equipment and personnel, this
requirement operates to contain a large portion of my fighter
strength. North Korean air, operating from near-by bases, has
been savage in its attacks in. Suwon area.
It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus
will threaten the overrimning of all Korea. Every effort is being
made to establish a Han River line but the result is highly
problematical. The defense of this line and the Suwon- Seoul
corridor is essential to the retention of the only air-head in
central Korea.
The Korean Army is entirely incapable of counter- action
and there is grave danger of a further breakthrough. If the enemy
advance continues much further it will seriously threaten the fall
of the Republic.
The only assurance for the holding of the present lins , and
the ability to regain later the lost ground is through the introduction
of US Ground Combat Forces into the Korean battle area. To
continue to utilize the Forces of our air and navy without an effective
ground element cannot be decisive.
If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a United
States Regimental Combat Team to the reinforcement of the vital
area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two-
division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-
offensive.
Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-
Navy-Air team in this shattered area, our mission will be
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needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worst it
might even be doomed to failure.
Army Chief of Staff Collins received this message, number C 56942, about
midnight, June 29-30, Washington time. "I was so concerned by the critical
situation it depicted and the urgency of MacArthur's request that I arranged for
a teleconference with General MacArthur at about 3:00 A. M. Washington time,
June 30 (5:00 P. M.
,
Tokyo time)," Collins later wrote.
The State Department was advised of General MacArthur's report and the
plans for the teleconference. Present at the teleconference to represent the
State Department were Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Husk,
and the Korean Desk Officer, Neil W. Bond. The teleconference actually
started at 3:40 A. M. Collins informed MacArthur:
DA-1 [Department of the Army No. 1]
Authorization proposed in your C 56942 will require
Presidential decision which will take several hours for considera-
tion. Meanwhile, you are authorized in accordance with Par. 2B,
JCS 84631, to move one RCT [Regimental Combat Team] immediately
to Pusan base area. This will be amplified in our telecon
scheduled for 30080 Z.
67Rad, C 56942 CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jim 50, in Schnabel, pp. 77-78. Also
Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Knopf,
a Borzoi Book, 1956), pp. 332-33; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York;







FEC-1 [Far East Command, No. 1]
Your authorization, while establishing basic principle that
U. S. ground combat troops may be used in Korea, does not give
sufficient latitude for efficient operation in present situation.
It does not satisfy the basic requirement contained in my message
C 56942. Time is of the essence and a clear-cut decision v/ithout
delay is imperative.
General Collins explained to MacArthur:
DA-
2
I was present at White House conference late afternoon
June 29 when decision was made to authorize action covered in
JCS 84631. Tenor of decision clearly indicated to me that the
President would wish carefully to consider with his top advisers
authorizing introduction of American combat forces into battle
area. Will not authorization given you in DA-1 permit initiation
of movement? Prior to completion of this movement we should
be able to obtain definite decision on your proposal. Does this
meet your requirement for the present ?'''0
According to General Collins:
No reply was received to DA-2. We took this to mean that
General MacArthur stood by his emphatic plea for a decision
"without delay. " After discussing this conclusion with the staff
members and State Department representatives present, I sent:
DA-9 Ref FEC-1.
I will proceed immediately through Secretary of the Army
to request Presidential approval your proposal to move one RCT
into forward combat area. Will advise you soon as possible,







General MacArthur did not acknowledge the receipt of DA-9. "Since
time was critical, " recallred General Collins,
I did not attempt to secure the concurrence of the other
members of the JCS. I stepped from the conference room, while
the staff continued the telecon with items of less importance,
and called Secretary Pace at his home. I gave him the gist of
General MacArthur's report and his urgent request at the
telecon. I recommended that approval for dispatch of a
regimental combat team to the Korean battle area be secured
from the President at once. Secretary Pace agreed.
The Secretary of the Army telephoned Truman at 5:00 A. M. On learning
MacArthur's request, the President told Pace to inform MacArthur immediately
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that the use of one regimental combat team was approved. It was only a few
minutes before Pace telephoned Collins to confirm Presidential approval. Thus
before the teleconference was concluded General Collins was able to tell
MacArthur:
DA-10
Your recommendation to move one Regimental Combat
Team to combat area is approved. You will be advised later
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as to further build-up.
Acheson was told in the morning by Rusk of what had happened. Ache son
recalled: "The request from the front and the President's reponse came as no
75





' Collins, pp. 22-23.
^Acheson, p. 412.
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Truman ordered a meeting of the Blair House Group at the White House
at 8:30 A. M.
.
June 30. He informed his advisers that he had already granted
authority for the use of one regimental combat team in the battle area and that
he now desired their advice on the additional troops to be employed. "I asked
if it would not be worth while to accept the Chinese offer, especially since
Chiang Kai-shek said he could have his thirty-three thousand men ready for
sailing within five days. Time was all
-important. "76
Acheson opposed the acceptance of Chiang's offer "on the ground that the
net result might well be the reverse of helpful by bringing Chinese Commimist
intervention, either in Korea or Formosa or both. "77 Acheson suggested that
"if Chinese troops from Formosa appeared in Korea tlie Communists in Peiping
[Peking] might decide to enter that conflict in order to inflict damage on the
Generalissimo's troops there and thus reduce his ability to defend himself
whenever they might decide to try an invasion of Formosa. "^^
The Chiefs of Staff sided with Acheson, pointing out that even Chiang's
best troops would have very little modern equipment and would be as helpless







transportation could better be used for America's own troops and supplies.
In his memoirs, President Truman recounted how he came to the final
decision:
I was still concerned about our ability to stand off the
enemy with the small forces available to us, but after some
further discussion I accepted the position taken by practically
everyone else at this meeting; namely, that the Chinese offer
ought to be politely declined. I then decided that General
MacArthur should be given full authority to use the ground
forces under his command.
On Admiral Sherman's recommendation. President Truman also approved
8
1
a naval blockade of North Korea.
Immediately after the meeting, the JCS informed General MacArthur:
"Restriction on use of Army Forces. . . are hereby removed and authority
granted to utilize Army Forces available to you. "^^ xhe authority now granted
could go beyond the use of two divisions that MacArthur originally recommended.
A briefing was held at the White House for congressional leaders at 11 A.M.
to explain the decisions that had been newly taken. In the midst of general
approval, Republican Senator Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska, minority floor
'^^Acheson, p. 412; Truman, H, 343.
^^Truman, E, 343.
^^Collins, p. 23.
^^Rad, JCS 84718 JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun 50, in Schnabel, p. 79;
also Collins, p. 23.
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leader, questioned the legal authority of the executive to send ground troops
into combat without consulting the Congress. Senator Alexander Smith
suggested a congressional resolution approving the President's action. Truman
said that he would consider Smith's suggestion and asked Acheson to prepare
a recommendation.
A statement by the President was later released to the public, on June
30, 1950:
At a meeting with congressional leaders at the White
House this morning, the President, together with the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, reviewed with them the latest developments of the
situation in Korea.
The congressional leaders were given a full review of
the intensified military activities.
In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's
request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the
North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, the
President announced that he had authorized the United States
Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets
in Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary, and had
ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.
General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain
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supporting ground units.
By Friday, June 30, the United States was fully committed in Korea in
military terms. According to Pace, the decision to employ Army units
Acheson, p. 413; Paige, pp. 262-63.
^Hearings, Pt. 5, 3372.
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"logically followed" the decisions taken earlier in the week and had been "practically
made for us" by subsequent events. But in a broader historical setting, it was
a sudden change of policy in less than one week between the North Korean attack
on June 25, and the dispatch of U. S. Army troops to Korea on June 30. Prior
to that week. United States policy was firmly committed against becoming involved
in any kind of war in Korea.
While American occupation forces were still stationed in South Korea in
1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having seen a report made by Lieutenant General
Albert C. Wedemeyer ia September, addressed a memorandum to Secretary of
State George C. Marshall on September 25, 1947, stating, "from the standpoint
of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining
the present troops and bases in Korea. " Underlying their reasons was a pre-
occupation with a strategy to deal with a possible larger war in Asia and in the
world in the future. A portion of the memorandum follows:
In the event of hostilities in the Far East, our present
forces in Korea would be a military liability and could not be
maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to
the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive operation
the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent
most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula.




If, on the other hand, an enemy were able to establish and
maintain strong air and naval bases in the Koreaa peninsula, he
might be able to interfere with United States communications and
operations in East China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, Sea of
Japan and adjacent islands. Such interference would require an
enemy to maintain substantial air and naval forces in an area
where they would be subject to neutralization by air action.
Neutralization by air action would be more feasible and less
costly than large-scale ground operations.
In the light of the present severe shortage of military
manpower, the corps of two division, totaling some 45,000 men,
now maintained in south Korea, could well be used elsewhere, the
withdrawal of these forces from Korea would not impair the
military position of the Far East Command unless, in consequence,
the Soviets establish military strength in south Korea capable of
mounting an assault on Japan. ^"^
When the United States Government decided in April, 1948, to withdraw
American occupation forces from South Korea, its official position was: "The
United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation
that an action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could
be considered a 'casus belli' for the United States. "^^^
As the United States was completing its withdrawal of troops from South
Korea in June, 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained a majority view which
stated:
From the strategic viewpoint, the position of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff regarding Korea, summarized briefly, is that
Truman, H, p. 325.
Collins, p. 29.
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Korea is of little strategic value to the United States and that
any commitment to United States use of military force in Korea
would be ill-advised and impracticable in view of the potentialities
of the over-all world situation and of our heaxy international
obligations as compared with our current military strength,
The Joint Chiefs were so much preoccupied with the over -all world




Why was there a sudden change of policy in late June, 1950? In retrospect
General Collins gave three reasons which emphasized the nature of the attack
requiring America's military response in Korea rather than because of any change
of Korea's strategic value.
First of all, I believe our political and military leaders
were surprised and deeply shocked by the bald actuality of the
North Korean attack. . . . apparently we could not believe that
such a small puppet state as North Korea would blatantly defy
the United States and the United Nations. Our prestige in Asia
and that of the United Nations were suddenly at stake, and we
reacted accordingly.
We received a second shock when it became quicldy
evident that the ROK Army's capacity to stop the attack had been
grossly exaggerated. . . . that the ROK x\rmy would not hold
long enough for a broadly based United Nations force to be
assembled. It was also obvious that with an overwhelming
victory in sight the North Koreans would pay no attention to





^^See Louis Johnson's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 4, 2671.
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States was the only member country with forces immediately
available for intervention. If we did not interpose at once,
South Korea would be overrun.
The third shock was the conviction in the minds of the
President and his principal State and Defense advisers, who
were assembled at the three Blair House conferences following
the North Korean attack, that it was the Soviet Union, not m.erely
a Communist puppet, that was challenging the United States and
the United Nations. The Soviet Union having been checked in its
program of imperialist expansion in Iran in 1946, in Greece from
1947 to 1949, and in Berlin in 1949, had unquestionably shifted
its probings for weaJaiess to the Far East. Ho Chi Minh was
relentlessly pressing the French in Indo-Chma, whom we were
then supporting with military aid. If South Korea were to fall
into Commimism, Indo-Clmia and, probably, Indonesia would
follow, and the whole balance of pov/er in the Far East would be
upset. Such an upset would be a direct threat, not only to
Japan, but also the United States and to the whole concept of
international peace imder the Charter of the United Nations.
Actually, through the indication of intelligence reports about North Korea's
military build-up and their major troop movement at critical 38th parallel areas,
the United States was aware of the possibility of a North Korean attack upon
South Korea. It was the evaluation of the intelligence that misled American
leaders to believe that the attack would not take place in 1950. The real "shock"
was the timing of the attack. Intelligence evaluation was based on a concept of
larger geographical theater and involved more enemies thou simply North Korean
Communists. The assumption was that Commimist moves in Asia, Europe, or
elsewhere in the world, would all be coordinated and directed by the Kremlin.
Collins, pp. 41-44.
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The judgment was made that in 1950 Southeast Asia would tal^e precedence over
Korea as far as Soviet ambitions in the Far East were concerned. In Korea
itself guerrilla activities and psychological warfare were thought to be more
likely than a military attack by North Korea.
However, the "shock" or surprise would not have been so severe if the
United States had prepared for the contingency of a North Korean attack. In
fact America had not planned for a limited war in Korea, prior to Juiic 25, 1950.
In tlie traditional concept of a total war, or at least a major war in the Far
East, it would certainly be unimportant for the United States to try to defend
Korea. But, in a conflict which involved Korea alone, the fall of the entire
Korean peninsula would seriously threaten the security of Japan. Japan, along
with the Ryukyus, the Philippines and the Aleutians, were regarded by the United
States to be within its defense line in the western Pacific. In the first few days
of the Korean War, Truman, Acheson and General Collins all became keenly
aware of the strategic value of Korea in relation to Japan. To intervene in
order to keep at least the southern half of the Korean peninsula in neutral or
friendly hands would thus enhance America's national security interest in the
Far East.
See MacArthur.'s public interview on March I, 1949, cited in Acheson,
p. 357; and Secretary of State Ache son's speech at the National Press Club in
Washington on Jan. 12, 1950, Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 23, 1950), p. 116.
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Nevertheless, the security consideration was only one among many
elements of the Korean decision. Another goal was to protect U. S. prestige mid
position in the cold war by firm action in Korea. The North Korean attack was
seen by America's decision-makers as a "Russian maneuver," instigated and
inspired by the Kremlin. The North Korean armed forces had been organized,
trained, equipped and supervised by the Soviets right from the beginning of the
Russian occupation of North Korea. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
North Korea in December 1948, the Soviet Union continued to supervise North
Korean forces and made large shipments of arms and military supplies to North
Korea, particularly in the spring of 1950. By Jime, 1950 these sinews of war
had included 40 YAK fighters planes, 70 attack bombers, 60 YAK trainers, 10
q o
reconnaissance planes, 150 Russian-built T-34 tanks and heavy artillery.
When the North Koreans attacked, American leaders believed that it was
the Soviet Union which was behind the move to probe a soft spot and to test the
will of anti-Communist countries to resist open armed aggression by Communist
forces. If the United States failed to act, the loss of South Korea would weaken
America's position as the leader of the free world, especially in view of the fact
that the United States was the principal sponsor and supporter of the Republic of
Korea. As Louis Halle observes, such consequences would have lost the trust of
^'^See Appleman, pp. 7-12.
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all those from Japan to Germany, who relied on the protection of the United
States to face Communist threat and pressures. It may also be interpreted,
as discussed by Robert Osgood, that Americans generally assumed, until oiter
the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950's, that the cold war
was "essentially a zero-sum contest between the two superpowers md that an
aggression by any small communist state woiild shift the world balance of power
toward the communist bloc. " This view of American security would be accepted
as long as America's efforts to counter aggression were successful at a tolerable
cost.
To prevent a third world war was the explanation that President Truman
gave for America's action in Korea. Truman believed: '^The Communists in
the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all
over the world. " He cited ^he attack against Greece and the Berlin blockade as
two previous examples of the Commimist threat to world peace, which could
have led to general war. Now the "aggression against Korea" was "the boldest and
most dangerous m.ove" the Communists had yet made. In Truman's v/ords: "The
attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia. " The best
time to meet Communist threat should be '^in the beginning. " And the best way to
^'^Halle, p. 208.
Robert E. Osgood and others, America and the World (Baltimore: Jolms
Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 8. Hereafter cited as Osgood (1970).
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to "meet the threat of aggression is for the peace-loving nations to act together. "
If they did not act together, they were "likely to be picked off, one by one. "
Truman wanted to learn a lesson from the history of the 1930's: "if tlie free
countries had acted together, to crush the aggression of the dictators ajid if
they had acted in the beginning, when the aggression was small—there probably
would have been no World War H. "^^ In this way, the United States, together
with other countries associated mth it in the United Nations, acted to meet the
attack, in Korea in order to prevent World War in.
Because Korea was seen by the United States in a larger context of a
Commimist threat in Asia and in the world, the decision to intervene in Korea
was accompanied by the decision to neutralize the Formosa Strait and to increase
military aid to the Philippines and the French in Indochina against the Communists
in all these areas.
Might the United States have overreacted, especially with regard to
Formosa? One of the basic intentions of the Formosan decision was to contribute
to the localization of the Korean fighting, even though this American move was
immediately denounced by Peking as "aggression against the territory of China. "
In view of the readiness of the Chinese Communist forces to conquer Formosa
See President Truman's radio address on April 11, 1051, Hearings, Pt.
5, 3547-52. Even though the occasion was related to the relief of the
command of General MacArthur, Truman discussed Korea from June 1950 onward.
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whose defense by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops was relatively weak, the
result of such a war, if not prevented, might be the loss of a strategically
important area into hostile hands on the flank of Korean fighting. America's
assumption here was that the Chinese Communists, if in possession of Formosa,
would cooperate and coordinate with the North Korean Communists against U. S.
action in Korea.
In addition to the military concern , the Formosan decision might have
some element of domestic politics. For six months prior to the outbrealc of the
Korean War, the conservative Republicans in Congress had been urging loudly
a tougher policy in the Far East. What they really demanded was an all-out
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commitment to Chiang Kai-shek. As Tang Tsou contends, "domestic politics
and the necessity to win wholehearted Republican support for the State Depart-
ment's policy in Korea made it highly desirable for the administration to reverse
its position on Formosa. "^^ Edward Friedman argues that by sending the
Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa, Truman might believe that this
would silence Republicans in Congress and would help win approval for a $50
billion military budget that the military wanted and budget-minded conservatives
would not approve. The reasoning here was that if Truman were thought to be
^'^See Jolin W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the
Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Bellmap Press, 1959), p. 64.
^^Tsou, p. 560.
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soft on Communism his other policy and political interests would suffer.
As far as the Korean decision itself was concerned, a failure to aid
South Korea would probably be attacked by congressional Republicans as a
parallel to the "loss of China. " Whether this was given an explicit consideration
by America's policy-m.akers is not clear from the available record. In any
event, the effect of the Korean decision together with the Formosan decision was
to produce immediate, though temporary, bipartisan cooperation and unity on
Far Eastern affairs.
Another explanation of the Korean decision was to preserve the United
Nations as a viable international organization. As soon as the decision was
made to take military action in Korea, the United States simultaneously tried
to place such action in the framework of the United Nations, even though
technically America's action was carried out slightly in advance of the formal
adoption of the UN Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950. The United
States was fortunate to find the Soviet delegate absent again from the Security
Council. Thus the new resolution, which clearly gave America's military
response in Korea legal and moral sanctions , was not obstructed by Soviet
99See Edward Friedman, "Problems in Dealmg With an Irrational
Power: America Declares War on China, " in America's Asia, Dissenting
Essay s on Asian-American Relations
,
ed. by Edward Freidman and Mark
Selden (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), p. 224. Hereafter cited as
Friedman (1971). cf. Rees, p. 31.
100
,
cf. Paige, p. 304.
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veto. Still, the initiative at the United Nations indicated U. S. willingness to
subject its Korean policy to divergent and possibly constraining influences
from the United Nations, while hoping, at the same time, to strengthen the
relatively new v/orld organization as a peace-keeping body. The United
States had involved the United Nations intimately in the establishment of the
Republic of Korea and in Korean affairs in general. Now here was a clear-cut
case of the resort to force to obtain political objectives, which ran counter to
one of the major goals of the United Nations. The United States could have
acted alone in Korea. This would have left the United Nations as weak as the
former League of Nations, as far as maintaining international peace and security
was concerned. But by acting through the United Nations, America could
give the international organization a chance to develop as a viable peace-
keeping body and advance its prestige and effectiveness.
Closely connected with the United Nations was the consideration of the
collective security system. Collective security was commonly understood
to involve the will of the peace-loving, democratic commimity of nations to
punish aggression in behalf of the United Nations. It fitted America's
tendencies of idealism in foreign policy. In more practical terms, however,
was Secretary Ache son's explanation during the MacArthur hearings:
The basis upon which wo are building our security,
in addition to the strength of our own Armed Forces, is
collective security, which is based on arrangements such as
^^^Robert E, Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press,
1957), p. 192. Hereafter cited as Osgood (1957).
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the North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio Treaty,
Those are essential to us. They are the most funda-
mental forces in the security of the United States. Therefore,
it is of transcendent importance that in our policies in all
parts of the world, where danger of war may be created,
we work absolutely hand in hand with our allies. '^^^
The defense of South Korea would reassure NATO allies that the
United States would defend the alliance at all costs.
America's allies, on their part, supported U. S. policy of repelling the
attack in Korea through the United Nations, thus upholding the principle of
collective security. Many allies not only voted for the UN Security Council
resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950, but also immediately offered to
provide various military assistance, however small or token, to the Republic
of Korea through the United Nations.
In summary, there were at least four goals that the Korean decision
was intended to achieve: (1) enhancement of America's national security
interest in the Far East; (2) protection of U. S. prestige and position in the
cold war; (3) prevention of World War HI; (4) preservation of the United
Nations as a viable world body and maintenance of tlie colle ctive security/
system. In other words, these were the major reasons why America under-
•^^^
Hearmgs , Pt. 3, 1764.
^^^Rees, p. 31. Also Goldman, p. 155; Davis S. McLellan, The Cold
War in Transition (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 23. Hereafter cited as
McLeiian (10G6).
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took military intervention in K<;>rea in response to the North Korean attack.
It should be pointed out that the availability of U. S. air, sea and ground forces
in nearby Japan for immediate employment provided the means to achieve the
above-mentioned goals
.
Before the decision was made to intervene, first with U.S. Navy and
Air Forces, then with American ground combat troops, the policy-makers in
Washington had relied on General MacArthur's communications, including his
assessments, personal observation and recommendations, as the most
important source of information for dealing with the rapidly developing
military situation. Although the commitment of ground combat forces was
originally MacArthur's recommendation, he did not play any significant role
in the choice of political and military objectives for America's action in Korea.
He was given the mission of clearing South Korea of North Korean forces,
which was subject to his more basic mission of the defense of Japai^.
The choice of policy objectives and their related course of action
throughout the critical week of June 24-30 relied heavily upon Secretary of
State Acheson's recommendations. The military leaders in the Defense
Department were consulted but do not seem to have taken the initiative with
regard to policy objectives. Their major contribution was that they felt it
necessary to extend air and sea operations to North Korea, after the decision
was made to defend South Korea. Truman was, of course, the only person
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whose decisions became final. He did not hesitate to decide quicldy and
firmly on Acheson's recommendations to deal with Korea's crisis situation.
America's immediate military objective in Korea, when the decision
was made to intervene, was to repel the aggression and to restore South
Korea's border at the 38th parallel. This was a limited objective in the
sense liiat it did not seek the total defeat of the enemy above the 38th
parallel. The United States had desired that this kind of limited fighting
would not provoke Soviet and Chinese intervention in Korea nor would it lead
to a general war with the Soviet Union. Consequently precautions were tal<:en
to keep American air and naval forces from going beyond the boundaries of
Korea in the north.
Within a period of less than a week, the decision was made to commit
U. S. ground troops to fight for the defense of South Korea. Did the policy-
makers consider any alternatives to this course of action? The available
records do not indicate the consideration of m.ultiple alternatives at each
stage of the decision-making process. Why? One hypothesis is:
When the decisioa-maldng process must be compressed
into a short time period and the situation is a crisis thrust
upon the decision makers from outside, single alternatives
rather than multiple alternatives will be considered. . .
One possible consequence of the single iiltcmative process
may be to put a great premium on leadership and on the
adequacy of probability calculations. Another may be to
provide a way of simplif ying a situation to the point where
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action is possible, thus avoiding the complexities of
estimate involved in discussing multiple alternatives.
Irving Janis writes:
According to Paige's analysis of the documents and
interviews bearing on the decision to enter the Korean War
in Jime 1950, the President set the tone at all the meetings
with his advisers, strongly shaping the group consensus as
each successive step was taken to deepen America's involve-
ment in North Korea. The President's vociferous advocacy
of a hard military line during the initial meetings of the
advisory group indicates that he had no hesitation about
setting the norm in favor of one particular alternative.
Perhaps the short time period of the Korean crisis in late June and Truman's
special leadership style in dealing with his advisory group, had much to do
with the decision-making process of considering only a single alternative
course of action.
What other alternatives might there have been to consider? In
United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955 , written by William Reitzel, Morton
A. Kaplan and Constance G. Coblenz, two other possible alternatives are
discussed, in addition to the considerations which favor the actual course of
action. One is no intervention in Korea, the other is to act without bringing
Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United States
Decision to Resist AggTession in Korea, " in Foreign Policy Decision-Making ,
ed. by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin (New York:
Free Press, 1962), p. 246.
^^^Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthinl<: (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin,
1972), p. 71. For specific examples along this line of thought, see the same
page.
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in the United Nations. Alexander L. George, in evaluating the Korean
decision, raises three questions. One of them is: "Was there a military
alternative to American involvement in a ground war in Korea? Could the
United States have accepted the military loss of South Korea and attempted to
minimize its demoralizing consequences upon the free world by other means?'
In his study George finds that there is no indication that any policy-mal^er
proposed either that U. S. ground forces not be committed at all, or that
they be used only to stabilize a line or hold a bridgehead. "Nor is there any
indication that tlie possibility of accepting the military loss of the South
Korean peninsula was considered, together with an exploration of alternative
politcal and military policies for minimizing the demoralizing consequences
of such a course upon the free world. "'^^'^
In any event, as far as America's policy-makers at that time were
concerned, the only contingency that would stop U. S. military intervention
in Korea was Russia's intervention, which could lead to a major war in the
Far East, even to World War in. In that case, Korea would not be the
1 A/?
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right place for the United States to fight a major war. It was calculated and
judged that the Soviet Union would not intervene in Korea against Americ^m
forces nor would they push the Korean crisis into a general war with the
United States. Nevertheless, the uncertainty of Soviet reaction, not only
in Korea, but also elsewhere in the world, prompted the United States to
engage only in a limited war in Korea. It was limited in three aspects.
(l)The objective was limited: to restore South Korea's border at the 38th
parallel without seeking to defeat the enemy totally above that line. (2) The
theatre of war was restricted to Korea: although the Soviet Union or
Communist China might be the supplier of North Korea's war materiels.
no U. S. air and sea operations would be permitted beyond the boundaries
of North Korea. (3) The number of the enemy forces was originally limited
to one. No initiative or provocation would be made which might induce
Soviet or Chinese intervention. No charge was made against the Soviet
Union for the responsibility of the North Korean attack.
Thus the United States decided to intervene in Korea through the
United Nations, to fight a limited war against only the North Korean
Communist forces who had made the attack on South Korea, so that the
armed attack would be repelled and the border of the 38th parallel restored
to the Republic of Korea.
CHAPTER III
BATTLE FRUSTRATIONS AND MILITARY PL/J^NmC
American Ground Troops in Action and the Establishment
of the United Nations Command under the United States
On July 3, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended that
the President should not ask for a congressional resolution of approval, but,
resting on his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the armed
forces, send troops to repel the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea.
A Department of State Memorandum of Jiily 3, 1950, was extensively circulated,
setting out the basis for such authority of the President in legal theory and
historical precedent.
Acheson later argued that though congressional approval would have done
no harm, the process of gaining it might well have done a great deal.
July—and especially the first part of it—was a time
of anguishing anxiety. As American troops were committed
to battle, they and their Korean allies under brutal punishment
staggered back down the peninsula until they m^aintained only
a precarious hold on the coastal perimeter around Pusan. An
incredulous country and world held its breath and read the
mounting casualties suffered by these gallant troops, most of
them without combat experience. In the confusion of the retreat
Acheson, p. 414.
2
See House Report 2495, 81st Cong. , 2nd Sess. , pp. 61-68; also Dept.
of State Bulletin (Jul 31, 1950), pp. 173-78.
even their divisional commander, Major General William
F. Dean, was captured. Congressional hearings on a reso-
lution of approval at such a time, opening the possibility of
endless criticism, would hardly be calculated to support the
shaken morale of the troops or the unity that, for the moment
prevailed at home. The harm it could do seemed to me far
to outweigh the little good that might ultimately accrue.^
On June 30, 1950, General MacArthur had ordered the 24th Division
under General Dean from Japan to Korea. MacArthur also ordered a small
task force under Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith from the same division
flown into Korea ahead of the main body to engage the North Korean Army as
quickly as possible, sacrificing security for speed. ^ "Task Force Smith" went
into action against the North Korean forces on July 5 near Osan. It was a
gallant but relatively futile action, suffering heavy losses. ^
By July 7, General MacArthur had more than doubled his original
estimate of American strength that would be required to hold the North Koreans.
He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he would now need four or four and a half
full-strength di\isions supported by an airborne regimental cornbat team and
3
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an armored group. Two days later, on July 9, MacArthur nearly doubled
his July 7 estimate. He radioed that the situation in Korea was critical. ^
On July 10, President Truman directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send two of
its members to the Far East for a first-hand estimate of the situation. Generals
Collins and Vandenberg were designated and they flew to Tokyo, arriving on
July 13. They held discussions with General MacArthur and his staff. Collins
also visted Korea briefly.
In answering Collins' questions, MacArthur stated that it was impossible
to say when he would be able to pass from stabilizing the battle -front to the
counteroffensive. He hoped to stop the North Korean (NK) advance when three
American divisions were in action and then to launch an amphibious operation
to cut the enemy lines of communication and routes of withdrawal. He would
follow the amphibious maneuver with an overland pursuit of the withdrawing
North Koreans. He said that he meant to destroy all the NK forces and not
merely drive them back across the 38th parallel, that in the aftermath of
operations, the problem would be to "compose and unite Korea, " and that it
might be necessary to occupy all of Korea, though this was specuiative at the
time. His troop requirement in the Far East Command under this situation
would be a total of eight infantry divisions and an additional Army headquarters.
6
Ibid.
, pp. 77-78; Schnabel, pp. 83-85.
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Furthermore, the Japanese Police Force should be converted into a con-
stabulary of four divisions, with American equipment to provide security for
7
Japan.
Generals Collins and Vandenberg returned to Washington on July 14,
and at once briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and
reported to the President. Collins stated his agreement with MacArthur that
the U. S. Eighth Army in Korea and the ROK Army would be able to hold a
bridgehead covering Pusan, but he urged prompt reinforcements. ^
At the United Nations, after the Security Council adopted the resolution
of June 27, recommending that "the members of the United Nations furnish
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,"
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
offered various forms of military assistance to operate on behalf of the
Security Council in support of the Republic of Korea, along with America's
full military commitment in Korea by June 30, 1950.^ Now that an inter-
national force could be organized in the name of the United Nations, how
should this force be directed and controlled?
7
Collins, pp. 82-83; Schnabel, p. 107.
^Collins, p. 85.
^UN Security Council, Official Records , 475th Mtg. , 30 Jun 1950, No.
17, pp. 3-6; see also Truman, II, 340, 342.
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Qq July 3, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie,
circulated a proposal to the delegations of the United States, the United
Kingdom and France, and the President of the Security Council (Mr. Arne
Sunde of Norway), which suggested that the Government of the United States
assume the responsibility for directing the armed forces of Member nations
in Korea, with the help of a "Committee on Coordination of Assistance for
Korea." The proposed committee, consisting of Australia, Fra^ice, India,
New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, would
stimulate and coordinate offers of assistance and promote contmuing United
Nations participation in, and supervision of, the military action in Korea.
The exact extent of its control was left undertermined in the proposal.
On July 4, the Department of State sought the views of the Joijit
Chiefs of Staff who opposed formuag such a committee. The Joint Chiefs
pointed out that to place a United Nations committee in the chain of command
could seriously interfere with the strategic and tactical control of operations
by General MacArthur and his commanders of army, navy and air forces in
the field. The Joint Chiefs wanted a command arrangement in which the
United States, as executive agent for the United Nations, would direct the
10
Trygve Lie, la the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954)
pp. 333-34.
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Korean operation, with no positive contact between the field commander and the
United Nations.
Thus, the proposal was rejected by the United States. Instead, a revised
resolution was developed. Wlien the Security Council met on July 7, the United
Kingdom and France introduced a draft resolution, which had been agreed to by
12Truman, recommending the establishment of a unified command under the
United States. It was adopted by a vote of 7 - 0, with 3 abstentions (Egypt,
India, Yugoslavia), and the U. S. S. R. again absent from the meeting. The full
text of the resolution of July 7, 1950, follows:
The Security Council,
Having determined that ihe armed attack upon the Republic
of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the
peace,
Having recommended that Members of the United Nations
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international
peace and security in the area,
1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which
Governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its
resolutions 82 (1950) and 83 (1950) of 25 and 27 June 1950 to
assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed
attack and thus to restore international peace and security in
the area;
2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have trans-
mitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic
of Korea;
3. Recommends that all Members providing military
''"'^Collins, p. 34; Schnabel, pp. 100-01.
^^Truman, II, 347.
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forces and other assistance pursuant to the afDresaid Security
Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance
available to a unified command under the United States of
America;
4. Requests the United States to designate the commander
of such forces;
5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to
use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against
North Korean forces concurrently with the f].ags of the various
nations participating;
6. Requests the United States to provide the Security
Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action
taken under the unified command.
The next day, Truman named MacArthur as the commander of such United
Nations forces. On July 14, Syngman Rhee placed all forces of the Republic of
Korea under MacArthur's command. On July 24, 1950, MacArthur issued
orders establishing the United Nations Command (UNC) with general headquarters
in Toledo, Japan. With few exceptions, staff members of the Far East Command
were assigned comparable duties on the UNC staff. In effect, the GHQ, United
Nations Command, was the GHQ, Far East Command, with an expanded mission.-
Late in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed MacArthur to send them a
report every two weeks on the actions of his forces. The JCS would, in turn,
submit the report through the Secretary of Defense to the Department of State
for presentation to the United Nations Security Council by the American dele-
^^UN Security Council, Official Rec ords, Fifth Yr. , Resolutions and
Decisions of the Security Council 1950 (8/1588) pp. 5-6.
Schnabel, p. 103.
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gation at Lake Success, New York. MacArthur was assured that he would be
consulted in advance if political considerations made it necessary at any time
for the Joint Chiefs to alter his reports.
MacArthur later testified at the Senate Committees hearings about his
channel of control:
... my connection with the United Nations was largely
nominal. There were provisions made that the entire control
of my command and everything I did came from our ounti Chiefs
of Staff and my channel of communication was defined as the
Army Chief of Staff.
. . The controls over me were exactly
the same as though the forces under me were all American.
All of my communications v/ere to the American high command
here. 16
Essentially this was the problem of how a general of one nation in command
of an international force was to be held accountable to the United Nations. Should
his first duty and loyalty be to his own government or to the United Nations?
The United States insisted that an American general in command of such an
international force in Korea must be directly responsible to the United States
Government and, through his government, be responsible indirectly to the United
Nations. This arrangement was accepted partly because American forces con-
stituted more than 90 per cent of the total non-Korean force. Thus the United
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field, even though it was legally United Nations action. The only constraint
would be the resolutions and decisions of the UN Security Council.
America's Attitude toward Peaceful Settlement
and Setbacks on the Battlcfront in July 195(5
"
While the British Government put British warships in Japanese waters
at MacArthur's disposal as the quickest method of furnishing help to Korea,
immediately after the June 27 resolution of the Security Council, -''^ it also
initiated moves to bring about a "peaceful settlement" there. In early July,
the British urged the United States to make concessions on Formosa or
Commimist Chinese representation in the United Nations for a cease fire in
Korea. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin wrote a letter to the American
Government saying that the Kremlin really wished to restore the status quo
ante in Korea, but he believed they would link a change in the U. S. position
on Formosa with it. That position, he said, did not have the backing of the
states that supported the UN Korean resolutions. One should avoid risking
Western solidarity by playing down those parts of President Truman's state-
ments of June 27 that did not bear directly on Korea. This message did
not "please" either Truman or Acheson. Acheson drafted and Truman approved
a "frank" reply, dated July 10, which, "indicating its joint authorship," made
'•'^Acheson, p. 416. UN Security Council, Official Records , 30 Jun





1. We would not agree to a forced trade of Formosa
to the Communists for their withdrawal from Korea.
2. Our policy aimed at as early and complete a liquidation
of the Korean aggression as was militarily possible, without
concessions that would whet Communist appetites and bring on
other aggressions elsewhere.
3. It also aimed at the peaceful disposition of the Formosan
question, either in a peace treaty with Japan or through the United
Nations.
4. If questions regarding Formosa or the representation
of China in the United Nations were to be considered there, we
regarded it essential that they be considered on their merits
and not under the duress and blackmail then being employed.
India also made an attempt at peaceful settlement in Korea but its proposal
20
was even less acceptable to the United States.
Meanwhile, within the Department of State, a difference of opinion
developed concerning postaggression policy. According to Acheson:
The Far Eastern Division, under Dean. Rusk and John
Allison, strongly urged that a crossing of the 38th parallel
should not be precluded. Only events could clarify whether
it should be crossed, but in their view peace and stability
would not exist in Korea while the country was divided.
Paul Nitze's Policy Planning Staff, influenced by George
Kennan's views, took the opposite position and urged that
General MacArthur shotdd be directed to announce, as UN
Commander, that his troops would not cross the parallel







Truman agreed that nothing should be said about postaggression policy
until the course of the fighting was much clearer than it was in mid-July but
on July 16th, he asked the National Security Couacil to prepare substantive
recommendations for him.
Acheson urged Truman to ask Congress for an immediate increase in
military strength and preparedness not only to deal with the aggression in Korea
but also to increase common defense, mth other free nations, against further
aggression. On July 19, the President sent a report to Congress requesting the
removal of the limitation on the size of the armed forces, urging legislation to
authorize the establishment of priorities and allocations of raw materials, and
asldng for additional appropriations for defense.
Legislation was passed, on August 8, 1950, which suspended for four
years the statutory limits on the manpower ceilings of the three services. In
August, measures were taken to double the size of the armed forces. On
September 27, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Army to increase its
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ill manpower, substantial increases in logistical support for the Army were
authorized and steps were taken to translate these authorizations into materiel.
In July, President Truman had signed Fiscal Year 1950-51 appropriations
for mutual defense assistance of $1.2 billion and another $4 billion supplemental
appropriation in September.
In addition to the pending regular defense appropriation of $13. 5 billion.
President Truman asked for a supplementary budget of $10 billion on July 19,
1950. The original defense budget passed Congress in late July and v/as signed
28by the President on September 6.'^° The supplementary budget was raised to
$11. 6 billion by President Truman with an additional request on August 4;
Congress approved on September 27 the sum of $12. 6 billion.^^ On December 1,
1950, a second supplemental defense budget of nearly $17 billion was submitted
to Congress and approved on January 6, 1951. The Fiscal. 1951 budget was
OA
ultimately to authorize a total of $48. 2 billion for the military establishment.
Thus, following the outbreak of the Korean War and the critical military situation
26
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in Korea during the summer of 1950, America's massive military build-up
was started and the momentum would continue to rise through the next two years,
not only for the requirements of Korea but also in preparations for dealing with
a possible Soviet threat elsewhere in the world, especially in Europe.
In order to slow the advance of the North Korean forces before they
enveloped all of Korea, General MacArthur decided to use a desperate strategy
of committing American forces piecemeal to gain time. He had to send his
groimd units into action against the North Koreans before his units were
completely combat ready. Thus, the 24th Infantry Division was rushed to Korea
from Japan to fight in the period of July 5 - 22, 1950. It succeeded in delaying
for two and a half weeks, the greatly superior North Korean forces of two
divisions, thereby gaining the precious time required to bring essential re-
inforcements from Japan and the United States. But the price it paid for this
mission was very high. When it was relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division at
Yongdong on July 22, it could muster only 8,660 men of its initial strength of
12, 197, a loss of almost 30 per cent. Equipment losses were estimated at
60 to 70 per cent. Losses in senior officers of field grade were unusually
severe, and its commanding general, William F. Dean, was missing in action.
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Even so, General MacArthur cabled Washington on July 23:
Operation planned mid-September is amphibious londin-
of a two-division corps in rear of enemy lines for purpose of''
envelopmg and destroying enemy forces in conjunction v/ith
attack from south by Eighth Army. Although the exact date
of D-day IS partially dependent upon enemy reaction during
the month of August, I am firmly convinced that an early and
Strong effort behind his front will sever his main lines of
communication and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushin-
blow. Any material delay in such an operation may lose this
opportunity. The alternative is a frontal attack which caia only
result m a protracted and expensive campaign to slowly drive
the enemy north of the 38th Parallel. ^3
General MacArthur had earlier agreed that the enemy attack on Pusan
would have to be stopped before the counteroffensive was launched. Consequently,
the Joint Chiefs called him to a teleconference on July 24 to inquire whether,
in the light of developments on the front of the Eighth and ROK Armies, he was
still planning on mid-September for the amphibious assault. MacArthur replied
confidently that "barring unforeseen circumstances, and with complete provision
of requested replacements, if the full Marine division is provided, the chances
to launch the movement in September would be excellent. "^4
The North Korean troops pushed on. In late July they forced the 1st
Cavalry Division from Yongdong and back on Kumchon. The U. S. 25th lufantry
Dividion was also withdrawing steadily. The situation became so critical that
General MacArthur made a personal visit to the Korean front on July 27 and
33
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emphasized that withdrawals must cease, that there would be no evacuation
from Korea. Two days later, General Walton H. Walker, who had assumed
command of the U. S. Army troops in Korea on July 13, issued an order to
hold the line, which was characterized as a "stand or die" order.
According to Appleman,
The movement around the left flank of Eighth Army in
late July had been the most brilliantly conceived and executed
of the North Korean tactical operations south of the Han
River. It had held v/ithin it the possibilities of victory— of
driving U. N. forces from the peninsula. It had compelled
Eighth Army to reinforce its units in the southwest at the
expense of the central front, and to redeploy the U.N. forces
along a shorter line behind the Nald;ong River, in what came
to be called the Pusan Perimeter.
. . . Never afterward were
conditions as critical for the Eighth Army as in the closing
days of Jidy and the first days of August 1950.^6
On August 1, General Walker ordered his entire force to break contact with the
enemy and to pull back behind the Naktong River, there to make a final stand. ^7
Under these circumstances, the Joint Chiefs on o July 31 had proposed,
with Truman's approval, that four National Guard divisions and two National
Guard regimental combat teams be called into active Federal service, effective
38September 1. On July 31, too, according to Acheson, "planners in the
35
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Pentagon" made proposals of a far-reaching nature:
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The recommendation was that the UN Supreme Com.mander
should be directed to cross the parallel, defeat the enemy's
forces, and occupy the country, provided the follov/ing
assumptions held:
1. That the United States would mobilize sufficient
resources to attain the objective and strengthen its military
position in all other areas of strategic importance.
2. That the Soviet Union would not intervene in Korea
or elsewhere.
3. That the President would proclaim, the Congress
endorse, and the United Nations adopt as our war aim a
united, free, and independent Korea, and that the United
States and other nations would maintain their troops in Korea
under the UN Command as occupying forces as long as
needed. ^9
At this point, this recommendation was an "intellectual exercise. ""^^
Nevertheless, it can be seen that the thinking of the Pentagon began to change.
Although the overall policy of a limited war would still be niaintained,
especially with respect to the Soviet Union, the original military objective
of restoring the border at the 38th parallel would be replaced by that of
crossing the parallel, defeating the enemy's forces and occupying all of
Korea imder a contemplated new authorization from the United Nations. It
is not clear whether this recommendation had encountered some opposition
within the Pentagon, as there were two conflicting views within the State





Thej;l_aimi^ the Inchon LancUng and the Considerntinn
of Crossing the 38th PaTallel AuPii£2^n
in the early weeks of August 1950, the first of three large contingents
of American reinforcements arrived at Pusan after sailing directly from the
United States and Hawaii. ^1 On August 4, American ground combat units in
Korea totaled more than 67, 000 men. The principal ROK combat strength at
this time was in five infantry divisions recently filled to a strength of approxi-
mately 45.000 men. 'Thus on 4 August, the United Nations combat forces
outnumbered the enemy at the front approximately 92, 000 to 70, 000. "^2
President Truman later wrote:
By early August our forces there [in Korea] had
been built up to a ground strength of sixtjr-five thousand men,
sufficient to hold the Pusan beachhead and enough to give
encouragement to offensive planning, and on August lO^the
Secretary of Defense informed me that it was planned to
send nearly two more divisions to Korea before September
25. Naval and air forces had been similarly increased
and further build-ups were in preparation.'^'^
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Soon elements of four United States divisions, a Marine brigade, and five
ROK divisions were deployed in a protective arc around Pusan. These forces
dug in to create the famed Pusan Perimeter. General Walker, using the tactics
of shuttling his units from one critical point to another, succeeded in blunting the
repeated North Korean attacks on his lines. '^^
Now that the North Koreans could be halted after the touch-and-go fighting
along the Pusan Perimeter, General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs began to
plan on the specific amphibious landing behind the enemy lines. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff sent two of its members, General Collins as Army Chief of Staff and
Admiral Sherman as Chief of Naval Operations, to confer with MacArthur in
Tokyo, on August 21-23, 1950, partly because MacArthur had not kept the Joint
Chiefs fully informed of the development of his plans. Collins and Sherman also
visited Korea on August 22 and were convinced that Americans and South Koreans
alike v/ould hold on to their bridgehead around Pusan.
The main briefing and conference on the amphibious assault took place on
August 23 at MacArthur's headquarters. Principal participants in the conference
included Generals MacArthur, Collins, Almond, Hickey and Wright of the Army
'^^Berger, p. 116; see also Rees, pp. 52-53.
^^Schnabel, p. 148; Collins, p. 121.
^^Collins, pp. 108-10.
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and Admirals Sherman, Joy, Struble, and Doyle of the Navy. The name of the
planned operation was CHROmXE; the landing site: Inchon; D-Day: September
15, 1950. Doyle and his Naval and Marine planners first presented a thorough
analysis of the naval phases of the landing operation. They emphasized the
great difficulties and the risks involved. The tides and the seaward approach to
Inchon constituted enormous physical obstacles. Over the centuries heavy tides
have deposited great mud flats on the shore of Inchon. On the ebb, the mudflats
stretched as far out as three miles from the shore line to the sea. American
landing craft LST's could approach only at flood tide of thirty feet and would be
stuck in the mud as soon as the tide receded, thus making them ideal targets for
North Korean artillery. The only approach to the port of Inchon was through the
narrow, twisting, treacherous "Flymg Fish" channel, which was dominated by
a small island. The North Koreans could easily mine the channel and fortify the
island. In addition, tlie landing was to come during the typhoon season which
threatened an even chance of a howling storm. '^'^ Doyle concluded that the
operation was not impossible but that he did not recommend it.^^
General Collins then expressed doubt that the Eighth Army could make a
47
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quick junction with the Tenth (X) Corps at Inchon. Collins suggested that
consideration be given to an alternative landing at Kunsan, nearly 100 miles
south of Inchon, which had few of Inchon's physical drawbacks. Admiral Sherman
seconded Collins' suggestion.
It was General MacArthur's turn to speak. He said that the bulk of the
North Korean forces were committed around Walker's defense perimeter. The
enemy had failed to prepare Inchon properly for defense. "The very arguments
you have made as to the impracticability involved will tend to ensure for me the
element of surprise, " he said. MacArthur recognized all of the hazards that
the Navy and Marine Corps had pointed out, but he had confidence in their ability
to overcome them. Since the Seoul-Inchon area was the one vital spot in the
enemy's line of communications, MacArthur insisted that only by seizing Seoul
and Inchon could he achieve a quick and decisive victory over the North Koreans.
He also pointed out the tremendous political and psychological advantages to be
gained by retaking the Korean capital from the invaders. As to the landing at
Kunsan, it would be largely ineffective and indecisive. MacArthur reiterated
50
that Inchon would not fail, that Inchon would succeed and save 100, 000 lives.
Collins was favorably impressed by MacArthur's presentation, but still
had some reservations. Sherman was struck by MacArthur's confidence and
^^Collins, pp. 123-24,
^^Whitney, pp. 348-50; Collins, pp. 125-26; Schnabel, p. 150.
^-^ColliJis, p. 126.
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optimism. 52 Collins and Sherman also discussed with MacArthur the possible
follow.up of a successful landing at Inchon. They agreed with the General that
he should be authorized to continue the attack across the 38th parallel to destroy
the North Korean forces, which otherwise would be a recurrent threat to the
independence of South Korea.
Upon their return to Washington, Collins and Sherman briefed the other
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President.
After examining the plans carefully, the Joint Chiefs on August 28 sent MacArthur
a conditional approval of his plans as follows:
We concur in making preparations for and executing a
turning movement by amphibious forces on the west coast of
Korea, either at Inchon in the event the enemy defenses in the
vicinity of Inchon prove ineffective, or at a favorable beach
south of Inchon if one can be located. We further concur in
preparations, if desired by CINCFE, for an envelopment by
amphibious forces in the vicinity of Kunsan. We imderstand
that alternative plans are being prepared in order to best
exploit the situation as it develops.
The Joint Chiefs also told MacArthur: 'We desire such information as becomes
available with respect to conditions in the possible objective areas and timely
information as to your intentions and plans for offensive operations. "^^ On
52
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August 30, MacArthur issued his operations order for the Inchon landing.
While the military were planning on counteroffensives in Korea, the
civilian officials in the State Department were debating the long-range policy.
There were two conflicting views. "One was that under no circumstances should
General MacArthur's forces cross the 38th parallel. The other denied this and
advocated (or some proponents did) going wherever necessary to destroy the
invader's force and restore security in the area. "^^
George Kennan wrote a memorandum to Acheson. It said that America's
action in Korea was right; the aggression must be defeated and discredited. But
it was not essential to the United States or within U. S. capabilities to establish
an anti-Soviet regime in all of Korea. Kennan maintained that the Koreans could
not maintain their independence against both Russian and Japanese pressures.
While Japanese influence might be preferable to the Russian from America's point
of view, the power to exert it did not now exist. Hence it would be unrealistic to
exclude the possibility of a period of Russian domination. The memorandum did not
mention any possibility of Chinese domination.
The State Department also asked Ambassador Austin to put up on August
17, a "trial balloon" by a speech in the UN Security Council. Austin said that





p. 446. Kennan probably meant that Japan did not have its own
military, or even economic power, to exert influence on Korea.
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"we must consider the aims for which the United Nations is fighting. We must
ask ourselves questions regarding the kind of peace that the outcome of the
conflict should bring.
- He suggested consideration not only of the objective of
the ending of the breach of the peace, but also the fact that "the General Assembly
for three years has sought the establishment by the Korean people of a free,
unified and independent nation. " Austin added:
This question has already been decided by General
Assembly resolutions 112 (H), 195 (HI) and 293 (IV) adopted
in 1947, 1948 and 1949.
. . . Korea's prospects would be
dark if any action of the United Nations were to condemn it
to exist indefinitly as half slave and half free, or even one-
third slave and two-thirds free. The United Nations has
consistently worked for a unified country, an independent
Korea. The United Nations will not want to turn from that
objective now.
Ambassador Austin's remarks were made in the presence of the Soviet representa-
tive, Jacob Malik, who had ended his boycotting and returned to attend and preside
over the Security Council meetings in August.
Earlier, on August 4, the Soviet Union had proposed to the Security
Council, "to invite the representative of the People's Republic of China and also
to hear representatives of the Korean people" in the course of the discussion of
the Korean question. Malik also proposed "to put an end to the hostilities in
UN Sccui'ity Council, Official Records, 5th Yr. 488th Mtg, 17 Aug 1950,
No. 30, pp. 4-8.
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Korea and at the same time to withdraw foreign troops from Korea. "^^
On August 20, three days after Ambassador Austin's speech, Chou En-lai,
Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, sent a cable to the United
Nations, his first in more than six weeks, focusing this time not on Taiwan
but on Korea. He stated in part:
Korea is China's neighboring country; the Chiaese
people cannot but be more concerned about the solution of
the Korean question. The question of Korea must and can
be settled peacefully.
. . . The Central People's Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China fully supports all
the proposals concerning the peaceful regulation of the
Korean question submitted on 4 August in the United
Nations Security Council by Mr. Yakov Malik on behalf
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Government. ^''^
On August 22, the Soviet representative, Malik, made some comments
on Ambassador Austin's speech of August 17 in the Security Council. Malik said,
in part:
What is the United States representative now proposing
to us ?
Referring to these [General Assemblj'^] resolutions, he
is proposing, in the first place, to continue the war and to
^" Official Records
,
483rd Mtg. , No. 24, pp. 1-2.
^^Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: Macmillan,
1960), p. 79. Chou's first cable was sent on July 6, 1950 to the UN Secretary
General for transmission to the members of the Security Council. In it he had
denounced both the Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950 and President
Truman's statement of Jime 27, 1950, particularly with respect to Formosa.
For the full text, see UN Security Council, Officials Records , 5th Year (1950),
Supplement for June -August, 1950, document S/1583, pp. 71-72.
UN Security Council, Offic ial Records , 5th Yr. , Suppls. for June-
Aug, 1950, p. 139.
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extend United States aggression against the Korean people;
in the second place, he is harking back to these resolutions,
which means a return to the days of the terrorist Syngman Rhee
regime, to the establishment of the domination of the United
States monopolies in Korea, to the conversion not only of
South Korea, but of Korea as a whole, into a colony of United
States imperialism.
. . This would inevitably lead to the
further aggravation of the Korean question. From this point
of view it is the duty of the Security Coimcil to take urgent
measures to put an end to hostilities in Korea, and to proceed
immediately to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. ^2
Malik reiterated his earlier proposal of August 4 to hear both parties involved
in the "internal" Korean conflict and to demand immediate withdrawal of all
foreign troops from Korea when hostilities were put to an end there.
There was no indication of Soviet intention to intervene militarily in
Korea even though the Soviet Union seemed to be aware of America's possible
future attempt to carry the war into North Korea to achieve the unification of
Korea. It should also be noted that at this point the overall military situation
in Korea was still in favor of the North Koreans. Thus there might be little
ground for the Russians to threaten to intervene in Korea militarily.
The Soviet proposal of August 4 was rejected by the Security Council
on September 5 by eight votes to one, with two abstentions.
Acheson did not get to read Kennan's aforementioned memorandum
until after August 21, when he returned from a week's holiday. Acheson





thought Kennan's conclusions were "disturbing," "emotional" and "moralistic."
'Ideas such as these could only be kept in mind as warnings not to be drawn into
quicksands. All this was good, even if purely negative, advice. "^^ Acheson was
more inclined toward the conclusion that "no arbitrary prohibition against crossing
the parallel should be imposed. As a boundary it had no political validity. " He
felt that troops could not be expected "to march up to a surveyor's line and
stop. " "Until the actual military situation developed further, no one could say
where the necessity for flexibility in tactics ended and embarkation upon a new
strategic purpose began. " Acheson was less sure of what to do next, "after
knocking out the invasion and as much of the invasion force as seemed practical. "^
The Making of the Policy to Cross the
38th Parallel, September 1950
By September 1, 1950, the National Security Coimcil had completed a study
concerning long-range policy toward Korea, which was forwarded to the Depart-














to commit itself definitely to any single course of action. There were too many
unknowns, namely, what Russia or China might do and whether the United States
could coun.t on the United Nations, even on those members considered to be
allies, to back up an American policy that might bring on a general war.
Without United Nations support, MacArthur should not be perm.itted to cross the
38th parallel. Although this National Security Council study agreed that the
resolutions of the UN Security Council provided a sound legal basis for crossing
the parallel, it felt that the United Nations forces should not do so for merely
local tactical reasons. If they were required to cross into North Korea to compel
the withdrawal of NK units from South Korea or to destroy NK forces, MacArthur
should be given special authority, and there should be a clear understanding
that no UN force would cross the northern boundary of Korea into Manchuria or
the U. S. S. R.
,
and that as a matter of policy only Korean units should operate
in the border region. Further, if either Russian or Chinese forces had already
entered Korea or had announced that they intended to enter, no matter how well
the tactical situation might otherwise favor crossing the parallel at the time,
General MacArthur should refrain from moving above the line. This did not
68
Ibid. ; Schnabel, p. 178.
^^Collins, p. 145.
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mean, however, that he should discontinue air and naval operations in North
Korea.
'^^
The study believed that any crossing of the 38th parallel by MacArthur
would evoke certain reactions for the Soviet Union. The Russians might encourage
the Chinese to occupy North Korea, even to commit troops into battle in the hope
of fomenting war between the United States and China. In the event that the
Chinese Communists alone intervened, the study recommended that MacArthur
continue the fighting as long as he had a reasonable chance of successful resist-
ance against a Chinese attack, and that MacArthur should be authorized to
initiate appropriate air and naval action against China. The United Slates should
then seek United Nations condemnation of the Chinese as aggressors. '^'^ If
major Russian imits entered the fighting at any stage either openly or covertly
anywhere in Korea, the United Nations forces should go on the defensive at once,
make no move that would aggravate the situation, and report to Washington for
instructions. Exactly what MacArthur would be told once he had reported to
Washington was not yet decided. But it was definite that the United States did
not want its resources tied up in Korea, an area regarded as of little strategic




, p. 178; Collins, p. 145.
^^Schnabel, pp. 178-79; Collins, p. 145.
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eventually would be stabilized along the 38th parallel, and it was suggested that
the United Nations, instead of crossing, should offer surrender terms to the
North Koreans as soon as victory of the United Nations forces seemed assured. 73
Obviously this National Security Council study was originally made with-
out consulting the Joint Chiefs. The most important question in the study was:
to cross or not to cross the 38th parallel for ground operations. The National
Security Council study was in favor of no crossing, unless there was United
Nations support. Here the major concern was not to provoke Russian intervention
by any crossing. Before the United Nations forces approached the parallel, any
indication of Soviet or Chinese intention to enter Korea should immediately pre-
clude UN crossing. However, Chinese entry alone in some instances would be
treated as less threatening. MacArthur should then continue to fight as long as
he had a reasonable chance of successful resistance against a Chinese attack.
It is not clear whether this applied to Chinese attack south of the 38th parallel
or after MacArthur 's forces crossed the parallel. Soviet military intervention
at any stage should make the UN forces go on the defensive at once, according to
the study.
'^^Collins, p. 145; Schnabel, p. 179. In August the President had
strengthened the National Security Council with a "Senior Staff" composed of
some of the "ablest" men from State, Defense, Treasury, JCS, the National
Security Resources Board, and the CIA. Sec Millis, Arms and the State,
p. 281.
114
The study also seemed to suggest that to cross the 38th parallel in order
to compel the withdrawal of NK units from South Korea or to destroy NK forces
might have better justification than merely for local tactical reasons. But in
general the study wanted to make sure that the problem of the 38th parallel
would not lead to a general war with the Soviet Union. Thus the policy of using
only Korean units in the border region and of prohibiting any crossing of the
northern boundary of Korea into U. S. S.R. or Manchuria was recommended for
such circumstances.
This National Security Council document received a cold review by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 7.'^^ The Chiefs disagreed with the assump-
tion that the military situation would or should be stabilized along the 38th
parallel. They argued that a limited advance to the parallel would solve
nothing, militarily or politically, since this would leave Korea divided by an
arbitrary boundary difficult to defend but easy for North Korean guerrillas to
infiltrate. On the other h^jDd, a successful drive to the north could make Korea
under a single government acceptable to the United Nations and could secure a
7fi




Ibid. ; Collins, p. 145.
'^^Collins, pp. 145-46.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they agreed with General MacArlhur
that the initial objective to be obtained was the destruction of the North Korean
forces. "^"^ In order to accomplish this mission, no prior restrictions shoidd
be placed on MacArthur's crossing the parallel if it became necessary to do so.
The chief contra argument that the JCS considered was that an extension of
operations to the north would provide additional excuse for Soviet recalcitrance
in the United Nations and could lead to the active intervention of the Soviets or
the Chinese Communists. The Joint Chiefs anticipated, however, that the main
strength of the NK Army would be broken in South Korea and that operations
north of the parallel would be chiefly of a mopping-up nature, which should be
conducted by South Korean troops. '^^ The Joint Chiefs stated:
We believe that after the strength of the North Korean
forces has been broken, which is anticipated will occur south
of 38 degrees North, that subsequently operations must taJ^e
place both north and south of the 38th Parallel. Such operations
should be conducted by South Korean feces since it is assumed
that the actions will be of a guerrilla character. General
MacArthur has plans for increasing the strength of the South
Korean forces so that they should be adequate at the time to




Action With Respect to Korea; in Schnabel, pp. 179-80.
79Mem Secy Defense, 7 Sep 50, sub: U.S. Courses of
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The JCS also touched on the subject of the posthostilities period. They
stated that they and MacArthur agreed that the occupation by UN forces should
be limited to the principal cities south of the 38th parallel and should be
terminated as soon as possible. Further, U.S. troops should be taken out of
Korea as early as safe to do so. The Chiefs also pointed out that MacArthur
and Rhee had agreed that the Government of the Republic of Korea should be
reestablished in Seoul as soon as it could be done. Rhee was willing, upon
reentry into the capital, to grant a general amnesty to all except war criminals
and to call for a general election to set up a single government for all of
80Korea. The Joint Chiefs recommended that their views be embodied in a
final review of the study before it was returned to the National Security
Council and submitted to the President. The JCS recommendations were
approved by the Secretary of Defense.
As to Acheson's position with regard to the 38th parallel, he finally
agreed that the UN Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950, was sufficient
to authorize military operations north as well as south of the parallel to repel
the invasion and defeat the invaders and that MacArthur should be authorized
to conduct them, provided that neither the Russians nor the Chinese entered
Schnabel, p. 180.
Collins, p. 146.
the conflict or aiinoimced their iatention of doing so.
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According to Collins, most of the Joint Chiefs' views, along \nth the
cautions of the National Security Council's staff, were included in the final
83
paper. Truman recalled that the decision to launch the amphibious landing
at Inchon made it necessary to consider "on a high policy level v/hat our sub-
sequent course of action should be. "
This was done in National Security CouDcil discussions
which finally resulted in a policy statement that I approved on
September 11, 1950.
The National Security Council recommended that om-
course of action would be influenced by three factors: action
by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation
with friendly members of the United Nations, and the risk of
general war.
General MacArthur was to conduct tiie necessary military
operations either to force the North Koreans behind the 38th
parallel or to destroy their forces. If there was no indication
or threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese Communist elements in
force, the National Security Council recommended that General
MacArthur was to extend his operations north of the parallel and
to make plans for the occupation of North Korea. However, no
ground operations were to take place north of the 38lh parallel
in the event of Soviet or Chinese Communist entry. ^'^
In order that MacArthur might have advance notice, the Joint Cliiefs on
September 15 sent him those provisions of the new national policy which were






or Communist China intervened. This message was for MacArthur's information
only. It informed him, among other details:
(a) Final decision cannot be made at this time inasmuch
as the course of action best advancing United States national
interest must be determined in the light of
(1) Action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese
Communists;
(2) In consultation with friendly members of the
United Nations; and
(3) An appraisal of the risk of general war;
(b) The United Nations forces have a legal basis for
conducting operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel to
compel withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the line
or to defend against these forces.
(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were authorized to direct
General MacArthur to plan for the possible occupation of North
Korea but to execute such plans only with the approval of the
President.
(d) General MacArthur should undertal^e no ground
operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel m event of occupation
of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. In this
event, air and naval operrations north of the parallel should not
be discontinued; and
(e) In the event of employment of major Chinese Communist
units south of the thirty-eighth parallel, the United States would
(1) not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with
Communist China; (2) authorize General MacAnhur to continue
military action as long ?,s it offered a reasonable chance of
successful resistance.'^"
In spite of his immediate concern with the outcome of Inchon landing
-{September 15 was D-Day for Operation CHROMITE), MacArthur wanted to know
""^Schnabel, p. 180.
S^Hearings, Pt. 1, 718, from item 33, on p. 41 of the paraphrased
messages furnished by JCS to Congressional Committees (Armed Services and
ForeigTi Relations).
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more about the national policy on Korea. He asked the Joint Chiefs to forward
by courier the entire text of the approved policy paper. This was done. 87
An Analysis of the Policy Statement of
September 11, 195Q
The policy statement, which was approved by Truman on September 11,
1950, seemed to have been a compromise bet^veen the original study made by the
National Security Council on Sept. 1 and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the latter reviewed the study and added their recommendations on Sept. 7. It
is not clear what role Acheson had played in the compromise, except that he
agreed to the final statement. The weight of the origii^al study favored stabili'/ing
the military situation along the 38th parallel, thus avoiding any possible complica-
tion of Soviet entry. The Jomt Chiefs had wanted not only to cross the parallel,
but also to drive to the Yalu to unify the whole country. The compromise was
that if there was no indication or threat of Soviet or Chinese military intervention,
MacArthur could extend his operations north of the 38th parallel. As to the
occupation of North Korea, it was decided that such plans should be made but
they would be executed only with the approval of the President. The Joint Chiefs,
influenced by MacArthur 's views, were now arguing strongly for a new military
objective: the destruction of the North Korean forces. Without trying to spell
^'^Schnabel, p. 180; Collins, p. 146.
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out clearly the possible implication of this new objective, such as its relationship
with the plans of the occupation of North Korea, the final policy statement
accepted it as the purpose of allowing MacArthur to operate across the 38th
parallel.
Should the United Nations be consulted? The final policy statement
rested its case of the crossing on the legal interpretation of the UN Security
Council resolution of June 27, 1950. Therefore there was no intention to
seek new support from the United Nations for the crossing.
Thus America's policy decision to cross the 38th parallel was made on
Sept. 11 for the purpose of destroying the North Korean forces, under the
condition of no indication of Soviet or Chinese entry into North Korea. It was
not clear in the policy statement how far north MacArthur would be allowed to
operate, except that he would be directed by the Joint Chiefs to plan for the
possible occupation of North Korea. It is also significant to note that operations
north of the 38th parallel would be conducted not by South Korean forces alone,
as was originally expected by the Joint Chiefs in their argument of Sept. 7.
Apparently the Joint Chiefs were using this argument merely to secure the
approval of the objective of crossing the parallel to destroy the North Korean
forces without causing too much damage to the principle of a limited war in
Korea. To be sure, crossing the parallel would result in a less limited war as
88
See Acheson, p. 452.
121
far as the area of groimd operations was concerned. But the priority of avoiding
a general war with the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists over Korea was
still maintained in the policy statement of September 11, 1950.
CHAPTER IV
INCHON AND U. S. CROSSING INTO NORTH KOREA
Inchon Landing and the Authorization of Ground
Operations North of the 38th Parallel
On September 8, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave MacArthur the final
green light for the landing at Inchon on September 15, aad the President was so
informed. ^
On September 12, Secretary Johnson submitted his resignation. President
Truman accepted it and made it effective as of September 19. General George C.
Marshall became the new Secretary of Defense on September 21.^
Operation CHROMITE went off successfully. MacArthur was personally
at the scene. Inchon was quickly taken by the X Corps, under the command of
Major General Edward M. Almond, due to lack of strong enemy resistance. On
September 18, Kimpo airfield was cleared for use. On September 22, the NK.
armies began to fall back everywhere, and the Eighth Army in the south was able
to break through the Pusan Perimeter and advance northward. The NK withdrawal
turned into a rout. Elements of the X Corps and the Eighth Army made a junction
•^Schnabel, p. 154; Collins, p. 128.
2
Schnabel, p. 181.
^Collins, pp. 132-40; Schnabel, pp. 173-77.
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on September 26 near Osan. By tlien, the Marine-Army team of the X Corps
had arrested control of Seoul from the enemy. By September 28, the South Korean
capital was liberated. The next day, only two weeks after the Inchon landing, in
a ceremony in Seoul, General MacArthur officially returned the capital city to
Rhee.^
After the policy statement on Korea had been approved by Truman on Sept.
11, the Joint Chiefs were anticipating instructions from the Secretary of Defense
to prepare a new directive for MacArthur to implement the new policy. However,
perhaps due to the resignation of Johnson and his replacement by Marshall, the
new directive was not drafted until ten days after American forces stormed
Inchon. On Sept. 25 the Joint Chiefs forwarded to Secretary of Defense Marshall
for approval a directive to be sent to MacArthur for future operations in Korea.
They told him that v/hile they had dealt chiefly with military matters, the
implications of the proposed order affected other agencies of the United States
Government; and they suggested that the Secretary obtain the concurrence of
these other agencies. Secretary Marshall sent the draft directive to the State
Department, which approved it but added some instructions on the return of
Seoul to the ROK Government oi Rhee. Because of the importance of this
Collins, pp. 132-40; Sclinabel, pp. 173-77.
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directive, Marshall secured the approval of Truman.^
On September 27, the Joint Chiefs transmitted the directive to MacArthur.
It stipulated that it was being furnished to provide him with "amplifying instructions
as to further military action to be taken by you in Korea. " The Joint Chiefs
warned him: "These instructions, however, cannot be considered to be final
since they may require modification in accordance with developments. "
MacArthur was ordered "to make special efforts to determine whether there is
a Chinese Communist or Soviet threat to the attainment of your objective, which
will be reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter of urgency. "^
For the first time, MacArthur had a written directive to destroy North
Korean forces:
Your military objective is the destruction of the North
Korean Armed Forces. In attaining this objective you are
authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious
and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th
Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation
there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or
Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended
entry, nor a threat ' to counter our operations militarily in
North Korea. Under no circumstances, however, will your
forces cross the Manchurian or USSli borders of Korea and,
as a matter of policy, no non-Korean Ground Forces will be
used in the northeast provinces bordering tlie Soviet Union
or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore,
support of your operations north or south of the 38th Parallel
will not include Air or Naval action against Manchuria or
against USSR territory.
^See Sclmabel, pp. 180-82; Collins, pp. 146-47.
^RAD, JCS 92801, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, 27 Sep 50; in Schnabel,
p. 182.
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la the event of the open or covert employment of major
Soviet units south of the 38th Parallel, you will assume the
defense, make no move to aggravate the situation and report
to Washington. You should take the same action in the event
your forces are operating north of the 38th Parallel, and
major Soviet units are openly employed. You will not discontinue
Air and Naval operations north of the 38th Parallel merely
because the presence of Soviet or Chmese Communist troops is
detected in a target area, but if the Soviet Union or Chinese
Communists should announce in advance their intention to
reoccupy North Korea and give warning, either explicitly or
implicitly, that their forces should not be attacked, you should
refer the matter immediately to Washington.
In the event of the open or covert employment of m.ajor
Chinese Communist units south of the 38th Parallel, you should
continue the action as long as action by your forces offers a
reasonable chance of successful resistance. In the event of an
attempt to employ small Soviet or Chinese Communist units
covertly south of the 38th Parallel, you should continue the
action.^
General MacArtliur was directed to use all ioformxation media at his
command to turn "the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized
Korean people" away from the United Nations and to direct it toward the Communists,
Korean and Russian, and, "depending on the role they play, " the Chinese
Communists.
When organized armed resistance by North Korean forces
has been brought substantially to an end, you should direct the
ROK forces to tal^e the lead in disarming remaining North Korean
units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activities
should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of




Circumstances obtaining at the time will determine ^le
character of and necessity for occupation of North Korea Yourplans for such occupation will be forwarded for approval to theJomt Chiefs of Staff. You mil also submit your plan for future
operations north of the 38th Parallel to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff for approval. 8
MacArthur was advised that the United States was formulating instructions
regarding "Armistice terms to be offered by you to the North Koreans m the
event of sudden collapse of North Korean forces and Course of Action to be
followed and activities to be undertaken during the post-hostilities period. " The
directive then continued:
As soon as the military situation permits, you should
facilitate the restoration of the Govemment of the Republic of
Korea with its capital in Seoul. Although the Government of
the Republic of Korea has been generally recognized (except by
the Soviet bloc) as tlie only legal government in Korea, its
sovereignty north of the 38th Parallel has not been generolly
recognized. The Republic of Korea and its Armed Forces
should be expected to cooperate in such military operations and
military occupation as are conducted by United Nations forces
north of the 38th Parallel, but political questions such as the
formal extension of sovereignty over North Korea should await
action by the United Nations to complete the unification of the
country.
^
Four significant points m^ay be mentioned with regard to this directive of
Sept. 27. (1) The purpose of crossing the 38th parallel was clearly stated as






Forces. " (2) This new objective was still subordinate to the higher policy of
avoiding general war with the Soviet Union or with Communist China over Korea.
However, the United States was prepared to fight against Chinese forces south
of the 38th parallel, if there was "a reasonable chance of successful resistance. "
This phrase was ambiguous. Did it mean avoidance of defeat? Prevention of
full occupation of the south by Chinese armies? Or ejection of these units from
the south? In any event the judgment was left to MacArthur to make. (3) The
granting to MacArthur of the authority to cross the parallel was facilitated by
the fact that up to this date of Sept. 27, there had been no indication of Soviet or
Chinese intention to enter North Korea. Perhaps the encouraging reports from
Korea after the Inchon landing also facilitated the implementation of the policy
decision of Sept. 11. (4) The military necessity of crossing the parallel to
destroy the North Korean forces took precedence over the political question of
sovereignty over North Korea or the plans for occupation of North Korea. Any
new decision by the United Nations would come later.
As MacArthur planned the advance into North Korea, he was aware of
the fact that although three -fourths of the NK Army was destroyed or captured
in South Korea, thousands of North Koreans, including a number of the senior
commaaders and staff officers, were able to slip away through the moimtains
or along the east coast road, escaping north of the 38th pariillei.
Collins, p. 155; Schnabel, p. 190.
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General Almond's X Corps had not been able fully to
provide the anvil against which General Walker's Eighth Army
and the ROK Army were to hammer the NK Army to destruction.
The X Corps did all that actually could be expected of it, but it
simply co'old not extend its lines to cover all escape routes west
of the Taebaek Mountains and found it impossible to cover the
trails through the mountains or the east coast road.
In accordance with the JCS directive of September 27, On September 28
General MacArthur submitted to the Joint Chiefs his plan of action in North
Korea: "If the North Korean Armed Forces do not surrender in accordance with
my proclamation to be issued on 1 October 1950, dispositions will be made to
accomplish the military objective of destroying them by entry into North Korea. "
13
MacArthur had been authorized to issue such a surrender proclamation. He
outlined his plan of action briefly. He would send the Eighth Army across the
38tli parallel through Kaesong and Sariwon to capture Pyongyang. Almond's X
Corps v/ould land amphibiously at Wonsan, thereafter "making juncture with the
Eighth Army. " Presumably, this juncture would require the X Corps to attack
west along the Wonsan-Pyongyang road. Macz\rthur promised Washington that
he would use only ROK troops for operations above the line Chongju-Yongwon-




^'^The more detailed line would be Chongju-Kunuri-Yongwon-Hamhimg-
Hungnam, see Schnabel, p. 216.
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reported, "will not be earlier than 15 October and not later than 30 October.
You will be provided detailed plans later. " He also reported that there was no
indication of "present entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese
Communist Forces. "'-^
General Collins later wrote:
This time, perhaps somewhat overawed by the success
of Inchon, some aspects of which we had questioned, the Joint
Chiefs did not wait for receipt of the details. We approved
the plan as outlined and on September 29 forwarded it to the
Secretary of Defense for final action, urging quick approval,
since it was possible that some ROK forces might even then
be crossing the 38th Parallel.
On September 28, Truman called Acheson to Washington from New York
to discuss the developing Korean situation with him and Marshall. Acheson
had gone to New York to present both the "Uniting for Peace" proposal to the




On September 29, after lunch in Blair House, MacArthur's proposed
movement in North Korea was described by an officer with the aid of a large
map of Korea. Acheson's assessment of MacArthur's plan was given later in
the followdng way:
^^Rad, C 64805, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Sep 50; in Schnabel, p. 188.
^^Collins, p. 158.
^




The plan seemed excellently contrived to create a
strong military position from which to exploit the possibilities
of the North Korean defeat
--either to insure the South by a
strong defensive line against a renewal of the attack or, if the
South Koreans were strong enough and the Chinese did not
intervene, to move toward the UN goal of a united, free, and
independent Korea. With these thoughts in mmd General
Marshall and I recommended, and the President approved, the
plan of operation.
The Joint Chiefs immediately radioed MacArthur on September 29, to carry out
his plan on schedule.
Meanwhile, news reports at this time were saying that General Walker
had informed reporters that his forces were going to halt along the 38th
parallel for regrouping and presumably to await permission to cross. Although
these reports were unconfirmed, Marshall sent a personal message to Mac-
Arthur on September 28: "Announcement.
. . may precipitate embarrassment
in the United Nations where evident desire is not to be confronted with the
necessity of a vote on passage of the 38th parallel. " Concemmg this crossing,
Marshall stated, "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically
to proceed north of the 38th parallel. "-
Acheson, p. 453.
•^Schnabel, p. 191.
^^Rad, JCS 92895, Secy Defense (Personal) to MacArthur, 29 Sept 50,
in Schnabel, p. 183; also Collins, p. 148.
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MacArthur replied to Marshall on September 30:
I am cautioning Walker against any involvement connected
with the use of the term 38th parallel, which line is not a factor
In the military employment of our forces. The logistical supply
of our units is the main problem which limits our immediate
advance. In exploiting the defeat of the enemy forces, our own
troops may cross the parallel at any time in exploratory probing
or exploiting local tactical conditions. My overall strategic plan
in North Korea is known to you. I regard all of Korea open for
our military operations unless and until the enemy capitulates. '^^
In another message on September 30, MacArthur wired Secretary Marshall
statLig his intentions to issue on October 2, a dramatic announcement about the
38th parallel following his proclamation of terms of surrender on October 1:
I plan to issue and make public the following general
directive to all elements of the United Nations Command at 1200
hours, Monday, 2 October, unless I receive your instructions
to the contrary.
"Under the provisions of the United Nations Security
Council Resolution of 27 June, the field of our military
operations is limited only by military exigencies and the
international boundaries of Korea. The so-called 38th
Parallel, accordingly, is not a factor in the military
employment of our forces. To accomplish the enemy's
complete defeat, your troops may cross the border at
any time, either in exploratory probing or exploiting
local tactical conditions. If the enemy fails to accept
the terms of surrender set forth in my message to him
of 1 October, our forces, in due process of campaign
will seek out and destroy the enemy's armed forces in
whatever part of Korea they may be located. "22
21
WTiitney, p. 398; see also Schnabel, pp. 183-84.
^^Appleman, p. 608; also Whitney, p. 399. See also Schnabel, p. 183,
fn 15 (2); Truman, II, 361.
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On the same day, MacArthur received a reply from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff: "We desire that you proceed with your operations without any further
explanation or aimouncement and let action determine the matter. Our govern-
ment desires to avoid having to make an issue of the 38th Parallel until we have
23
accomplished our mission. " Truman was advised on October 1 of this
exchange.
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution of
October 7, 1950 and Communist China's
Threat of Intervention
From the available record it is not clear v/hen and how the decision was
made in Washington to draft a new United Nations resolution to be proposed to
the General Assembly. According to Acheson, "It represented a view that had
been growing in the Far Eastern and United Nations divisions of the Department
25
[of State] during August and was given a strong push by the success at Inchon. "
Collins' account emphasized public opinion and Truman's desire as the major
sources of influence for the drafting of a new UN resolution in late September:
Public opinion and political considerations had to be
v/eighcd by the President and his advisers. ... By and large,




Schnabel, p. 183, fn 15(2).
Ache son, p. 454.
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a strong public opinion in favor of continuing military operations
to eliminate the Communist satellite state of North Korea and
thus, hopefully, prevent a recurrence of the Korean war.
World opinion also had to be considered, especially as
reflected in the United Nations, under whose aegis the war was
being fought. United Nations sanction for crossing the 38th
Parallel was highly desirable. The State Department was
satisfied that the United Nations resolutions of June 27 and July
7 provided adequate authorization, but President Truman insisted
on a more specific new authorization. 26
It seemed certain that the initial motive for a new UN resolution was to
provide clear authorization to conduct military operations in North Korea.
Truman wrote in his memoirs: "This resolution, if adopted, would be a clear
authorization for the United Nations commander to operate in North Korea. "^'^
But military operations in North Korea could not be stated as a goal by
itself. They had to be connected with a more acceptable cause. The United
States found that unification of Korea had been a long-term aim of the United
Nations since 1947, even though the means employed to achieve it had always
been through peaceful and political negotiations. Previous efforts had all failed
to bring about Korean unification. Now the North Korean forces were suffering
defeat and were retreating in the aftermath of the Inchon landing. Perhaps force
could be used to unify Korea if Russia or Communist China would not intervene.
Collins, pp. 148-49. See also Rees, p. 101.
Truman, p. 362.
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Therefore it would do no harm to restate the long-range goal of Korean unification
in a new UN resolution without explicitly stipulating that it now became the war
aim of the United Nations forces, while the new resolution could supply implicit
justification for MacArthur's military operations in North Korea. How far north
could he go? The intention was as far north as the capability of the UN forces
would allow v/ithout provoking the Soviets or the Chinese to come in. Acheson
later recalled the thinking about the UN proposal, while admitting its "naive view
of the probabilities" in retrospect:
Behind this proposal lay the belief that effort to carry
out the 1947 resolution had been blocked by Soviet military
power. Soviet forces, however, had been withdrawn and the
substituted North Korean troops defeated and scattered. No
opposing military force rem.ained in the North to frustrate UN
efforts, and the chances were believed good that neither Russian
nor Chinese troops would mtervene if only Korean soldiery
attempted to establish whatever degree of order was possible in
the rugged country of the extreme north, where even the
Japanese had had only nominal sovereignty. If the Koreans
encountered too heavy resistance, they could fall back to the
strong position across the neck.
Even though the United States was mainly responsible for the drafting of
the resolution, it was introduced to the UN General Assembly by the United King-
dom on September 30, co-sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands,
Norway, Paldstan and the Philippines. These sponsors were selected with a view
Acheson, p. 454.
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to broadening the basis of support and emphasizing the United Nations character
of the proposed action. ^9
The Security Council was avoided because the Soviet representative,
Malik, who had returned to and attended Council meetings since August and who
possessed the Soviet veto power, "would obviously prevent the adoption tliere of
any plan to assure peace unpalatable to the North Koreans. "-^^ That was why
Acheson had also proposed the "Uniting for Peace'' plan to make further UN
decisions possible by action in the General- Assembly, if any Security Council
decision with regards to the Korean aggression should be blocked by a Soviet
veto. According to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council was the
principal instrument for carrying out the purpose of maintaining international
peace. But should it be paralyzed by a veto, Acheson proposed that the duty and
responsibility be taken up by the General Assembly. His "Uniting for Peace" plan
was finally adopted in a General Assembly resolution on Nov. 3, 1950. Actually
the General Assembly was to take action on the Korean situation about one month
earlier by its adoption of the resolution of October 7.






The General Assembly referred the Korean question to its First Committee.
In the course of discussing the eight-power resolution which the United Kingdom
had introduced, American Ambassador Austin made the following remarks,
among other points, on September 30, in support of it:
I shall speak briefly, because events require us to act
quickly.
. . .
Today, the forces of the United Nations stand on the
threshold of military victory. The operations authorized by the
Security Council have been conducted with vigor and skill. The
price paid had been high. The sacrifice in anxiety, sorrow,
wounded, and dead must be abundantly requited. A living
political, social, and spiritual monument to the achievement of
the first enforcement of the United Nations peace -malting
function must be erected.
The opportunities for nev/ acts of aggression, of course,
should be removed. Faithful adherence to the United Nations
objective of restoring international peace and security in the area
counsels the taking of appropriate steps to eliminate the power
and ability of the North Korean aggressor to launch future attacks.
The aggressor's forces should not be permitted to have refuge
behind an imaginary line because that would recreate the threat
to the peace of Korea and of the world.
The political aspect of the problem identified with the
38th parallel becomes a matter of major concern for the United
Nations. The question of whether this artificial barrier shall
remain removed and whether the country shall be united now
must be determined by the United Nations.
. . .
The artificial barrier which has divided North and South
Korea has no basis for existence either in law or in reason.
Neither the United Nations, its Commission on Korea, nor the
Republic of Korea recognizes such a line. Now, the North
Koreans, by armed attack upon the Republic of Korea, have denied
tlie reality of any such line.
Whatever ephemeral separation of Korea there was for
purposes relating to the surrender of the Japanese was so
volatile that nobody recognizes it. Let us not, at this critical
hour and on this grave event, erect such a boundary. Rather,
let us set up standards and means, principles and policies,
according to the Charter, by which all Koreans can hereafter
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live in peace among themselves and with their neighbors.
. .
."^^
On this same day, Sept. 30, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai declared in
an official speech to the Central People's Government Council in Peking:
The Chinese people enthusiastically love peace, but
in order to defend peace, they never have been and never will
be afraid to oppose aggressive war. The Chinese people
absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they
supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded
by the imperialists. WTioever attempts to exclude the nearly
500 million Chinese people from the U.N. and whoever ignores
and violates the interests of this one -fourth of mankind and
fancies mainly to solve arbitrarily any Far Eastern problems
directly concerned with China, will certainly break their
skulls.
Chou's warning that China would not tolerate seeing their neighbors
"being savagely invaded by the imperialists'- was the most open threat of
counter-action yet voiced by a Chinese official in the event of possible UN pursuit
across the parallel. His warning was reported in the New York Times and
35
Herald Tribune on Oct. 1.
At noon on October 1, Tokyo time. General MacArthur broadcast and
issued a statement of surrender terms to the Commander in Chief, North Korean
Forces, He stated in part:
^^See Dept. of State Bulletin (Oct 9, 1950) pp. 579-80.
^^
Veople's China , vol. H, No. 8, Oct. 16, 1950, p. 9. Quoted in Wliiting,
p. 108. See also Tsou, pp. 572-73.
3^
See Whiting, p. 108.
^^Spanier, p. 86 and p. 286, note 12. Also Martin Lichtcrman,
"To the
Yalu and Back, " in American Civil-Military- Decisions , ed. by Harold
Stem
(University, Alabama: Univ. of Ala Press, 15^63), p. 589.
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The early and total defeat and complete destruction of
your armed forces and war maldng potential is now inevitable.
In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried
out v/ith a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of
property, I, as the United Nations Commander in Chief, call
upon you and the forces under your command, in whatever part
of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease
hostilities imder such military supervision as I may direct.
... 36
Also on October 1, elements of the ROK Army on the East coast crossed
the 38th parallel in probings and met with practically no resistance. On October
2 MacArthur reported this rapid advance to the Joint Chiefs. ^"^
On the same day, Russia's representative Andrei Vishinsky presented
a Soviet counter-proposal on Korea to the First Committee of the UN General
Assembly. It called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all foreign troops,
equality for North and South Korea in a new commission to rule the country
until all-Korean elections could be held, and creation of a UN commission to
observe the elections with members from countries bordering Korea. '^^
In the early morning hours of October 3, Chou En-lai summoned Indian
Ambassador in Peking, K. M. Panikkar, and told him. that if American troops
crossed the 38th parallel China would send in troops to help the North Koreans.
However, this action would not be taken if only South Koreans crossed the
36
See State Dept Bulletin (Oct 9, 1950), p. 586.
37
Schnabel, p. 195; Truman, H, 361.
38
Acheson, p. 452; Rees, p. 107; Goodrich, p. 129.
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39parallel. Panilckar quicldy transmitted Chou's warning through the British
and the State Department received this information on October 3. Similar
reports were also received from American embassies in Moscow, Stockholm,
London and New Delhi.
U. S. intelligence agencies discounted Chou's warning of October 3
(1) because it was passed on through the "roundabout" channel: Indiaa Govern-
ment to British Government to Washington; (2) because "it hardly seemed likely
that, if the Chinese were serious, they would disclose their intentions in
advance"; (3) because Panildcar was suspected of having Commimist leanings.
Thus the U. S. intelligence community generally agreed that Chou's threat was
"a bluff, primarily a last-ditch attempt to intimidate the United States, and
probably covered a less drastic plan of action, such as offering sanctuary to
41
the North Korean leaders. "
39
K. M. Paniklcar, In Two Chinas (London; G. Allen and Unwin, 1955),
pp. 108-10; Truman, II, 361-62; Acheson, p. 452. During September, through
the Indian Government, the U.S. had sought evidence of Chinese intentions
toward Korea. Before Inchon, Panikkar had reported Chou En-lai as emphasizmg
China's peaceful intentions, in which the Lidian ambassador agreed. See
Acheson, p. 452.
'^^Truman, II, 361-62; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The
Sea War in Korea (Washington: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), p. 11.
41
Collins, p. 173; also Schnabel, p. 198.
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On the question of channels of communication, David Rees argues that
India might have been chosen by Communist China as a go-between, preferable
to the traditional Swiss and Scandinavians, because it was a fellow Asian
country to the Chinese leaders and "the Chinese revolution stood for the re-
assertion of Asian interests against the West. "^^ Michael Lindsay suggests
that better relations between China and Great Britain or greater willingness
on the part of the Chinese to talk to UN officials might have helped China in
more clearly expressing and communicating effectively intentions and threats.
Of course, the main, problem here was the lack of direct diplomatic contacts
between China and the United States.
The United Nations Command intelligence staff also commented on the
reported warning from the Chinese Foreign Minister and other recent public
statements, "Even though the utterances. . . are a form of propaganda they
cannot be fully ignored since they emit from presumably responsible leaders in
the Chinese and North Korean Communist Governments. The enemy retains
a potential of reinforcement by CCF [Chinese Communist Forces] troops. "^^
Earlier, on August 1, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2
officer, had reported, ". . . sources have reported troop movements from
^^Rees, p. 111.
^^Michael Lindsay, China and the Cold War (Melbourne: Melbourne Univ.
Press, 1955), pp. 17-18.
"^^DIS, GHQ, UNC, 2946, 3 Oct and 2947, 4 Oct 50, in Schnabel, pp.
199-200.
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Central China to Manchuria for sometime which suggest movements preliminary
to entering the Korean theater. " Willoughby put the number of regular Chinese
troops in Manchuria at about 246,000 men, organized into nine armies totaling
thirty-seven divisions. Eighty thousand men were reported assembling near
An-tung, just across the Yalu River from Korea.
On receiving Chou's warning, Acheson thought that since Vishinsl^ was at
this same time making a proposal in the United Nations, "it was obvious that a
combined Sino-Soviet effort was being made to save the North Korean regime.
Chou's words weie a warning, not to be disregarded, but, on the other hand, not
An
an authoritative statement of policy. " Thus, Chou's warning was regarded as
more in the nature of diplomatic maneuver than a statement of genuine intentions.
Truman did not think that Paniklcar's statement could be taken as that of
"an impartial observer, " since the Indian Ambassador had in the past "played the
game of the Chinese Commimists fairly regularly. " "It might very well be no
more than a relay of Communist propaganda. " Moreover, a key vote on the
eight-power draft resolution in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly
was due on October 4. Thus, Truman concluded, "it appeared quitely [sic] likely
DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2913, 31 Aug 50, p. 1-d, see Sclmabel, p. 179.
Ache son, p. 452.
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that Chou En-lai's 'message' was a bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations
by threats of intervention in Korea.
"'^^'^
On October 4 the eight-power draft resolution was passed by the First
Committee and then submitted to the plenary meetings of the General Assembly.
America's allies end friends generally supported the resolution. The Indian
delegate, Sir Benegal Rau, objected to the assumptions implied in the resolution
that the United Nations forces would be authorized by the resolution to enter
North Korea and to remain there until the imification of Korea was completed and
stability achieved. He said that the Indian Government feared that the residt
might be to prolong North Korean resistance, and even to extend the area of
conflict.
'^^
The Joint Chiefs sent a copy of the draft resolution to MacArthur on
October 6, at the same time informing him that the United States Government
considered it as supporting operations north of the 38th parallel.
On October 7, the UN General Assembly formally adopted, with n;inor
amendments, the First Commattee report which contained the eight-power draft
resolution. In the adopted resolution, the General Assembly made reference




See UN General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Sess.
,
Plenary Mtgs,
294th Meeting, Oct. 7, 1950, p. 230.
49
Had, JCS 93555, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Oct 50; see Schnabcl, p. 194.
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December 12, 1948; and October 21, 1949; and the Security Council resolutions
of June 25, 1950 and June 27, 1950; and then
Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions
of the General Assembly referred to above was the establishment
of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea,
1. Recommends that
(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions
of stability throughout Korea;
(b) All constituent acts be tal^en, including the holding of
elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the
establishment of a imified, independent and democratic govern-
ment in the sovereign State of Korea;
(c) All sections arid representative bodies of the
population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate
with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of
peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a
unified government;
(d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part
of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the
objectives specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
(e) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish
the economic rehabilitation of Korea;
The General Assembly resolution of October 7 also set up the United Nations
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, to replace the
existing United Nations Commission on Korea, and to represent the United
Nations in connection with the unification of Korea and its economic rehabilitation.
Official Records, 5th Sess. , Resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly during the period 19 Sept. to 15 Dec 1950, Supplement No. 20
(A/1775) pp. 9-10.
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It may be noted that previous resolutions of the UN General Assembly
in 1947, 1948 and 1949 did not use the words "the establishment of a unified,
independent and democratic Government of Korea. " The new resolution inter-
preted their "essential objective" to be so. The key provision to justify entering
North Korea was the recommendation, "All appropriate steps be taken to ensure
conditions of stability throughout Korea. "
On October 9, MacArthur broadcast a second surrender demand. Taldng
note of the action of the UN General Assembly on October 7, MacArthur repeated
the surrender terms of October 1 and added:
And I call upon all North Koreans to cooperate fully with
the United Nations in establishing a unified independent demo-
cratic government of Korea assured that they will be treated
justly and that the United Nations will act to relieve and
rehabilitate all parts [sic, of] to a unified Korea.
Unless immediate response is made by you in the name
of the North Korean Government I shall at once proceed to take
such military action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees
of the United Nations.
Here MacArthur was publicly linking the UN goal of a unified, independent
and democratic government of Korea to what might be accomplished through
military action under his command, whereas the United States Government's
original intention was to use the UN resolution to justify military operations in
North Korea without explicitly linking the two.
Hearings, Pt. 5, 3483; also 3426.
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General Walker of the Eighth Army had been authorized by MacArthur's
Headquarters on October 7 to start the attack across the 38th parallel into North
Korea when ready. Walker ordered his men to initiate action on October 9.
On October 9, too, the Joint Chiefs with the approval of Truman, sent a
directive to MacArthur:
In light of the possible intervention of Chinese Communist
forces in North Korea the following amplification of our directive
is forwarded for your guidance
:
"Hereafter in the event of the open or covert
employment aii5rwhere in Korea of major Chinese
Communist units, without prior annoimcement, you
should continue the action as long as, in your judgment,
action by forces now under your control offers a
reasonable chance of success. In any case you will
obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking
any military action against objectives in Chinese
territory.
Evidently the success of Inchon and the adoption of the UN General Assembly
resolution of October 7 increased America's confidence regarding possible
Chinese intervention. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's directive on October 9 indicated
that the United States was now prepared to fight against Chinese Communist forces
anywhere in Korea as long as, in MacArthur's judgment, there was a reasonable
chance of success.
On the other hand, Communist China must have decided, by this time, to
Schnabel, p. 202; Collins, p. 165.
Truman, II, 362; also Schnabel, p, 200.
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intervene in Korea. They would declare that America's crossing the 38th
parallel threatened China's security.
m Peking, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement was issued on October
10:
.T. .r.-^""^
American forces are attempting to cross
the thirty-eighth parallel on a large scale, the Chinese peoole
cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation
created by the mvasion of Korea.
. . and to the dangerous trend
towards extending the war. The American war of invasion in
Korea has been a serious menace to the security of China from
its very start.
Ascertaining Chinese Intentions and Capabilities to Intervene
and the Advance of the United Nations Forces in North Korea
In a series of intelligence summaries between October 8 aad October 14,
the Far East Command's G-2 reported that the U. S. S. R. "would find it both
convenient and economical to stay out of the conflict and let the idle millions of
Communist China perform the task as part of the master plan to drain United
States resources into geographical rat holes of the Orient. " General Willoughby
told Washington officials tJiat a build-up of Chinese forces along the Korean-
Manchurian border had been reported by many of his sources and that, "while
exaggerations and canards are always evident, the potential of massing at the
Antung and other Manchurian crossings appears conclusive. " According to his
computations, between nine and eighteen of the thirty-eight Chinese divisions
54
Rr.dio Peking, Chinese International Ser\dce in English, Oct. 11, 1950;
quoted in VvOiiting, p. 115. See also Goodrich, p. 139.
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believed to be in Manchuria were massing at the border crossings. Yet,
continuing reports of Chinese Communist troops crossing into Korea in early
October were discounted by the Far East Command's G-2 since "no conclusive
evidence" existed; and the recent Chinese threat to enter North Korea if American
forces crossed the 38th parallel was characterized as "probably in a category of
diplomatic blackmail. "^^
One intelligence report reaching Truman on October 12 stated that
Chinese military forces, while lacking the necessary air and naval support,
could intervene effectively but "not necessarily decisively. " Further, in spite
of Chou En-lai's statements and troop movements to Manchuria, there were no
convincing indications of Chinese Communist intentions to resort to full-scale
intervention in Korea. The general conclusion of the report was that the Chinese
were not expected to enter North Korea to oppose the United Nations Command,
at least not in the foreseeable future. Several reasons were given for this con-
clusion: the Chinese Communists undoubtedly feared the consequences of v/ar
with the United States; anti-Communist forces would be encouraged and the
regime's very existence would be endangered; the Chinese Communists also
would hesitate to endanger their chances for a seat in the United Nations. More-
over, in the unlikely event that the Chinese entered the war without the benefit
of Soviet naval and air support, they were bound to suffer costly losses. On the
55
Schnabcl, p. 200; Collins, p. 174.
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other hand, acceptance of Soviet aid, if forthcoming, would make China more
dependent on Russia and would increase Russian control in Manchuria. This
report agreed with many others that, from a military standpoint, the most
favorable time for intervention had passed. For all of these reasons, U. S.
intelligence officials concluded that while full-scale Communist intervention
in Korea had to be regarded as a continuing possibility, such action, barring a
Soviet decision for global war, was not probable in 1950. During this period,
intervention probably would be confined to continued covert assistance to the
North Koreans.
On October 15, Truman met MacArthur at Wake Island, but Acheson
and Marshall did not attend this conference. Truman and MacArthur first
tallied privately. Then a general conference was held. Among the topics
discussed were Korea, Japan and the Far East, especially rehabilitation for
Korea and a Japanese peace treatj''. At one point, Truman asked MacArthur:
'What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?" According to the
notes kept by the conferees from Washington and compiled by General Bradley
and later released by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations
Committees, MacArthur replied:
Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second
months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful
of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The
^%jt in CofS, DA file 323-3, 12 Oct 50, see Schnabel, pp. 201-02;
also Collins, p. 175.
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Chinese have 300, 000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably
not more than 100,000 to 125,000 are distributed along the
Yalu River. Only 50, 000 to 60,000 could be gotten across the
Yalu River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases
for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down
to Pyong^^ang there would be the greatest slaughter.
With the Russians it is a little different. They have an
air force in Siberia and a fairly good one , with excellent pilots
equipped with some jets and B-25 and B-29 planes. They can
put 1, 000 planes in the air with some 200 to 300 more from the
Fifth and Seventh Soviet Fleets. They are probably no match
for our Air Force. The Russians have no ground troops avail-
able for North Korea. They would have difficulty in putting
troops into the field. It would take 6 weeks to get a division
across and 6 weeks brings the winter. The only other combina-
tion would be Russian air support of Chinese ground troops.
Russian air is deployed in a semicircle through Mul<;den and
Harbin, but the coordination between Russian air and the
Chinese ground v/ould be so flimsy that I believe Russian air
v/ould bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us.
Groimd support is a very difficult thing to do. Our marines
do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own Air
and Ground Forces are not as good as the marines but they
are effective. Between untrained air and ground forces an
air umbrella is impossible without a lot of joint training.
I believe it just wouldn't work with Chinese Communist ground
and Russian air. We are tlie best. ^'
According to General MacArthur, his reply to the question of the chance
of China's intervention was, in part:
My own military estimate was that with oin- largely
unopposed air forces, with their potential capable of destroying,
at will, bases of attack and lines of supply north as well as
south of the Yalu, no Chinese military commander would
hazard the commitment of large forces upon the devastated
Substance of Statements made ai: Wake Island Conference on October
15, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 5.
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Korean peninsula. The risk of their utter destruction through
lack of supply would be too great.
On Oetober 19, the State Department intelligcnee also came to the
conclusion that Chinese intervention was unlikely, but that Chinese threats
could not be dismissed as mere bluff. The basis of this intelligence
conclusion cannot be known from the available record.
On October 20, the Central Intelligence Agency delivered a memoran-
dum to Truman v/hich said that they had reports tliat the Chinese would move
into North Korea far enough as to be able to safeguard the Suiho electric
plant and other insttdlations along the Yalu River which provided them with
power.
Consequently, the State Department suggested to the Joint Chiefs that
MacArthur be instructed to disavow publicly any intention of destroying such
hydroelectric power facilities along the Manchurian border. An announcement
by MacArthur would have the dual purpose of allaying Chinese
fears of tres-
passing into Manchuria by the United Nations Command and of showing the





^^Acheson's testimony, Hearings, Pt. 3, 1833.
^^Truman, II, 372.
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destructive in purpose. The Joint Chiefs felt that such an announcement
would be militarily undesirable, but they were directed by Triunan to send
the suggestion to MacArthur. The Chiefs also told MacArthur that he could
fii
issue the text of the announcement if he wished.
MacArthur did not feel that the time was propitious for such an
announcement, especially since the Suiho Hydroelectric Power Plant at
Sinuiju was not under United Nations control and no determination could be
made at long range of how much power was being turned out or where it
was going. MacArthur explained:
If, however, this power is being utilized in
furtherance of potentially hostile military purposes
through the manufacture of munitions of war or there
is a diversion of it from the minimum peaceful
requirements of the Korean people, most serious
doubts would at once arise as to our justification for
maintaining status quo.
Thus, MacArthur did not wish his hands tied in such a manner. The
Joint Chiefs did not press the matter and the announcement was never
made. ^2
A few days earlier, on October 17, Truman spoke in San Francisco.
Among other things, he emphasized America's peaceful intentions in Korea:
^^Rad, JCS 94799, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Oct 50, see Scbnabel, p. 231.
According to Truman, the JCS was directed to ask MacArthur if he
bad any
objection to the issuing of such a statement. Truman, n, 372.
^^Rad, C67154, CINCFE to JCS, 22 Oct 50, in Schnabcl, pp.
231-32.
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Our sole purpose in Korea is to establish peace
and independence. Our troops will stay there only so long
as they are needed by the United Nations for that purpose.
We seek no territory or special privilege. Let this be
crystal clear to all—we have no aggressive designs in
Korea or in any other place in the Far East or elsewhere.
No country in the world which really wants peace has
any reason to fear the United States.
While Truman was speaking, the Eighth Army v/as advancing toward
the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, which was taken on October 19;
and the X Corps was being waterlifted to land at Wonsan on the east coast
of North Korea. ^'^
MacArthur also issued U.N. Operations Order No. 4, on October
17, which assigned a new objective for the United Nations Forces, to
capture territory up to a line running from Sonchon on the west coast to
Pyongwon, northwest of the Changjin Reservoir, and thence via Pungsan
65
to Songjin on the Sea of Japan, This line was about 40 miles south of
the Manchurian border most of the way but almost 100 miles from the
Russian frontier on the east coast. Operations Order No. 4 removed the
restrictions on the use of non-Korean, troops north of the Chongju-Kunuri-





A more detailed line would be Sonchon- Chongsanjanggol-Koin-
dong-Pyongwon-Toksil-li-P'-ingsan-Songjin. See Schnabel, p. 216.
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Yongwon-Hamhimg line, restrictions that had been stipulated by the Joint Chiefs
directive of September 27. All units, v/ithout regard to their composition, were
to press forward to the assigned objective line. North of this new line, however,
only ROK troops would operate. Although the western end of this line at Sonchon
w^as not far in advance of the JCS limiting line, in its center and on the east
coast it was from 50 to 100 miles ahead of the JCS line. General Collins later
wrote: "This was the first, but not the last, stretching of MacArthur's orders
beyond JCS instructions. If the Chiefs noted this—and I have no recollection
that we did—we offered no objection. "^^
Thus in mid-October, 1950, the Joint Chiefs allowed MacArthur to press
forward in North Korea. This move had the potential risk of inducing Chinese
intervention, especially in view of Chou En-lai's warning of October 3; Peldng's
public statement that America's crossing the 38th parallel was a menace to China's
security; and Chinese Communist troop movement to Manchuria and its military
build-up along the Korean-Manchurian border. But the U. S. intelligence estimate
continued to be that Chiaese intervention was not a probability, though a possibility.
An even more important factor in policy considerations was General MacArthur's
strong conviction, apparently shared by the Joint Chiefs and other policy-makers
in Washington, as indicated by the directive of October 9, that the United States
Collins, pp. 175-77; Schnabcl, p. 216.
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was no longer fearful of Chinese intervention. Thus MacArthur's advance north-
ward should not be stopped. He even got away with the use of non-Korean troops
in the area farther north than the Joint Chiefs had initially intended in their
directive of September 27. The original purpose of such restrictions in the
border region of North Korea had been to reduce the chances of Chinese or
Soviet entry.
Nevertheless, to avoid Chinese entry was still desirable if it could be
done other than halting MacArthur's drive.- (Soviet iatervention was treated as
less a problem by now. ) Thus the announcement was made by Truman that the
United States had no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place in the
Far East or elsewhere. And the attempt was also made, though not carried
out, to disavow publicly any intention of destroying hydroelectric power facilities
along the Manchurian border.
On October 18 American reconnaissance planes flying close to the Yalu
found almost 100 Russian-built fighters lined up on An-tung airfield across the
river in Manchuria. MacArthur's air commander, General Stratemeyer,
minimized tills ominous discovery by telling General Vandenberg in Washington
that the planes were probably there purposely to lend "color and credence to
menacing statements and threats of Chinese Communist leaders, who probably
felt that this display of strength involved no risk in view of our apparent desire
to avoid border incidents. " Stratemeyer certainly did not believe that the
Chinese meant to use these fighters to attack his planes since they had not
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done so when the observation aircraft, an easy target, had come close. "I
believe it especially significant, " he told Vanderberg, "that, if deployment for
possible action in Korea were under way, it would be highly unlikely that aircraft
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would have been positioned to attract attention from south of the border. "
Ten days later, in Tokyo, the GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary carried
what it termed a "reliable report" that 400,000 Chinese Communist soldiers
were in border -crossing areas, alerted to cross into North Korea. To detect
any such crossings, the UN Command ordered daily air reconnaissance flights
no
over the border area.
On October 24, 1950, MacArthur, without consulting his superiors, told
his field commanders that he was lifting the restrictions with respect to the
employment of United Nations forces in North Korea. He said that initially he
had established a restraining line for United Nations ground forces other than
Republic of Korea, in viev/ of the possibility of the enemy's capitulation. He
now authorized his field commanders to use any and all ground forces at their
commands, as necessary, in order to capture all of North Korea. He cautioned,
^however, that United Nations ground forces, other than those of the Republic
of Korea, should be withdrawn as soon as feasible and be replaced by Republic
^"^Rad, A25438, INT-IE, CG, FEAF to CS USAF, 20 Oct 50, in
Sclinabel, pp. 230-31.
^^Schnabel, p. 22, fn 24.
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of Korea units. MacArthur ordered all commanders under him to drive forward
with all speed and with full utilization of all of their forces.
On the same day, the Joint Chiefs advised MacArthur that his instructions
to his field commanders were not in consonance with their directive of September
27 which stated that as a matter of policy no non-Korean ground forces would
be used in the area along the Manchurian border or in the northeast province
bordering the Soviet Union. "While the Joint Chiefs of Staff realize," they told
him, "that you undoubtedly had sound reasons for issuing these instructions




On October 25, MacArthur replied to the Joint Chiefs that the instructions
reported in his message regarding the lifting of restrictions with regard to the
employment of United Nations forces in North Korea were a matter of military
necessity. He pointed out that the Republic of Korea forces were not of
sufficient strength and were not sufficiently well led to be able to handle the
situation. More seasoned commanders were necessary. MacArthur further
stated that he saw no conflict between the removal of these restrictions and the
directive dated September 27. This directive indicated that the instructions
—sent to MacArthur could not be considered final since they might require
^^Collins' testimony, Hearings, Pt. 2, 1240.
"^^Hearings, Pt. 2, 1240 and Sclmabel, p. 218,
157
modifications in accordance with developments. MacArthur felt that he had
the necessary latitude for modifications in a message from the Secretary of
Defense on September 30 which stated: 'We waat you to feel unhampered
tactically and strategically to proceed north of the parallel. " MacArthur also
assured the Joint Chiefs:
I am fully cognizant of the basic purjDOse and intent of
your directive, and every possible precaution is being taken
in the premises. The very reverse, however, would be
fostered and tactical hazards might even result from other
action than that which I have directed. This entire subject
was covered in my conference at Wake Island.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff "at least tacitly accepted MacArthur 's defense of his
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order and made no move to coiuitermand it, " wrote General Collins later.
MacArthur 's reference to Wake Island was difficult to prove precisely. There
was, of course, enthusiastic confidence then in MacArthur's strategy and judgment
in the wal^e of his success at Inchon. Both MacArthur and the Truman admini-
stration looked forward to a quick end to the war through the destruction of the
North Korean forces. Perhaps it did not occur to them at Wal^e Island that the
exclusive use of South Korean troops in the border region of North Korea might
not be sufficient to achieve the objective. The problem was reduced even
further by their common belief that a Chinese intervention was unlikely. Now,
'^^Hearings, Pt. 2, 1240-41; Truman, II, 372; Schnabel, p. 218.
"^^Collins, p. 180.
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ten days later, MacArthur found that there was a conflict between the goal of
the destruction of the North Korean troops and the policy of using only Korean
soldiers in the border area to avoid Chinese entry. He apparently reasoned
tliat since Chinese entry was still improbable, tlie former goal should talce
precedence over the latter policy. And the Joint Chiefs accepted his explanation.
The Purpose of Crossing the 38th Parallel:
An Assessment
Why did the United States decide to cross the 38th parallel? Was this
for the purpose of achieving Korean unification? What was the relationship
between the crossing and the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7,
1950? Why was the crossing not stopped by the threat of Chinese intervention?
Wliat role did the success of Inchon play in the decision to cross the parallel?
What was MacArthur's influence in the decision?
It is in the historical perspective that the critical significance of
America's decision to cross the 38th parallel can be clearly seen, since this
decision utlimately induced Chinese intervention, which then became the
decisive element in the subsequent developments of the Korean War.
One explanation for the decision has much to do with the success of the
Inchon landing on September 15. Immediately after the Inchon operation, the
indication was that the collapse of the North Korean Army was at hand. There
was a pressing need to exploit the military situation and the crossing would
promise a quick and total victory over the remjiants of the retreating North
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Korean troops.
Another explanation is that the crossing was in response to the UN
General Assembly resolution of October 7, for the achievement of "the
establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea.
"
The reasoning here is that peace and stability in Korea required the removal
of the barrier of the 38th parallel. Simply to drive the North Korean
Communists behind the parallel would only leave them free to rebuild and
re-equip for renewed attack. The political goal of Korean unification justified
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the crossing and going north.
It is true that in terms of the time sequence the main body of the U. S.
Eighth Army and other non-Korean UN forces actually crossed the 38th
parallel after the General Assembly adopted the resolution of October 7, But
America's policy decision to cross the parallel had already been made on
September 11, with a fev/ qualifications, i.e. , if there was no indication of
Soviet or Chinese intervention. And the authorization to cross the parallel was
given General MacArthur on September 27. Moreover, MacArthur's delay in
crossing had nothing to do with the UN resolution. It was his problem of
logistical supplies.
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See Rees, p. 100 and Lichterman in Stein, p. 596.
'^'^See Millis, p. 276. Also Ambassador Austin's speech of September
30, 1950 at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly.
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The date of September 11 is significant to understand the initial motive
of America's decision to cross the parallel. It preceded the Inchon landing
of September 15; thus the outcome of Inchon was still unlmown and uncertain,
especially in view of the daring and gambling character of the landing. It
cannot be said, then, that as a result of the success of Inchon, America decided
to cross the parallel to exploit the situation. Inchon had much to do with the
implementation stage of the policy decision to cross the parallel, especially
with regard to the qualifying condition of no Chinese intervention. But, as
far as the policy-making process was concerned, the outcome of Inchon could
not be a major factor.
On September 11 and throughout late August and early September, U.S.
and UN forces in Korea were surrounded by North Korean troops in the tiny
southern tip of the peninsula. Any limited scale of Chinese military inter-
vention might just push U. S. and UN forces out of Korea. Thus the danger
of Chinese entry must loom large, if not larger, than Soviet intervention, in
America's policy-making considerations. When the spectacle happened at
Inchon, the United States regained the confidence not only to defeat the North
Korean forces but also to deal with possible Chinese intervention. In tliis
atmosphere, Chinese official threat of military intervention in late September
and early October was not taken seriously. And MacArthur was instructed on
October 9 to deal differently with Chinese entry from Soviet entry.
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The purpose of crossing the 38th parallel was clearly stated in the
directive of September 27 from the Joint Chiefs to MacArthur, which was based
on the policy statement of September 11. Both documents had the approval of
Truman. The directive to MacArthur instructed:
Your military objective is the destruction of the North
Korean Armed Forces. In attaining this objective you are
authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious
and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th
Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation
there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or
Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended
entry, nor a threat to counter our opetations militarily in
North Korea. '^^
The crossing was thus essentially a move to achieve the military objective
of "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces. " America's military
leaders had been more insistent and consistent about this view than civilian
policy-makers. Within the State Department, there were two conflicting views.
One view, similar to the military's, to which Acheson finally agreed, had been
opposed by a second view that under no circumstances should MacArthur 's forces
cross the 38th parallel. The staff of the National Security Council had also
favored, in their study of September 1, the stabilization of the military situation
along the 38th parallel.
The military leaders had no such disagreement about the need to cross
the parallel, at least from the available record. General MacArthur had voiced
Schnabel, p. 182.
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such a view as early as mid-July when he told visiting members of the Joint
Chiefs in Tokyo, Collins and Vandenberg, that he intended to destroy all the
North Korean forces and not merely drive them back across the 38th parallel.
The planners in the Pentagon also made proposals on July 31 that MacArthur
should be directed to cross the parallel, defeat the enemy's forces and occpy
the country.
'^^
When Collins and Sherman visited Tolcyo, August 21-23, 1950, to discuss
the Inchon planning, they agreed with MacArthur that he should be authorized to
continue the attack, following a successful landing at Inchon, across the 38th
parallel to destroy the North Korean troops, which otherwise would be a
recurrent threat to the independence of South Korea.
'^'^
It may be said that
MacArthur had impressed his view favorably upon members of the Joint Chiefs
who, in reviewing the National Security Council study of September 1, stated
on September 7 that they agreed with MacArthur that the initial objective to be
obtained was the destruction of North Korean forces. In order to accomplish
this mission, no prior restrictions should be placed on MacArthur 's crossing
the parallel. In this instance, the view of the Joint Chiefs was finally adopted




the making of this policy had been dominated by the military. Acheson agreed
to it. And it was through the National Security Council that the final recommenda-
tion was made to Truman, who approved it. '^^
The question still remains: my was there such a strong desire, on
Sfjptember 11, to pursue and destroy the North Korean Army, thus requiring
the crossing of the 38th parallel? At this point the United States had not
contemplated to seek any new UN resolution. For a better understanding of
the passion of war, it may be fruitful to examine America's traditional approach
to war. In American thought, war could only be justified when fought as a
crusade, as a means of punishing the enemy who dared to disturb the peace.
By its nature, war was thought to be an all-out struggle that could be won only
by crushing the enemy totally. §0 During war the determining objective was
typically to obtain a clear-cut, definitive victory in the most effective manner as
quickly as possible. Thus foreign policy was largely suspended, and immediate
military considerations were dominant.
Up to the Second World War, the United States had fought all its wars in
the above-mentioned maimer. The tradition had been deeply rooted. In the case
of Korea, although a limited objective was formulated in the beginning because
of the fear of Soviet or Chinese intervention, soon the view of crossing the 38th
78See also Lichterman in Stein, p. 595.
79
See Rees, xi; Osgood (1957), p. 30.
80Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York;
Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), p. 44.
^^Osgood (1957), p. 29.
164
parallel to crush the North Korean enemy totally began to appear in the policy
discussions. In mid-September, with no clear indication of Soviet or Chinese
intention to intervene, and with the prospect of rapid military build-up in
America for strengthening world-wide defense against Commimist threats, the
tradition would prevail that a total victory over the North Korean forces could
and should be achieved. This meant that before the enemy troops in Korea were
willing to surrender, they had to be pursued and destroyed. If this could not be
accomplished south of the 38th parallel, then the crossing became a military
necessity. That was why the military were more insistent and consistent about
this step than the civilian policy- makers. America's tradition also tended to
pursue its wars in a political vacuum, i.e. , to dissociate military policy from
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political policy during the war. It may be said that the initial decision to
cross the 38th parallel was not necessarily nor directly related to the political
goal of Korean unification.
But why did the United States also press for the adoption of the UN
General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950, which re-stated the political
objective of the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic govern-
ment of Korea? Obviously the attempt at a new UN resolution was not made
until after the success of the Inchon landing had become apparent and the
See Osgood (1957), pp. 23-32.
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policy decision of crossing the 38th parallel was about to be carried out. As
Acheson later wrote, the new UN resolution represented a view that "was given
a strong push by the success at Inchon. "^^ MacArthur was given the authoriza-
tion to cross the parallel on September 27. Three days later the draft resolution
was introduced to the UN General Assembly. Clearly there was an urgent need
for the United States to obtain authorization and support from the United Nations
to conduct military operations in North Korea now that the actual crossing was
about to take place, even if only for the peoples of the world to see jind under-
stand better. Truman later wrote that the resolution, "if adopted, would be a
clear authorization for the United Nations commander to operate in North
84Korea. "°^ The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a draft copy of the UN resolution to
MacArthur on October 6, after the First Committee of the General Assembly
had voted for it and just before the UN General Assembly formally adopted
it, and told him that the United States Government considered it as supporting
operations north of the 38th parallel.
To regard it as authorization and support was one thing. To make it







achieve Korean unification by force. That was why the UN General Assembly
resolution of October 7 had to be stated "in ambivalent language" to avoid tlie
charge of attempting political unification by military force while at the same
time it could provide authorization and support to MacArthur's military
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operations across the parallel in North Korea.
Acheson would never admit that the objective in the new UN resolution
was a war aim. He would contend that unification had never been made some-
thing the United Nations would fight for. However, if, in the process of
destroying Communist resistance unification could also be achieved, that
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would be fine. During the MacArthur hearings, Acheson explained that if
the Chinese had not entered the war, "force would have been used to round
up those people who were putting on the aggression. We were unifying it as
a result of the request of the Koreans, and it would be through elections, and
that sort of thing. "^^
This vagueness on the relationship between the military operations in
North Korea and the UN recommendation of unification represented the
opportunistic aspect of America's policy on Korea. The United States Govern-
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cf. Rees, pp. 101-02.
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See Lichterman in Stein, p. 594.
^^Hearings, Pt. 3, 2258.
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ment did not want to say explicitly that the goal of Korean unification was worth
fighting for, yet America would welcome and desire the results of vinification
through use of force. Thus, when General MacArthur, who felt less constrained
and less hesitant, clearly declared in his surrender demand to North Korean
forces on October 9, that unless the North Koreans immediately surrendered and
cooperated "fully with the United Nations in establishing a unified independent
democratic government of Korea" he would "at once proceed to take such military
action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations, " the
Truman administration did not repudiate him and the world believed his assump-
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tion. ' At this point MacArthur's troops crossed the 38th parallel to do just
what he said he would do.
The initial decision to cross the parallel was primarily a military move,
dictated by America's traditional approach to war, to crush the North Korean
enemy totally, if there was no indication of Soviet or Chinese intention to enter.
The success of Inchon removed the fear of Chinese intervention and enabled the
decision to be implemented. Soon after the authorization was given MacArthur
to cross the parallel, a new resolution was introduced to the UN General Assembly
to justify the crossing and military operations in North Korea. The adopted
resolution of October 7, 1950 re-stated the political objective of Korean unification
without explicitly maiding it a war aim. The United States Government was
^^cf. Lichterman in Stein, p. 594.
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opportunistic enough to want to see unification as a result of the use of force,
but only MacArthur unequivocally announced that his military action across the
parallel was to achieve the UN goal of a unified, independent and democratic
government of Korea.
CHAPTER V
U. S. POLICY ON CHBNIESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION
Initial Contacts with the Chinese Communist
Forces in North Korea and the Bombing of
the Yalu Bridges
Following the success of the Inchon landing, the United States was no
longer fearful of possible Chinese intervention and Chou En-lai's warning of
October 3 was not taken seriously, as mentioned earlier. In addition, both
General MacArthur and the United States Government believed that Chmese
entry was unlikely. Not only had he crossed the 38th parallel, but MacArthur
pushed forward to the north. The restrictions on using only Korean troops in
the border region of North Korea were also removed by MacArthur and the
measure was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after MacArthur explained it.
As the United Nations Forces advanced northward toward the Yalu in
late October 1950, they suddenly came into contact with strong enemy resistance
which turned out to be Chinese Communist forces. On October 25, almost
simultaneously in both western and eastern Korea, Chinese prisoners were taken.
General Willougliby reported this fact to Washington on October 28 and said
that he believed organized Chinese units were in Korea. But he discounted their
significance by saying:
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From a tactical standpoint, with victorious United States
divisions in full deployment, it would appear that the auspicious
time for intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to
believe that such a move, if planned, would have been postponed
to a time when remnant North Korean forces have been reduced
to a low point of effectiveness. ^
By October 31, General Bradley had received information which showed
that elements of five Chinese Communist divisions had been identified south of
the Yalu, the largest being a regiment. On the same day. General Collins told
the Army Policy Coimcil that the reported crossings of the Yalu River might
reflect a face-saving effort since Chou En-lai had declared that his government
would not stand idly by and watch the North Koreans go down in defeat. Collins
did not think that the Chinese would cross the river in sufficient numbers to risk
a serious beating by MacArthur 's forces. However, when asked if the Chinese
could become a real threat to the United Nations Command, Collins replied that
they definitely could in spite of their lack of airpower and their weakness in
artillery.
On the battlefront, the United Nations forces actually suffered serious
setbacks due to Chinese attacks. By October 31, General Walker ordered the
advance of the Eighth Army halted and drew his main forces back across the
Chongchon, holding only a shallow bridgehead above the river.
^
^DIS, GHQ, UNC, 2971, 28 Oct 50, in Schnabel, pp. 233-34.
^Schnabel, pp. 234-35. For Walker's detailed explanation in a
letter to
General MacArthur, see Schnabel, pp. 235-36.
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On November 2, General Willoughby reported to Washington that 16, 500
Chinese Communist soldiers had entered North Korea. The Chinese Communist
government reputedly was labeling these troops "volunteers. " Willoughby was
puzzled by the Chinese device of com.mitting "volunteers" in "special units,"
such as "Volimteer Corps for the Protection of the Hydroelectric Zone," tastead
of in regular organized regiments of the Chinese Communist Army. He concluded
by warning:
Although indications so far point to piecemeal commit-
ment for ostensible limited purposes only, it is important not
to lose sight of the maximum potential that is immediately
available to the Chinese Communists. Should the high level
decision for full intervention be made by the Chinese Communists,
they could promptly commit 29 of their 44 divisions presently
deployed along the Yalu and support a major attack with up to
150 aircraft. 2
On that same day, November 2, the American Consul General in Hong
Kong sent Washington a report that Communist China had formally made the
decision on October 24 to enter the Korean War. An estimated twenty Chinese
Communist armies had been sent to Manchuria.^
^Telecon, TT 3968, G-2 DA (Boiling) with G-2 FEC (Willoughby), 2 Nov
50; in Sclmabel, pp. 239-40.
^Intell Rpt, 2 Nov 50, in G-2, DA files, see Sclmabel, p. 240. Usually
there were three or four divisions in a Chinese army. See Appleman, p. 751
and Schnabel, p. 179.
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On November 3, Willoughby reported 316,000 regular Chinese ground
forces and 274,000 Chinese irregulars, or security forces, in Manchuria. Most
of the regulars were believed to be along the Yalu at numerous crossing sites. ^
These disclosures had an extremely ominous ring and, together with the
news of the withdrawal of the Eighth Army before Chinese forces already in
Korea, caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to call on General MacArthur for an
evaluation. They requested his earliest "interim appreciation of the situation in
Korea and its implications in light of what appears to be overt intervention by
Chinese Commimist units. " MacArthur replied on November 4, 1950:
It is impossible at this time to authoritatively appraise
the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North
Korea. Various possibilities exist based upon the battle
intelligence coming in from the front.
First, that the Chinese Communist Government proposes
to intervene with its full potential military forces, openly pro-
claiming such course at what it might determine as an appropriate
time; second, that it will covertly render military assistance, but
will, so far as possible, conceal the fact for diplomatic reasons;
third, that it is permitting and abetting a flow of m.ore or less
voluntary personnel across the border to strengthen and assist
the North Korean remnants in their struggle to retain a nominal
foothold in Korea; fourth, that such intervention, as exists, has
been in the belief that no UN forces would be committed in the
extreme northern reaches of Korea except those of South Korea.
_ A realization that such forces were insufficient for the purpose
^Telecon, TT 3971, DA and GHQ, UNC, 3 Nov 50; see Schnabel, p. 240.
^Rad, WAR 95790, CSUSA to CINCFE, 3 Nov 50; in Schnabel, p. 240.
Truman later wrote: "I asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain an up-to-date
estimate of the situation from General MacArthur," as this time. See Truman,
n, 373.
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may well have furnished the concept of salvaging something from
the wreckage.
The first contingency would represent a momentous
decision of the gravest international importance. While it is
a distinct possibility, and many foreign experts predict such
action, there are many fundamental logical reasons against it
and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant its
immediate acceptance.
The last three contingencies, or a combination thereof,
seem to be most likely conditions at the present moment.
I recommend against hasty conclusions which might be
premature and believe that a final appraisement should await
a more complete accumulation of military facts.
Within MacArtliur's Headquarters, the estimate of Chinese forces already
in North Korea was raised from 16, 500 on November 2 to 34, 000 on November 3.
Chinese troops had crossed and were continuing to cross into North Korea from
Manchuria over a number of international bridges. The number of Chinese troops
in Manchuria, ready to cross into North Korea if ordered, was also raised from
316, 000, which Willoughby reported to V/ashington on November 3, to 415, 000 on
o
the same day.
According to James F. Schnabel, "the appearance of Chinese military
formations in Korea and evidence that these forces were being augmented rapidly,
9
caused MacArthur to call for an all-out air effort to smash them. " On November
Truman, II, 373; see also Schnabel, pp. 240-41.
'DIS GHQ FEC UNC, No. 2977, 3 Nov 50; see Schnabel, p. 241.
Sclmabel, p. 241.
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5. MacArthur ordered General Stratemeyer to throw the full power of the Far
East Air Forces into a two-week effort to knock the North Koreans and their new
allies out of the war. "Combat crews are to be flown to exliaustion if necessary. "
MacArthur instructed Stratemeyer to destroy the Korean ends of all international
bridges on the Manchurian border. From the Yalu southward, excepting Rashin,
the Suiho Dam, and other hydroelectric plants, the Far East Air Forces were to
"destroy every means of communication and every installation, factory, city, aiid
village. " MacArthur warned that there must be no border violations and that all
targets close to or on the border must be attacked only under visual bombing
conditions.
Also on November 5, MacArthur sent a special report to the UN Security
Council, stating that the United Nations Forces "are presently in hostile contact
with Chinese Communist military units, " and providing confirmed intelligence
reports on Chinese prisoners of war taken in Korea and the result of their
interrogation.
On that same day, MacArthur 's General Headquarters informed Washington
that an official statement of the Chinese Communist Government on November 4
charged that the United States was bent on conquering not only Korea but also
•^^USAF Historical Study No. 72, United States Air Force Operations in
the Korean Confl ict , 1 November 1950 - 30 June 1953 (Washington, D. C. : Air
Force Historictil Division, 1955 and 1956), p. 22; cited in Sclmabel, p. 241.
^^Hearings, Pt. 5, 3492-93.
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China, as "the Japanese imperialists have done in the past. " The statement,
possibly made to prepare the Chinese people for further moves in Korea, claimed
that in order to protect China, Chinese military forces must now assist North
Korea.
During a routine daily teleconference on November 6, MacArthur notified
Army authorities that he intended to have his B-29's take out immediately the
international bridges across the Yalu between Sinuiju and Antrnig. He hoped, by
destroying these bridges, to prevent or at least slow down the flow of Chinese
military strength into Korea. Had this matter been handled routinely by the
Army staff and merely reported through channels, the mission might have been
well under way before the nation's leaders learned about MacArthur's intentions.
However, about three and one -half hours before his planes were due to
take off, General Stratcmeyer radioed directly to Air Force Headquarters in
12
Telecon, TT 3975, DA and GHQ, UNC, 5 Nov 50; see Sclinabel, p. 241.
This was a joint declaration by all parties participating in the Peking regime. It
asserted that there were no limits to tlie aggressive ambitions of imperialists
and that, in launching the aggressive war against Korea, the Americtin imperialists
certainly did not confine their design to the destruction of the North Korean
government but also wanted to invade China, extend their rule over Asia, and
conquer the whole world. In the joint declaration the conclusion was drawn that
China's security was intimately related to the existence of the North I^Corean
regime, that to save one's neighbor was to save oneself, and that to defend the
fatherland required giving help to the people of Korea. See Tsou, pp. 576-77.
For the full text of the joint declaration, see a reprint in Hsin-hua yueh-pao,







Washington the gist of his order from MacArthur. This information was promptly
passed to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett. ^5
WOiat happened next on November 6 was later described by Acheson in the
following way:
Shortly after ten o'clock that morning Robert Lovett
brought the order to me in the State Department, saying that
he doubted whether the bombing would importantly interrupt
traffic across the river and that the danger of bombing the
Manchurian city of Antung was great. Mr. Rusk, who was with
us, contributed that we were committed not to attack Manchurian
points without consultation .with the British and that their Cabinet
was meeting that morning to reconsider their attitude toward the
Chinese Communist Government. We had also asked the UN
Security Council for an urgent meeting to consider General
MacArthur's report of Chinese intervention in Korea. Ill-
considered action at this mom.ent could be unfortimate. We agreed
and telephoned General Marshall, who thought that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff should be asked to postpone MacArthur's action until the
President's instructions could be obtained.
Acheson then telephoned Truman in Kansas City and explained the situation, adding
that MacArthur's reports as late as the day before had contained no hint of move-
ments across the river but had spoken only of reserves on the Chinese side.
Truman told Acheson that he would approve this bombing mission only if there was
an immediate and serious threat to the security of the troops. Subject to this,
Truman agreed on the importance of postponing the action until they could find out
17
why MacArthur suddenly found this action necessary.




, pp. 463-64; Truman, H, 374-75.
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Lovett then met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff who sent a message to
MacArthiir in accordance with the President's instructions. The message went
out at 11:40 Washington time, only an hour and twentj^ minutes before the B-29's
were scheduled to tal^e off from Japan. The Joint Chiefs directed MacArthur
to call off until further orders any bombing of the international bridges.
"Consideration is being urgently given to the Korean situation at the governmental
level, " they told him. They also explained:
One factor is the present commitment not to take action
affecting Manchuria without consulting the British. Until further
orders postpone all bombing of targets within five miles of the
Manchurian border. Urgently need your estimate of the situation
and the reason for ordering bombing of Yalu River bridges as
Indicated. -^^
General MacArthur immediately replied:
Men and material in large force are pouring across all
bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only
jeopardizes but tlireatens the ultimate destruction of the forces
under my command. The actual movement across the river can
be accomplished under cover of darkness and the distance between
the river and our lines is so short that the forces can be deployed
against our troops without being seriously subjected to air
interdiction. The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy
is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all
in stall at' ons in the north area supporting the enemy advance to the
maximum of our air destruction. Every hour that this is post-
poned will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations
blood. The main crossing at Sinuiju was to be hit within the next
few hours and the mission is actually being mounted. Under the
gravest protest that I can make, I am suspending this strike and
^^Truman, II, 375.
^Rad, JCS 95878, JCS (Personal for MacArthur), 6 Nov 50; in Schnabel,
pp. 242-43.
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carrying out your instructions. What I had ordered is entirely
within the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and
directions which I have received from the United Nations and
constitutes no slightest act of belligerency against Chinese
territory, in spite of the outrageous international lawlessness
emanating therefrom. I cannot overemphasize the disastrous
effect, both physical and psychological, that will result from
the restrictions which you are imposing. I trust that the matter
be immediately brought to the attention of the President as I
believe your instructions may well result in a calamiity of
major proportion for which I cannot accept the responsibility
without his personal and direct understanding of the situation.
Time is so essential that I request immediate reconsideration
of your decision pending which complete compliance will of
course be given to your order.
General Bradley read this message to President Truman over the telephone.
Even though the President was aware of the dangers involved in such a bombing
attack, he thought that since MacArthur was on the scene and felt so strongly
about its unusual urgency, the President told Bradley to give MacArthur the
"go-ahead. " Thus the Joint Chiefs sent MacArthur the following message on
November 6, 1950:
The situation depicted in your message [of November 6]
is considerably chaiiged from that reported in last sentence your
message [of November 4] which was our last report from you.
We agree that the destruction of the Yalu bridges would contribute
materially to the security of the forces under your command
unless this action resulted in increased Chinese Communist
effort and even Soviet contribution in response to what they might
well construe as an attack on Manchuria. Such a result would
not only endanger your forces but would enlarge the area of
conflict and U. S. involvement to a most dangerous degree.
Truman, II, 375.
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However, in view of first sentence your message [ofNovember 6] you are authorized to go ahead with your plannedbombmg in Korea near the frontier including targets at Sinuiju
and Korean end of Yalu bridges provided that at time of receipt
of this message you still find such action essential to safetj' of
your forces. The above does not authorize the bombing of anydams or power plants on the Yalu River.
Because of necessity for maintaining optimum position
with United Nations policy and directives and because it is vital
in the national interests of the U. S. to localize the fighting in
Korea it is important that extreme care be talcen to avoid"
violation Manchurian territory and airspace and to report
promptly hostile action from Manchuria.
It is essential that we be kept informed of important
changes in situation as they occur and that your estimate as
requested in our [message of Nov. 6] be submitted as soon as
possible.
The bombing of the Yalu bridges was caused by military urgency created
by the strong attacks by Chinese Communist forces upon MacArthur's troops in
North Korea. Apparently the Chinese attacks were powerful and harmful. At
first MacArthur did not report any alarming situation, perhaps because he did not
want Washington to be so concerned that it might change his mission of advancing
to destroy the North Korean forces or impose new restrictions on his conduct of
operations. Thus Washington had not shared MacArthur's urgency when he first
ordered the bombing. In addition, the United States Government felt committed
to consulting the British since the contemplated bombing might affect the situation





Nations involved. Above all. Washington desired to localize the fighting in Korea
by trying to avoid any violation of Manchurian territory especially from the air.
which might accidentally happen in a bombing mission near the border.
MacArthur argued that the bombing was within the scope of the United Nations
resolutions and directions. Actually these resolutions had not provided for the
circumstance of Chinese Communist troops fighting in North Korea against UN
forces. As it turned out. the battle urgency prevailed and the bombing was
permitted without consulting the British.
By that time, American intelligence agencies in Washington had prepared
an estimate of Chinese intentions based on the pooled information from all sources.
The estimate concluded that between 30. 000 and 40. 000 Chinese were now in
North Korea and that as many as 700, 000 men, including 350, 000 ground troops,
could be sent into Korea to fight against the United Nations forces. These Chinese
forces would be capable of halting the United Nations advance either by piecemeal
commitment or by a powerful all-out offensive, forcing the United Nations forces
to withdraw to defensive positions farther south. The intelligence report concluded
with a warning:
A likely and logical development of the present situation
is that the opposing sides will build up their combat power in
successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of
major magnitude are involved. At any point the danger is
present that the situation may get out of control and lead to a
general war.
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This inteUigence estimate was furnished to all high-level planning and policy
groups, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 6. 22 Truman later wrote
that he was supplied with such an estimate at that time. 2^
In retrospect this intelligence estimate should have received more immediate
attention and response, especially since it was realistically based on the capabaities
of the Chinese Communists rather than merely trying to guess their intentions.
But events would soon overtake and alter the perspective of its warning. For at
this point (November 6) in the Korean battlefield, the Chinese broke off their
attacks on the Eighth Army and withdrew mto the hills to the north in Korea. 2^
This disengagement would have effects upon MacArthur's evaluation of Chinese
intervention and his plans to cope with it.
MacArthur sent his estimate of the situation, as had been requested by
the JCS, in tv/o messages on November 7. In the first of these messages, he
concluded that he had been confirmed in his belief that this was not a full-scale
22
Intell. Estimate, 6 Nov 50, sub: Chinese Communist Intervention in
Korea, in G-2, DA files; see Schnabel, p. 245.
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Truman, 11, 376-77. Truman's statement that: "It reported that there
might be as many as two hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in
Manchuria" was probably incorrect. According to Matthew B. Ridg-vvay,
MacArthur's G-2 had estimated around this time that the Chinese could put
200, 000 troops across the Yalu per month . See Ridgway, The Korean War,
p. 60.
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intervention by the Chinese Communitsts. However, the Chinese threat w
real and developing one. That Chinese forces were engaging his forces
unquestionable, although their exact strength was difficult for his commanders
to determine. They were strong enough to have seized the initiative from
Walker's forces in the west and to have materially slowed Almond's advances
the east. "The principle seems thoroughly established, " MacArthur said, "that
such forces will be used and augmented at will, probably without any formid
declaration of hostilities. " He emphasized that if the Chinese augmentation
continued it could reach "a point rendering our resumption of advance impossible
and even forcing a movement in retrograde. " But he affirmed his intentions to
resume his advance in the west, possibly within ten days, and to try to seize the
initiative, provided the enemy flow of reinforcements could be checked. "Only
through such an offensive effort can any accurate measure be taken of enemy
strength. " MacArthur went on to say:
I deem it "essential to execute the bombing of the targets
under discussion as the only resource left to me to prevent a
potential buildup of enemy strength to a point threatening the
safety of the command. This interdiction of enemy lines of
advance within Korea is so plainly defensive that it is hard to
conceive that it would cause an increase in the volume of local
intervention or, of itself, provoke a general war.
The inviolability of Manchuria and Siberia has been a
cardinal obligation of this headquarters from the beginning of
hostilities and all verified hostile action therefrom is promptly
reported. The destruction of hydroelectric installation has never
been contemplated. Complete daily situation reports will continue
to be furnished you as heretofore.
Truman, H, 377; Sclmabel, p. 245.
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The second message from MacArthur on November 7 was about air
operations:
Hosti].e planes are operating from bases west of the Yalu
River against our forces in North Korea. These planes are
appearmg in increasing numbers. The distance from the Yalu to
the mam line of contact is so short that it is almost impossible
to deal effectively with the hit and run tactics now being employed
The present restrictions imposed on my area of operations
provide a complete sanctuary for hostile air immediately upon
their crossing the Manchuria-North Korean border. The effect
of this abnormal condition upon the morale and combat efficiency
of both air and ground troops is major.
Unless corrective- measures are promptly tal<:en this factor
can assume decisive proportions. Request instructions for
dealing with this new and threatening development. 26
The Joint Chiefs immediately replied to MacArthur that "urgent necessity for
corrective measures" was being presented for highest United States-level
consideration.
Starting on November 8 and continuing until December 5, MacArthur sent
the Far East Air Force to bomb all the main Yalu bridges from Sinuiju to
Hyesanjin. By the end of November, the air effort had succeeded, at great cost,
in cutting four of the international bridges and in damaging most of the others.
Chinese disengagement after November 6 encouraged MacArthur to tliink
that they were not attempting a full-scale intervention in Korea while it also made
26







him want to resume offensive advance to take an "accurate measure" of enemy
strength, in conjunction with the bombing of the Yalu bridges to check their flow
of reinforcements
.
On November 9, the Far East Command intelligence report carried an
analysis of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in Korea. It accepted 8 CCF
divisions from 4 armies with a strength of 51, 600 men as being in contact with
UN forces; it accepted 2 more divisions with 12,600 men as probably in contact,
and still another 2 divisions with 12,600 men as possible being in the X Corps
zone but not in contact with UN forces. This analysis gave a total of 76, 800 CCF
troops as probably being in North Korea. 29 On the same day, MacArthur
Headquarters publicly stated that "strong forces of the Chinese Communist Army,
estimated at 60, 000 men, had entered the Korean War, with an equal number of
reinforcements believed to be on the way. From mid-November to November
24, the Far East Command apparently accepted Chinese Communist strength in
Korea at a maximum of 70, 051 and a minimum of 44, 851.
In the week preceding the resumption of the UN attack on November 24,
the Department of the Army in Washington accepted the estimate of 51, 600 CCF
troops in Korea, and a probable total of 76,800 CCF troops in Korea.
pq
^^FEC DIS 2983, 9 Nov, aud 2988, 14 Nov 50; See Applemaa, pp. 762-63.
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-examination of MacArthur's Mission in Koron
and the National Security CounciT Mectino;
of November 9, 1950
On November 8, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur that the
eventuality anticipated in their instructions to him of September 27, "entry into
North Korea by major.
. .
Chinese forces,
" appeared to have been realized. At
least the introduction of Chinese forces to the extent reported by him would so
signify. "We believe therefore, " they warned him, "that this new situation
indicates your objectives as stated in that message, "the destruction of the North
Korean armed forces, " may have to be re-examined. "^"^
MacArthur protested vigorously to the Joint Chiefs on November 9
against any re-examination of his mission. MacArthur pointed out that their
instructions to him on October 10 had exactly defined his course of action in the
present situation. They had told him, in the event of the open or covert employ-
ment anjrwhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units without prior
announcement, to continue the action as long as in his judgment his forces had
a reasonable chance of success. "In my opinion it would be fatal to weal<;en the
fundamental and basic policy of the United Nations to destroy all resisting armed
forces in Korea and bring that country into a united and free nation, " MacArthur
warned. lie proclaimed his faith in the effectiveness of air interdiction by
'Rad, JCS 96060, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Nov 50; in Schnabcl, p. 250.
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telling the Joint Chiefs that he could, with his air power, keep the numbers of
Chinese reinforcements crossing the Yalu low enough to enable him to destroy
ttiose Chinese already in Ko rea. He meant to launch his attack to destroy those
forces about November 15 and to keep going until he reached the border. lie
explained:
Any program short of this would completely destroy the
morale of my forces and its psychological consequences would
be inestimable. It would condemn us to an indefinite retention
of our military forces along difficult defense lines in North
Korea and would unquestionably arouse such resentment among
the South Koreans that their forces would collapse or might
even turn against us.
MacArthur further stated that anyone who hoped that the Chinese, once they
had succeeded in establishing themselves in North Korea, would abide by any
agreement not to move southward would be indulging in wishful tliinldng at its
very worst.
MacArthur also deprecated the "Munich attitude" of the British. "The
widely reported British desire to appease the Chinese Communists by giving
them a strip of North Korea, " he said, "finds a most recent precedent in the
action taken at Munich on 29 September 1938 by Great Britain, France and
Italy. . . . "^^ He went further and referred to a State Department document
criticizing the British appeasement of Hitler to lend emphasis to his statement.
He warned that any such appeasement of the Communist aggression carried the







germs of ultimate destruction for the United Nations.
In this message of November 9, MacArthur argued fervently:
To give up a portion of North Korea to the aggression
of the Chinese Communists would be tlic greatest defeat of the
free world in recent times. Indeed, to yield to so immoral a
proposition would banlcrupt our leadership and influence in
Asia and render untenable our position, both politically and
militarily. It would not curb deterioration of the present
situation into the possibility of a general war, but would
impose upon us the disadvantage of having inevitably to fight
such a war if it occurs, bereft of the support of countless'
Asiatics who now believe in us and are eager to fight with us.
Such an abandonment of principle would entirely reverse the
tremendous moral and psychological uplift throughout Asia
and perhaps the entire free world, which accompanied the
United Nations decison of June 25th, and leave in its place the
revulsion against the organization bordering on complete
disillusionment and distrust.
From a military standpoint, I believe that the United
States should press for a resolution in the United Nations
condemning the Chinese Communists for their defiance of the
United Nations' orders by invading Korea and opening
hostilities against the United Nations' forces, calling upon the
Communists to withdraw forthwith to positions north of the
international border on pain of military sanctions by the United
Nations should they fail to do so. I recommend with all the
earnestness that I possess that there be no weakening at this
critical moment and that we press on to complete victory which
I believe can be achieved if our determination and indomitable
will do riot desert us.
See Wliitney, pp. 411-12.
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Whitney, p. 412; see also Schnabcl, pp. 251-52. Schnabel's version
uses "any" portion, instead of "a" portion in the phrase, "to give up a portion of
North Korea to tJie aggression of the Chinese Communists. ..." According to
Schnabcl, MacArthur also asserted that by moving to halt his forces short of the
Yalu River American authorities "wouid follow clearly in the footsteps of the
British wlio by the appeasement of recognition lost the respect of all the rest
of Asia without gaining that of the Chinese segment. " Sclmabel, p. 251.
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In this message MacArthur was going beyond strictly military issues to
argue on political and moral grounds. His basic assumption was that a complete
victory over the enemy forces of Chinese Communists and North Korean remnants
in North Korea was imperative for the credibility and prestige of the United
Nations and America's leadership and influence in Asia. It was also required for
the maintenance of the South Koreans' will to continue to fight. He wanted to
press on until he reached the border and thus unite the nation. He was less
concerned about provoking Chinese full-scale intervention by the drive to the
Yalu. A total victory in Korea was his aim.
Truman directed the National Security Council to meet on November 9 to
consider on an urgent basis what the national policy should be toward Chinese
Communist involvement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been instructed to furnish
their views on what should be done.
On November 9, 1950, the Joint Chiefs forwarded to the Secretary of
Defense for consideration by the National Security Council a lengthy analysis
containing their views and recommendations. Without accepting the theory that
the Chinese troops in Korea were volunteers, the Joint Chiefs expressed the
opinion that such a view was feasible in the event that the Chinese merely wanted
to gain time for the defeated and disorganized remnants of the North Korean army.
But they pointed out that intelligence reports did not back up this theory, since
they showed that Chinese Communist soldiers were entering Korea both as
individuals and in well-organized, well-led and well-equipped units, probably
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of division size.
Examining Chinese motives in sending military forces against the United
Nations Command, the Joint Chiefs saw three possibilities, alftough none of
these had as yet been made clear by Chinese actions either in Korea or in
Manchuria: the Chinese might wish to protect the Yalu River and the Changjin-
Pujon Reservoir power complexes and establish a cordon sanitaire in North
Korea; they might wish to continue the active but undeclared war in Korea to
drain American resources without expending too much of their own military
strength; or they could be planning to drive the United Nations forces from
Korea. If the Chinese Communists were prevented, through United Nations
action, from obtaining electricity from the Yalu power systems, Manchuria's
economy would suffer severely. Consequently, if the Chinese Communists had
intervened in Nortli Korea solely to protect the power plants, it might be well,
the Joint Chiefs suggested to the Secretary of Defense, to announce an unmistakably
clear guarantee tliat the United Nations would not infringe on the sovereignty of
Manchuria, would not damage the power plants, and would not interfere with
their operation. If the Chinese Communists rejected such a guarantee, the
United States could feel fairly certain that they had some other objective in
intervening.
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The Joint Chiefs thought that it was also a real possibility that the Chine
might be planning a limited war of attrition in Korea to tie down and dissipate
United States strength. "Korea is at such a distance from the United States
that it would be expensive for the United States m manpower, materiel, and
money to conduct an undeclared war in that area over a long period. " Con-
versely, the Chinese, being next door to Korea, would fmd it comparatively
inexpensive, with their practically vmlimited manpower and Soviet equipment,
to carry on such a war indefinitely. The continual involvement of United States
forces in Korea would, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs, be in the interests of
Russia and of world communism by imposing a heavy drain on U. S. military
and economic strength. They still considered Korea a "strategically unimportant
area" and felt that, in the event of a global war, fighting in Korea would leave
the United States off-balance while Russia completed its plans for global
conquest. The Joint Chiefs could also visualize quite clearly a situation v/hereby
the United States, through concentrating its strength to defeat the Chinese in
Korea, might, "win the skirmish in Korea but lose the war against the USSR
if global war eventuates. ^^^^
The Jomt Chiefs did not truly believe that the Chinese Commujiists
intended to drive the United Nations forces from all of Korea. Wliile it was




could not force MacArthur 's men off the peninsula "without material assist,
by Soviet naval and airpower. " If Russia did intervene to that extent, it would
be evident that World War m had begun and the United States should get its
divisions out of Korea as fast as possible.
If the Chinese intervened in full strength, the Joint Chiefs foresaw three
possible courses of action for United Nations forces: to continue the action as
planned; to set up a defensive line short of Korea's northern border; or to
withdraw. In the first instance, some augmentation of United Nations military
strength in Korea might be necessary if a drive to the Yalu were to succeed,
even if no more ;Chinese troops entered the fighting. The second course, pause
and dig in, was, in the eyes of the Joint Chiefs, perfectly feasible and, indeed,
perhaps expedient in the face of unclarified military and political problems
raised by Chinese entry. But they rejected withdrawal because "if conducted
voluntarily it would so lower the world wide prestige of the United States that
it would be totally unacceptable.
. . .
" If the United Nations forces were
compelled to leave Korea involuntarily it "could only be accepted as the pre-
lude to global war. " With specific reference to global war, the Joint Chiefs
maintained that current conditions did not conclusively indicate that global






The conclusion and the recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were:
1. Every effort should be expended as a matter of
urgency to settle the problem of Chinese Communist inter-
vention in Korea by political means, preferably through the
Umted Nations, to include reassurances to the Chinese
Communists with respect to our intent, direct negotiations
through our Allies and the Interim Committee [of the UN
General Assembly] with the Chinese Communist Government,
and by any other available means.
2. Pending further clarification as to the military
objectives of the Chinese Com.munists and the extent of their
intended commitments,
.the mission assigned to the Commander
in Chief, United Nations Command, should be kept under
review, but should not be changed.
3. The United States should develop its plans and malce
its preparations on the basis that the risk of global war is
increased.'^'*
Whereas MacArthur advocated a military solution to the problem of
Chinese Communist intervention, i.e.
, a total victory, the Joint Chiefs favored
political means and negotiations through the United Nations or other diplomatic
channels. Whereas MacArthur was less concerned about a general war resulting
from his drive to the Yalu, the Joint Chiefs had to consider the undesirable
consequences of even a limited war in Korea over a long period against the
Chinese Communists, because it would impose a heavy drain on U. S, military
and economic strength, while the Soviet Union could preserve and prepare for
global conquest. The aim of the Joint Chiefs was not a victory over the Chinese
Truman, II, 378; also Schnabel, p. 254.
Communists in Korea, for they were the wrong enemy at the wrong place. The
overall strategic objective was to act m such a way as to insure victory over the
U. S. S.R. in a future global war. As for the immediate military strategy in
Korea to deal with possible full-scale Chinese intervention, the Joint Chiefs
preferred to pause and dig in without either withdrawing or advancing.
But because of Chinese disengagement which obscured their objectives
and their intended commitments as far as America was concerned, and because
of MacArthur's strong argument that his mission in Korea should not be changed,
the Joint Chiefs recommended to the National Security Coimcil tliat MacArtlmr's
mission of "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces" should be kept
under review but should not be changed.
Apparently when the Joint Chiefs submitted their recommendations to the
National Security Council, they had already received MacArthur's message of
November 9 insisting' that his mission in Korea should not be changed. Acheson
wrote later:
The Joint Chiefs were intimidated but not convinced
by this blast [from MacArthur]. They believed, as they always
had, that Chinese power, if the Chinese chose to exert it, could
be defeated militarily in North Korea only by a greatly augmented
and determined American effort and that we had other and more
pressing needs for our forces elsewhere. The goal of a free and
united Korea belong, if it were achievable at all, in the field
of diplomatic effort. Therefore, they recommended—witli
presidential approval through the National Security Council—
that the mission assigned to General MacArthur should be kept
under review but not changed at that time.
^Acheson, pp. 465-66.
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The Central Intelligence Agency's estimate of the situation at this time was tliat
the Russians were not themselves willing to go to war but that they wanted to
involve the United States as heavily as possible in Asia so that they might gain
a free hand in Europe. '^^
Bradley represented the Joint Chiefs at the l^^ational Security Council
meeting on November 9, which was attended by the Secretaries of State and
Defense, Bedell Smith (then head of CIA), and other members of the Council.
Truman was not present, but was given a report of the proceedings afterward.^''
At this meeting, Bradley explained the views of the Joint Chiefs con-
cerning three possible intentions of the Chinese Communist intervention.
Bradley also said that in his opinion tlie United States should be able to hold in
the general area of present positions but that there would be an increasing
question of how much pressure the United States could stand without attacldng
Manchurian bases. The Joint Chiefs, however, were of the opinion that such an
attack should be a United Nations decision, since it exceeded the terms of the
resolution under which United Nations forces were operating.
General Bradley noted that General MacArthur seemed to think that the
bombing of the bridges across the Yalu would stop the flow of Chinese Communist
^^Truman, H, 378.
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troops into Korea. Bradley himself, however, tliought that this was rather
optimistic. '^^
General Smith of the CIA said that the Yalu River would be frozen over
within fifteen to thirty days and would be passable, with or without the bridges.
MarshaU pointed out at this meeting of the NSC that the X Corps on the
eastern front of North Korea was widely dispersed and tliinly spread, which
represented an added risk. Bradley replied that of course MacArthur had
done this in order to carry out his directive that he was to occupy the whole
50
country and hold elections.
Acheson asked Bradley if there was any line that was better from a
military point of view than the present one. Bradley replied that from a purely
military point of view the farther back the line was the easier it would be to
maintain. He added, however, that he realized that any baclcward movement
of U. S. forces would lose America support and might adversely affect the will
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of the South Koreans to fight.
Acheson expressed himself as feeling that the Russians were especially
interested in the idea of defense in depth. He si:^gested, therefore, that a








with a constabulary but no UN armed forces. Insofar as the Chinese were
concerned, Acheson saw them as having two interests: The first was to keep
America involved, while the lesser interest was m the security of the border
and the power plants. ^2 He thought that the United States ought to explore
privately the possibility of a twenty-mile demilitarized zone, ten miles on each
side of the Yalu. He went on to say that the trouble with any such proposal, of
c ourse, would be that the Commu]iists would insist on all foreign troops leaving-
Korea, and thus abandon Korea to the Communists.
When Acheson summarized the whole discussion of the NSC meeting on
November 9, he pointed out:
It was agTeed that General MacArthur's directive should
not now be changed and that he should be free to do what he could
in a military way, but without bombing Manchuria. At the same
time, the State Department would seek ways to find out whether
negotiations with the Chinese Communists were possible, although
one problem was that we lacked any direct contacts with the
Peiping [Peking] regime through diplomatic channels.
The NSC also recommended, as a result of this meeting, that political
action should be started in the United Nations to seek support of an overwhelming
52During the MacArthur hearings, Acheson testified that on Nov 8, 1950,
"the general view here in Washington stated the Communist objective was to halt
the advance of the UN forces in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being






majority of members in demanding the prompt withdrawal of Chinese forces
from Korea, and that political channels should also be used to explore Chinese
intentions.
The most significant conclusion of this important meeting of the National
Security Council was that both military and political means woidd be explored
to cope with the problem of Chinese intervention. If MacArthur could achieve a
military victory in Korea, he would not be denied it; thus "he should be free to
do what he could in a military way. " Diplomatically the Chinese Communists
would be asked, through the United Nations, to withdraw their forces from Korea
after being given an assurance of non-violation of Manchuria's integrity. The
trouble with this double approach was that, if the opportunity of a military
victory was to be grasped, the continued use of force directed toward the Yalu
might, at the same time, undermine the trustworthiness of diplomatic assurances
with regard to Manchuria.
General Collins later wrote: "In retrospect, the most important outcome
of this meeting was that it permitted General MacArthur to go ahead with his
plans for an attack, or reconnaissance in force, to the Yalu, a move that v/as








Diplomatic Activities and the Drive
to the Yalu
On November 10, 1950, the United States, together with the United Kingdom,
France, Cuba, Ecuador and Norway, introduced a joint resolution in the United
Nations Security Council, on the question of Chinese Communist intervention in
Korea. Earlier, on November 6, the United States had called the attention of
the UN Security Council to General MacArthur's special report dated November 5
concerning Chinese intervention. On November 8, the Security Council adopted
a British proposal to invite a representative of the Pekiag Government to be
present during discussion by the Council of the above special report of the United
Nations Command in Ko rea. The Council rejected a Soviet proposal to extend a
general invitation to the Chinese Communist Government to take part in the
discussion of the entire Korean question in the Security Council.
The draft resolution, sponsored by the United States and five other nations,
recalling and affirming especially the General Assembly resolution of October 7,
1950, and having noted from MacArthur's special report that "Chiaese Communist
military units are deployed for action against the forces of tlie United Nations in
Korea, "
Calls upon all States and authorities, and in particular
those responsible for the action noted above, to refrain from
assisting or encouragiag the North Korean authorities, to prevent
their nationals or indi^dduals or units of their armed forces from
giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the
immediate withdrawal of any such natiomils, individuals, or
units which may presently be in Korea;
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^^^^"^s that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold
the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect
legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone;
Calls attention to the grave danger which continued inter-
vention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the maintenance
of such a policy;
Requests the Intermin Committee on Korea and the United
Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
to consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems
relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in v/hich States or
autliorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest, and
suggests that the United Nations Commission for the Unification
and Rehabilitation of Korea proceed to the area as soon ? s
possible, and, pending its arrival that it utilize the assistance
of such States members of the Commission as now have representa-
tives in the area for this purpose. ^"^
This draft resolution was not brought to a vote until November 30, after the
situation in Korea had changed radically, at which time the Soviet Union vetoed
the measure.
On November 11, Chou En-lai cabled that Communist China could not
accept the invitation of the UN Security Council, in connection with MacArthur's
special report, because it deprived the Chinese representative "of the right to
discuss in the Security Council the most pressing question to the Chinese people,
namely the question of armed intervention in Korea and aggression against China
CO
by the United States Government.
Dept. of State, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, July 1950-
February 1951 , Publication ^.263, Far Eastern Series 44 (1951), Document 13,
pp. 22-23.
^^UN Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year,Suppl for Sept through
Dec 1950, Document S/1898, H, p. 114.
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On the same day, a statement by the representative of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China replied to General MacArthur's
special report of November 5, and to Ambassador Austin's charges at the Security
Council on November 8 against Communist Chinese intervention in Korea. Pelcing's
statement said, "... the United States of America has invaded Chinese territory,
violated Chinese sovereignty and is threatening Chinese security. " It pointed
out that in addition to sending an American fleet into the waters of Taiwan, "which
belongs to China. " TL S. aircraft had violated the air borders of China, had
bombed Chinese territory, killed Chinese civilians and destroyed Chinese
property in Manchuria in numerous cases in the last three months.
The full tale of the crimes committed in North-East
China [Manchuria] by the United States air forces which have
Invaded Korea is given below. Recently the number of air
attacks has been increasing daily. These crimes committed by
the United States armed forces, which are violating the
territorial sovereignty of China and threatening its security,
have alarmed the whole Chinese people. Righteously indignant,
many Chinese citizens are expressing the desire to help the
Korean people and resist American aggression. Facts have
shown that the aim of United States aggression in Korea is not
only Korea itself but also the extension of aggression to China.
The question of the independent existence or the downfall of
Korea has always been closely linked with the security of China.
To help Korea and repel United States aggression means to
protect our own homes and our own country. It is, therefore,
completely natural for the Chinese people to be ready to help
Korea and offer resistance to United States aggression. . . .
In order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean
question it is essential, above all, to withdraw all foreign troops
from Korea. The K:orean question can be solved only by the
people of North and South Korea themselves; this is the only
way in which the Korean problem can be solved peacefully.
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Chinese people ardently love peace, but it will not be
id to take action against aggressors, and no aggresso
can intimidate it.
This statement from Peking was transmitted on November 14 by the Soviet
representative, Malik, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and
circulated as Document S/1902. The major part of it was also read at the
Security Council meeting of November 16 at the insistence of Malik.
About this time, the issue of "hot pursuit" also came up.^^ General
MacArthur had reported in his message pf November 7 that enemy aircraft
operating from Manchurian fields had dashed into Korean air space to strike UN
air and ground forces and then flew to safety behind the Manchurian border a
very few minutes away. It had had a serious effect upon the morale and combat
efficiency of UN air and groimd troops. The Joint Chiefs recommended corrective
action of "hot pursuit" to deal with this "threatening" development. It was
discussed between the Departments of Defense and State and was favored by
both. On November 13, Acheson sent telegrams to American ambassadors in
six of the thirteen nations that had troops in Korea. The telegram asked them
to inform these countries that "it may become necessary at an early date to




Document S/1902, pp. 115-17.
60
See Hearings, Pt. 3, 1722-24, 1912-15, 1927-28; testimony of
Acheson.
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the extent of permitting hot pursuit of attacking enemy aircraft up to 2 or 3
minutes' flying time into Manchurian air space. " The purpose of this diplomatic
move was not to ask the concurrence of these governments but to get their reactions
in advance of the contemplated measure. The United States received strongly
negative responses from the six governments, saying they thought it was dangerous,
undesirable, and unwise. Acheson transmitted the views of these governments to
the Secretary of Defense on November 23 and November 24. Both Departments
then decided to go no further with the suggestion.
Meanwhile, on November 16, Truman issued a statement in which he took
note of the resolution which had been introduced to the UN Security' Council on
November 10 concerning the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The
statement then said:
United Nations forces now are being attacked from the
safety of a privileged sanctuary. Planes operating from bases
in China cross over into Korea to attack United Nations ground and
air forces and then flee back across the border. Chinese
Communist and North Korean Communist forces are being re-
inforced, supplied and equipped from bases behind the safety of
the Sino-Korean border.
The pretext which the Chinese Communists advance for
taking offensive action against United Nations forces in Korea
from behind the protection afforded by tlie Sino-Korean border is
their professed belief that these forces intend to carry hostilities




Siieukinjr for the Uiiilcd States Government nnd people I
can give assuranec that we support and are acting; within tlic
'
limits of United Nations policy in Korea, and tliat we have never




On November 18, MacArthur notified the Joint Chiefs tliat the Eighth Army
would launeli its attaek as selieduled on Nove.nlx^r 21. lie emphasized that the
delay in mounting the offensive liad been caused by logistical difficulties, not
enemy actioru He assured tlie Joint Cliiefs tliat intensified air attacks by his air
forces during the preceding ten-day period had been very successful in isolating
the battle area, stopping troop reinforcement by the enemy, and greatly reducing
the flow of enemy supjilies. ^'^ While the supply situation of UN forces was un-
satisfactory, MacArthur nevertheless proposed to elear the country of enemy
forces before the Yalu froze and furnished a crossing for overwhelming numbers.
65Such was the reasoning.
As Achoson looked back, he later wrote, "the critical period slands out
as the three weeks from October 20 to November 17. Then all the dangers from
^^
Ilcarings, IH. 5, 3404.
^^-^Rad, C G9211, CINC UNC to DA, 18 Nov 50, see Schnabel, p. 272;
also Ajjploman, p, 771,
65
Achoson, p. '1(57. See Stone, p. 186 for an argument that the chite of
Nov. 15 and then Nov. 24 was chos(Mi to coincide with tlie arrival of Peking's
rcpresentntivc in N.Y. for UN Security Coimcil meetings in eonneetion will) the
"eomplaiiit of armed invasion of Taiwan."
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dispersal of our own forces and intervention by the Chinese were manifest. We
were all deeply apprehensive."^^ In his memoirs, Acheson reviewed "the last
clear chance" for America before the disaster came in late- November and early
December:
Our bafflement centered about the two principal enigmas
of this situation: What were the facts about Chinese military
presence in North Korea and what were their intentions? (The
first would throw light on the second. ) And what was General
MacArthur up to in the amazing military maneuver that was
unfolding before unbelieving eyes? Regarding the first, the
forces that had struck the Eighth Army during the last days of
October and the opening days of November had been powerful,
fully equipped, and competent—and yet they seemed to have
vanished from the earth. The most elementary caution would
seem to warn that they might, indeed probably would, reappear
as suddenly and harmfully as they had before.
However, on the morning of November 21, 1950, at a meeting of Acheson
and his staff, Acheson noted that on a straight military basis MacArthur was
authorized to pursue the enemy forces north of the 38th parallel and destroy them
as a military force. If China intervened MacArthur was to pursue the mission
mtil it was evident he could not succeed. Acheson felt that no one should change
this part of the directive until MacArthur had had a chance to "probe" the
situation. The Secretary al so noted the concern which China and Russia might






the Communists believed that the United States v/ould use Korea in that way.
Their fear might relate, he said, "to propaganda on the rearmament of
Japan. . . . This might lead you to believe that there is more sensitivity here
than the intelligence reports lead one to believe. " Acheson's concluding
observations at this meeting in the State Department were:
If MacArthur is successful in. repelling Chinese inter-
vention and ROK takes over tension may ease, but if Chinese
Communist forces cannot be destroyed and strong resistance is
met there and we find ourselves with a long struggle on our
hands we must turn to negotiation and their [Chinese] sensitivity
becomes even more important.
On the afternoon of November 21, Secretary Acheson, General Marshall
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met at the Pentagon. Acheson recalled later:
After General Ridgway had pointed out the startling
dispositions, I stated our concerns. General MacArthur seemed
to have confused his military directive (to follow and destroy the
remnant of the North Korean Army unless Chinese intervention
in force made it evident that he could not succeed in this task)
with his civil affairs directive intended to follow military success
(helping the UN Commission establish a government for a iinited
Korea). At this point our object was not "real estate" but an
army. An attempt to establish a united Korea by force of arms
against a determined Chinese resistance could easily lead into
general hostilities, since both the Chinese and the Russians, as
well as the Japanese, had all regarded Korea as a road to some-
Documentation, Princeton Seminar. See David S. McLellan, "Dean
Acheson and the Korean War, " Political Science Quarterly (March 1968), pp.
30-31. Hereafter cited as McLellan, "Acheson and War, " (1968).
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where else rather than an end in itself. Very definitely the
policy of our Government v/as to avoid general war in Asia.
Apparently General MacArthur could not determine the degi-ee
of Chinese intervention without some sort of a "probe" along
his line; therefore we did not oppose that. When I privately
expressed a layman's concern to Generals Marshall and Bradley
over MacArthur's scattering of liis forces, they pomted out
that the Chiefs of Staff, seven thousand miles from the front,
could not direct the theater commander's dispositions.
Robert Lovett, Undersecretary of Defense, reported nothing from
MacArthur to indicate that he could not accomplish his mission of getting to the
Yalu. The minutes of the meeting show General Marshall expressing his
satisfaction that Acheson had stated his belief that MacArthur should push
forward his planned offensive. '^^
Following the agreement that "General MacArthur had to have his try, "
the discussion went on to diplomatic methods of easing the dangerous showdown
that might be coming by such a method as Bevin favored—a cease-fire and a
demilitarized buffer zone along the Manchurian border—or by falling back to the
neck of Korea, concentrating U. S. forces, and doing the probing with Korean
forces, as was thought to be Government policy at the end of September.
Acheson "was sure that General MacArthur would frustrate any such efforts
^
until he had felt out Chinese strength. " Accordingly, Acheson had persuaded
Acheson, p. 467.
McLellan, "Acheson and War ," (1968), p. 31.
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the British to hold up any initiative in the United Nations. '^1
On the question of whetiaer the United Nations should attempt to negotiate
a buffer zone or simply make an announcement of intent to practice self-
restraint, General MarshaU preferred a political announcement of intent
following MacArthur's success. "The time for making political proposals would
be after MacArthur had had such a success. " Acheson stressed the need for
finding a way of terminating Chinese intervention in the war should it occur.
The concept of a buffer zone based upon
-the high ground along the Yalu was
finally agreed upon, with Acheson envisaging a demarcation line accepted
tacitly by the Chinese and ratified by negotiation. '''^
On November 9, the National Security Council had concluded that
General MacArthur's mission in Korea should be kept under review but not
changed at that time. Twelve days later, with continued Chinese disengagement,
America's leaders in Washington accepted MacArthur's offensive attempt to
probe and feel out Chinese strength. Other efforts, such as a cease-fire and
a demitilarized buffer zone along the Manchurian border were held up partly
because Acheson "was sure that General MacArthur would frustrate any such




MaLellan, "Acheson and War" (1968), pp. 31-32.
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suggestion, not an order, be sent him to stop on high terrain south of the river
for diplomatic maneuver and settlement.
There was an almost complete absence of enemy contact on the entire Eighth
Army front as Walker's men assumed their starting positions on November
22-23. General MacArthur, suspicious of this unusual quiet and somewhat
worried over the gap between the X Corps and the Eighth Army, ordered General
Stratemeyer to patrol this gap with great care. But American pilots flying from
twelve to sixteen sorties in daylight hours-and a half-dozen sorties at night
located no enemy forces in the gap.
Acheson testified during the MacArthur hearings that on November 24,
We concluded here in Washington that the Chinese objective
was to obtain United Nations withdrawal by intimidation and
diplomatic means, but in case of failure of these means there
would be increasing intervention, and it was said that there was
not available evidence sufficient for a conclusion as to whether
the Chinese Communists were committed to a full-scale offensive
effort.
Truman later wrote that on November 24 a national intelligence summary
of the CIA stated, "the Chinese Communists would 'at a minimum' increase their
operations in Korea, seek to immobilize our forces, subject them to prolonged
attrition, and maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being." The
See Schnabel, p. 272.
Hearings, Pt. 3, 1834; see also Whitney, p. 413.
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intelligence summary also stated, "the Chinese possessed sufficient strength
to force the U.N. elements to withdraw to defensive positions. ""^S
While the Eighth Army started a "general assault" to "end the war" imd
"restore peace and unity to Korea, "76 the Joint Chiefs sent a message to
MacArthur on November 24. It said:
There is a growing concern within the United Nations
over the possibility of bringing on a general conflict should a
major clash develop with Chinese Communist forces as a result
of your forces advancing squarely against the entire boundary
between Korea and Mancliuria.
. . . Proposal in United Nations
may suggest unwelcome restriction on your advance to the north
since some sentiment exists in United Nations for establishing a
demilitarized zone between your forces and the frontier in the
hope of thereby reducing Chinese Communist fear of United
Nations military action against Manchuria.
. . .
The consensus of political and military opinion at a
meeting held Thursday with the Secretaries of State and Defense,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other officials, was that there
should be no change in your mission, but that immediate action
should be taken at top governmental level to formulate a course of
action which will permit the establishment of a unified Korea and
at the same time reduce risk of more general involvement. On
the assumption that your coming attack will be successful,
exploratory discussions were had to discover what military
measures, which you might in any event wish to take, might lend
themselves to political action which would reduce the tension with






See Gen MacArthur 's special communique, Nov 24, 1950, in Hearings,
Pt. 5, 3491-92.
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Whitney, pp. 417-18. See also Sclinabel, pp. 268-69; Hearings, Pt.
2, 1229.
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The Joint Chiefs told MacArthur that the following measures were considered:
(a) After advancing to or near the Yalu, CINCFE might
hold his forces in terrain dominating the approaches to the
valley of the Yalu. These forces should be principally ROK
troops. Other United Nations forces shoidd be grouped in
positions in readiness.
This plan would be used only if effective enemy resistance ceased. The limit
of Almond's advance in the northeast would be fixed at Chongjin. "It was thought
that the above would not seriously affect the accomplishment of your military
mission, " the Joint Chiefs explained. •
(b) United Nations forces would caitinue to make every
effort to spare the hydroelectric installations in North Korea;
(c) The United Nations Unification and Rehabilitation
Commission would, at a propitious time, enter into negotiations
with appropriate representatives of the Chinese Commmiist
Government in order to insure equitable distribution of hydro-
electric power;
(d) In the event the Chinese forces did not again attack
in force across the Yalu, elections in Korea could proceed in
accordance with the action by the United Nations; and
(e) The ultimate handling of the extremely sensitive
northeast province would await United Nations procedures.
General MacArthur was told that no decision had yet been made on procedures
for handling tiie matter of entering northeastern Korea, since dealings there
81
would be with the U. S. S. R. and not China. °
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Hearings, Pt. 2, 1229, a paraphrase.
"^^Schnabel, p. 269.
^^Paraphrase of message, item 60, in the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report





The Joint Chiefs then reviewed their own suggested measiu-es as listed
above. 'While it is recognized that from the point of view of the commander
the field this course of action may leave much to be desired, it is felt that there
may be other considerations which must be accepted, ..." This course "might
well provide an out for the Chinese Communists to withdraw into Manchuria
without loss efface. ..." The Russians, too, might be reassured; and it was
felt that Russian concern was at the root of their pressure on the Chinese to
interfere in Korea.
The Joint Chiefs asked for MacArthur's comments on the proposals, to
include timing and method of announcement if he agreed. They wanted to be
sure that the measures did not impede the military operation, yet felt it import-
tant that the Chinese and Russians not misinterpret MacArthur's intention as
aggression against their borders. The message of November 24, 1950
concluded:
Since there are many political and military implications
involved in these ideas and since other nations would be involved,
no action along these lines is contemplated until full opportimity
has been given for further consideration of your views, final







As late as November 24, 1950 when General MacArthur launched his
offensives to reach the northern border of North Korea the United States still
wanted to reduce the tension with Peking and Moscow by assuring them that
MacArthur's military action involved no aggressive intentions against their
borders. In reti'ospect this was unrealistic ally seeking the best of two worlds.
Instead of examining the possibility that Peking and Moscow might fear the use
of Korea as a route to Manchuria or elsewhere, the Joint Chiefs felt that the
suggested measure of holding the high terrain along the Yalu might be sufficient
to relieve their concern.
General MacArthur replied on November 25, arguing against the
suggested proposals:
The concern underlying the search for the means to
confine the spread of the Korean conflict is fully understood
and shared here, but it is believed that the suggested approach
would not only fail to achieve the desired residt but would be
provocative of the very consequences we seek to avert.
In the first place, from a military standpoint my personal
reconnaissance of the Yalu River line yesterday demonstrated
conclusively that it would be utterly impossible for us to stop
upon terrain south of the river as suggested and there be in
position to hold under effective control its lines of approach
to North Korea. The terrain ranging from the lowlands in the
west to the rugged central and eastern sectors is not adaptable
to such a system of defense were we, for any reason, to
sacrifice the natural defense features of the river line itself,
features to be found in no other natural defense line in all of
Korea. Nor would it be either militarily or politically
defensible to yield this natural protective barrier safeguarding
the territorial integritj'^ of Korea.
Moreover, any failure on our part to prosecute the
military campaign through to its public and oft-repeated
objective of destroying all enemy forces south of Korea's
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northern boundary as essential to the restoration of unity and
peace to all of Korea, would be.
. . regarded by tlie Korean
people as a betrayal of.
. .
the solemn undertaldng tlie United
Nations entered into on their behalf, and by the Chinese and all
of the other peoples of Asia as wealmess reflected from the
appeasement of Communist aggression.
.
Study of the Soviet and Peiping propaganda line discloses
little to suggest any major concern over the potentiality of
United Nations control of the southern banks of the Yalu River.
Even what has been said concerning the hydroelectric facilities
in North Korea is for the most part a product of British-American
speculation, finding little reflection in any Soviet or Chinese
utterances. Indeed, our information on these facilities and the
disposition abroad of their power output fails to confirm that
dependence upon this source of power is a major factor in the
basic causes giving rise to the Chinese aggressive moves in
Korea. Thus, despite the fact that those hydroelectric facilities
at Chongjin brought under control of the X Corps had been closed
down completely for a full month prior to the arrival of our
forces, with much of the vital machinery and other equipment
removed and dispersed and are not yet restored to operation,
no suggestion of complaint has emanated from So\aet or Chinese
sources over the deprivation of power caisequent thereto. In
view of these factual considerations one is brought to the conclusion
that the issue of hydroelectric power rests upon the most tenuous
of grounds. 84
MacArthur continued his argument by emphasizing that the entry of the
Chinese Communist forces into the Korean conflict was a risk which the United
States had taken with its eyes wide open when it sent troops into Korea. "Had
they entered at the time we were beleagaiered behind our Pusan Perimeter
beachhead, " MacArthur said, "the hazard would have been far more grave than
Q C
it is now that we hold the initiative. . . . "^
Wliitney, pp. 418-19. See also Schnabel, pp. 270-71.
Schnabel, p. 271.
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Our forces are committed to seize the entire border area,
and indeed in the east have already occupied a sector of the Yalu
'
River with no noticeable political or military Soviet or Chinese
reactions. We have repeatedly and publicly made it unmistal^ably
clear that we entertain no aggressive designs whatsoever against
any part of Chinese or Soviet territory. It is my plan, just as
soon as we are able to consolidate positions along the Yalu River,
to replace as far as possible American forces with those of tlie
Republic of Korea and publicly announce orders affecting:
(1) The return of American forces to Japan; (2) The parole of all
prisoners -of-war to their homes; (3) The leaving of the imification
of Korea and the restoration of the civil processes of government
to the people, with the advice and assistance of the United Nations
authorities. I believe that the prompt implementation of this plan
as soon as our military objectives have been reached will effectively
appeal to reason in the Chinese mind. If it will not, then tlie
resulting situation is not one which might be influenced by bringing
to a halt our military measures short of present commitments.
By resolutely meeting those commitments and accomplishing our
military mission as so often publicly delineated, lies the best--
indeed the only--hope that Soviet aad Chinese aggressive designs
may be checked before these countries are committed from which,
for political reasons, they cannot withdraw.
Here again General MacArthur displayed his indifference to the consequences
of a war against the Chinese Communists while concentrating on achieving the
objective of destroying all enemy forces south of Korea's northern boundary for
the restoration of unity and peace to all of Korea. He assumed that the motive of
Chinese intervention coidd only be pushing the UN forces out of Korea, rather than
feeling them to be a threat to their security. Now that he had defeated the North
Koreans and was approaching the Yalu, he was not afraid of Chinese intervention
'Whitney, p. 419. See also Schnabel, p. 271.
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on whatever scale he might encounter in his offensive efforts.
Major General Charles L. Bolte, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations,
G-3, urged Army Chief of Staff Collins to subscribe to these views of General
MacArthur and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their approval
of the idea of a full force advance to the border. However, events were to over-
take any such action by the Joint Chiefs. ^'^
Communist China's Full-scale Coimterattack
"The Eighth Army's attack got off to a good start with only light enemy
contact for the first two days. Then, as dusk fell on November 25, the Chinese
Comminists slashed into the allied forces without warning and with overwhelming
strength. " These Chinese forces crushed the Eighth Army's right flank and forced
the rest of the Army's units to withdraw. On November 27, Chinese units also
attacked the X Corps in the eastern sector and cut the main supply route of
89
General Almond's Marine troops on November 28.
MacArthur radioed the Joint Chiefs on November 28, sayuig that this was





All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy
forces composed of North Korean troops with alien token elements
can now be completely abandoned. The Chinese forces are
committed in North Korea in great and ever increasing strength.
No pretext of minor support under the guise of voluntarism or
other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. We face an
entirely new war.^^
MacArthur estimated that Walker and Almond now apparently faced a total Chinese
force of about 300,000 in addition to 50,000 North Koreans.^''"
MacArthur explained to the Joint Chiefs his theory of Chinese strategy
since the Inchon operation, and said, "Their ultimate objective was imdoubtedly
a decisive effort aimed at the complete destruction of United Nations forces in
on
Whitney, p. 421. See also Collins, p. 220; Schnabel, pp. 274-75.
^•Schnabel, p. 275; Whitney, p. 421. According to Gen. Bradley's
testimony, however, the figure for Chiaese troops in North Korea was put at
200,000. See Hearings , Pt. 2, 972-73. Gen. MacArthur, in his special
communique issued on Nov. 28, 1950, stated, "a major segment of the Chinese
continental armed forces in army, corps and divisional organization of an
aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is now arrayed against the United Nations
forces in North Korea. " See Hearings , Pt. 5, 3495. Gen. Walker had reported
to MacArthur on Nov. 28 that the enemy attack force numbered some 200, 000,
all of them apparently Chinese. Evidently Walker was referring only to his zone
of operation in the western sector. See Schnabel, p. 274. It is not clear whether
Bradley used the numbet in Walker's report or he meant to say "over 200,000"
as in MacArthur 's special communique but had omitted the word "over. " It may
be noted that mitney's quotation from MacArthur 's message of Nov. 28 to the
JCS does not give the total number of Chinese forces, but merely identifies
seven field armies. Earlier, the UN Command had accepted the estimate of
about 60,000 to 70, 000 Chinese troops in Korea by Nov. 24, which was less
than one -fourth the number actually there. See Appleman, p. 769. On Nov. 25
Eighth Army intelligence put the enemy strength on its front at 149,000, an
increase of 95, 000 from its estimate of the day before. See Lynn Montrose and
Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign (Washington,
D.C.
U. S. Marine Corps, 1957), p. 140.
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Korea. " MacArthur continued, "At the present moment the freezing of the
Yalu River increasingly opens up avenues of reinforcements and supply which
it is impossible for our air potential to interdict. "^^ MacArthur further stated:
It is quite evident that our present strength of force is
not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by the Chinese with
the inherent advantages which accrue thereby to them. The
resulting situation presents an entire new picture which
broadens the potentialities to world-embracing considerations
beyond the sphere of decision by the Theater Commander.
MacArthur went on to say: "This command has done everything humanly possible
within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its
strength. "^^ "The limitless capabilities of the entire Chinese nation, with
Soviet logistical support, were arrayed against it. "^^ MacArthur concluded:
"My strategic plan for the immediate future is to pass from the offensive to
the defensive with such local adjustments as may be required by a constantly
fluid situation. "^"^
^^See Whitney, pp. 421-22.
^hhid.
, p. 422.
^^Schnabel, p. 275. See also Collins, p. 220; Whitney, p. 422.
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Collins, pp. 220-221. Also Truman, H, 384.
^^MacArthur, p. 375. MacArthur did not quote this report directly,
but referred to it, changing all verbs into the past tense.
^'^Collins, p. 221. See also Schnabel, p. 275; MacArthur, p. 375;
Bradley's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 2, 973.
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MacArthur's military judgment, prior to November 24, 1950, on Chinese
Communists strength in North Korea turned out to be entirely wrong. He had
not prepared for such a massive and surprise counterattack as the Chinese
managed to mount upon the UN forces. His forces almost immediately suffered
reverses and had to retreat at once. His drastic decision to shift from offense
to defense was an indication of the failure of his offensive advance to the Yalu.
Thus he felt it necessary to provide explanations to the Joint Chiefs to justify
his actions.
After the Joint Chiefs received MacArthur's report, General Bradley
telephoned Truman at 6:15 A. M. , November 28, to inform him about MacArthur's
cable on the extent of damage that the Chinese v/ere inflicting on American
troops in Korea.
Truman called a special meeting of the National Security Council on the
same day. Bradley represented the Joint Chiefs before the Council. He
summarized the military situation as serious, but not as catastrophic as news-
paper reports indicated. Bradley said that MacArthur under heavy attack had
turned to the defensive. The offensive had been to find out the dimension of
Chinese intervention; now America knew. The extent of the U. S. predicament
and the nature of new directives must await clarifications. The 300 aircraft,
^^Truman, H, 385.
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including 200 bombers, on Manchiirian airfields constituted a serious threat to
American forces and American planes crowded on Korean fields. To bomb
them invited retaliation from Chinese and Russian aircraft. So far they were
quiescent. General Vandenberg concurred in not initiating the bombing.
Secretary of Defense Marshall produced a report by the three service
secretaries, with which he and the Joint Chiefs agreed, recommending that the
United States should continue to act as the executive agent of the United Nations
and, with its support, not be drawn into a separate conflict with Communist
China. "We should not get ourselves involved either individually or with the
United Nations in a general war with China. "^^^ Hence, the United States should
use all means to keep the war limited, not strike Chinese territory, and not use
Chinese Nationalist forces (which, the Joint Chiefs noted, might cause withdrawal
of the much more effective British forces). Bradley added that if the United
States allowed itself to be pulled into a general war with China, it would be
impossible to continue the build-up of forces in Europe.
The military leaders also urged a rapid increase in U. S. military power
to meet increasing needs for it. Truman agreed with this view and with the
99
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necessity for sending to Congress a supplement budget to take care of the
increased costs of greater military readiness.
There was discussion of the number of replacements MacArthur woidd
need and what might be sent him. Generals Marshall, Bradley and Collins
pointed out that in Korea MacArthur would have to get along with the forces he
had. Troops for replacement of losses would not be ready until the new year,
nor new divisions until after March 1, 1951. Even then competing demands for
the latter would be heavy.
General Collins said that he thought a line could be held in Korea. The
X Corps in the east was in a precarious position but probably could be pulled
105back to safety. All the military officers from the Defense Department were
distressed at MacArthur's exposed and scattered tactical position. They would
call his attention to it, but it was for him to solve; it would not help to interfere
with operations on the spot.
As the National Security Council meeting continued Truman asked
Acheson to comment on the situation. Acheson expressed his views that the
United States was closer than it had yet been to a wider v/ar. There had always
been a Chinese involvement in Korea. It had been progTessively uncloaked
103
Acheson, p. 469; Schnabel, p. 286.
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""^Truman, II, 387; Acheson, p. 469.
^^^Truman, IJ, p. 387.
Acheson, p. 471.
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until now America faced a full-scale attack. "Behind this was the somber
possibility of Soviet support in any one of many forms. We should consider
Korea not in isolation but in its worldwide setting of our coDfrontation with our
Soviet antagonist. We had objectives to reach and dangers to avoid. "107
Acheson continued:
... if we openly accused the Soviet Union of aggression,
the United Nations would be demolished. If we came out and
pointed a finger at the Soviet Union, it would serve no purpose,
because we could do nothing about it. To make the accusation,
however, and then to do nothing about it would only wealcen our
world position. If we proposed action against the Kremlin, on
the other hand, we might find ourselves alone, without allies. ^^8
As to the Chinese Communists, Acheson said, "The State Department
would take on the task of uniting the United Nations against the Chinese Com-
munist aggression and branding it as such, regardless of a Soviet veto in the
Security Council. "^^^
Acheson felt that the memorandum of the three secretaries and the
comments were very wise. His reaction was, as he later wrote:
General MacArthur faced a new situation. This time we
should see that he understood his instructions. He seemed to
have been under the misapprehension that he was supposed to
occupy the north and northeastern parts of Korea. We should






terminate that involvement. We could not defeat the Chinese
in Korea because they could put in more men than we could
afford to commit there.
Acheson maintained that the imperative step was to find a line tliat the United
States could hold and hold it.
Such proposals as a cease-fire or demilitarized zone
in the North could be considered, but there was no indication
that any such arrangements could be made. To pull out of
Korea at this stage v/ould be disastrous for us. Outside of
Korea we should speed building our own military strength
and that of our European allies.
Acheson believed that if the United States went into Manchuria and bombed
the airfields there with any degree of success, "Russia would cheerfully get in
it, " and that the Russians were trying to lure America into this bigger-than-
ever trap inside their perimeter and bleed America dry.
Truman told the NSC that he had thought at first that he ought to go
before Congress and address a special session but that he did not now tliink
this would be right. "Korea was a United Nations matter, aad our country
-| 1 o
should not make an individual approach to it. "
The first reaction of America's leaders in Washington to massive Chinese
coimterattack was to re-commit the United States to a United Nations approach









not be pulled into a general war with Communist China. America's perspective
was the possibility of a worldwide confrontation with the Soviet Union, in
which Korea occupied only a minor point, less significant than Europe. Thus,
as Acheson wrote, 'We could not defeat the Chinese in Korea because they
could put in more men than we could afford to commit there. " If this had
been realized earlier, would it have made any difference to America's policy
on Chinese Communist intervention? Until the Chinese actually launched their
full-scale counteroffensive, the United States was pursuing an opportunistic
policy of desiring Korean unification as a result of the use of force, even after
Chinese units had appeared on the scene and contacted the UN forces for a
short while. America did not believe that the Chinese commitment could be
on such a large scale. In addition, General MacArthur underestimated Chinese
strength and would, in any event, welcome the opportunity to defeat them in
Korea. He took advantage of the ambiguity in America's policy on Korean
unification and the use of force to urge a quick drive to the Yalu and occupation
of all of Korea in cooperation with the efforts of the United Nations. He was
not stopped in these attempts, but now the disaster came upon the UN forces
and military position of the United States was in peril
.
The Joint Chiefs, with the approval of Truman, accepted
MacArthur 's estimate of the situation and advised him on November 29 of
their approval of his plans to pass from the offensive to the defensive. They
told him to put aside any previous directives in conflict with his current plan
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to defend. They stated that strategic and tactical considerations were paramount.
Concerned with the exposed position of the X Corps and the apparent lack of
coordination between the X Corps and the Eighth Army, the Joint Chiefs requested
information regarding these points. ^^"^ They suggested that MacArthur should
close the gap between Almond and Wall<:er and form a continuous defense line
across the peninsula.
Also on November 29 the Joint Chiefs sent a message to MacArthur in
reply to his recommendation of using Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa.
MacArthur had cabled on that day the following substance:
Thirty-three thousand seasoned troops from Formosa
were offered in accordance with the United Nations Security
Council Resolution on June 27 for operations in Korea. The
United States declined this offer from the Chinese Embassy in
Washington because Formosa was threatened with imminent
attack and preservation of the full defensive strength of the
Chinese Government was necessary. The belief that use of
Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would be an excuse for
formal intervention on behalf of the North Koreans by the
Chinese Communists probably influenced the declination. No
longer valid are either of these reasons for declination. As I
reported yesterday, Chinese Communist intervention in Korea
is already most full and complete, and Formosa was relatively
freed from danger of potential attack with the movement north-
ward in China of the center of gravity of the Chinese forces
following the landing at Inchon.
The only potential source of reinforcement available for
early commitment are the Chinese armies on Formosa. In
approximately 14 days troops from this force could be landed
^l^Collins, p. 222; Bradley's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 2, 973.
^""^Schjtiabel, p. 279.
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in Korea. If desired, there would undoubtedly be made avail-
able a much larger force than originally offered.
I strongly recommend: That you authorize my direct
negotiations with tlie authorities of the Chinese Governm.ent on
Formosa. In order to reinforce our position in Korea, I would
arrange for the movement north of such Chinese units as may
be needed and desirable. These units would be incorporated
in the UN command.
The reply from the Joint Chiefs on November 29, on President Truman's
instructions "after a lengthy conference in which State Department and Defense
Department took part, " called MacArthur's attention to the international
implication of his recommendation and reaffirmed U. S. Commitment to collective
United Nations action and the desirability of maintaining allied unity in the
United Nations:
Your proposal is being considered. It involves world-
wide consequences. We shall have to consider the possibility
that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated
with us in the United Nations, and leave us isolated. It may
be wholly unacceptable to the commonwealth coimtries to have
their forces employed witli Nationalist Chinese. It might extend
hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our
position of leadership in the Far East is being most seriously
compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be
necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-
up in that organization. '
^^^MacArthur's testimony; see Hearings , Pt. 1, 271-72. The reasoning
here was similar to Senator Wm. F. Knowland's telegram to Secy, of State




On November 30, 1950, MacArthur responded to the suggestion by the
Joint Chiefs of the need to close the gap between the X Corps and the Eighth
Army:
Any concept of actual physical combination of the
forces of the Eighth Army and X Corps in a practically
continuous line across the narrow neck of Korea is quite
impracticable due to the length of this line, the numerical
weakness of our forces, and the logistical problems created
by the mountainous divide which splits such a front from
north to south.
In a second message a few hours' later, MacArthur gloomily predicted
that the Eighth Army would not be able to make a stand in the foreseeable
future and would ". . . successively have to replace to the rear. " He had now
concluded that the Chinese intended to destroy the United Nations forces
completely and to secure all of Korea.
Misjudgment about Chinese Intervention;
An Assessment
Why did the United States misjudge Chinese intentions and Chinese
strength, so that the Korean disaster came upon America in December 1950
and January 1951? What were the policy-mal^ers' assumptions regarding
Chinese intervention? What policy did the United States actually pursue toward




Chinese intervention in Korea went through four stages: (1) official
threat of military intervention before American forces crossed the 38th parallel;
(2) movement of Chinese units across the Yalu into North Korea and powerful
engagements with some UN troops in late October and early November; (3) dis-
engagement after November 6; (4) massive counterattack in later November and
subsequent total commitment to the defeat of US/UN forces in Korea.
In retrospect it is clear that the Chinese meant their warning about
crossing the 38th parallel m early October'. But why did the United States
discount their tlireat at that time ? For one thing, the channel of communication
was suspect. Truman did not trust Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peking,
who transmitted the message. And the timing of the October 3 warning was
interpreted as diplomatic blackmail, since a UN General Assembly resolution
was pending, which was intended to "authorize" UN forces to cross the parallel.
These were the reasons that Truman and Acheson later gava^^^ It should be
noted that the Chinese did not threaten to intervene in Korea until after the
military situation had clearly shifted against the North Koreans in the wake of
the Inchon landing. By that time it was evident that the existence of the North
Korean regime was in danger. For the United States to exploit this military
situation would seem to promise a quick and easy victory over the North Korean
forces if the 38th parallel did not stand in the way. The sudden success of
Truman, II, 362; Acheson, p. 452; Hearings, Pt. 3, 1833.
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Inchon had changed America's attitude toward Chinese threat of intervention.
No longer was there any fear that Chinese entry might push US/UN forces out
of Korea, as in the days of the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. Indeed, as
indicated in the directive of October 9, 1950 from the Joint Chiefs, with
Presidential approval, to MacArthur, the United States was now prepared to
fight against major Chinese Communist units anywhere in Korea as long as
there was, in MacArthur's judgment, a reasonable chance of success. In
a sense, Chou's warning of October 3 arrived too late. If it had come before
the Inchon landing, it woidd have certainly been taken into serious consideration
1 90
and might have affected America's policy choices.
At first there might be other reasons for the United States to estimate
that it was more likely that the Chinese Communists would not intervene than
that they v/ould. As Acheson later testified during the MacArthur hearings:
Among the reasons for believing that they v/ould not
come in were the amount of well-trained troops which they
would have to commit, the possible weal^ening of the Govern-
ment in China itself, the lack of real advantage to China itself
in coming in, ... its position internationally, it would
probably lose ground rather than gain ground in its international
position. 123
But in late October and early November when the UN forces met with
12lTruman, II, 362.
^^^cf. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (N. Y. : Wiley, 19G0),
p. 136.
123
Hearings, Pt. 3, 2101.
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strong resistance from Chinese Communist units and even suffered setbacks,
there v/as no longer any question about Chinese military presence in North
Korea. What, then, did America's policy-makers assume under the circum-
stances? Why was there no stop of MacArthur's advance to the north?
Even though Washington knew the concentrations of Chinese troops in
Manchuria and near the Yalu border, and their capabilities to intervene in
Korea with full strength, America's strategy was based on a reading of
Chinese intentions
,
while failing to give proper weight to Chinese capabilities.
The United States would rather believe that Chinese intervention was on a small
scale and could not be decisive. This thinking was reinforced by Chinese
125disengagement after November 6. In any event, America could not ascertain
the precise strength and locations of Chinese forces in North Korea despite
air reconnaissance.
Perhaps more importantly in terms of policy consideration was the lack
of fear of Chinese intervention, as long as the Soviets did not intervene. After
Inchon, MacArthur was particularly confident that American military might,
especially American air power, was capable of dealing with the Chinese forces
126
through the decisive effect of air interdiction and close air support. This
-^^'^See Ridgway, p. 243.
""^Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War , security
studies paper (Los Angeles: UCLA, 19G7), pp. 12-13. /Jso Rees, p. 131.
•^^^Tsou, p. 575; Appleman, p. 765.
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confidence was most explicitly expressed by MacArthur at Wake Island and
challenged by none of the conferees from the Truman administration. Later
when the Chinese units began to appear in North Korea and attacked the UN
forces in late October and early November MacArthur ordered on November 5
the Far East Air Force to exert its full power in order to knock the enemy out
of the war. He also ordered the bombing of the Yalu bridges to try to stop
Chinese reinforcement. It was based on this strategy of the effective use of
air power that he argued strongly on November 9 that his mission in Korea
should not be changed but that by resuming the attack northward, he should
and could destroy the remaining enemy forces in North Korea. Washington
finally decided on November 9 to allow MacArthur to attempt military victory
in Korea. Among the ingredients of this decision must have been America's
concept of Chinese power. Without Soviet assistance, Chinese Communist
power standing alone was underestimated and not respected at this time. ^^'^
America's policy toward the Chinese Communists on Korea after
November 9, 1950 was to offer reassurances respecting Manchurian borders
while, at the same time, allowing MacArtliur's forces to continue to advance
toward the Yalu. The reassurances were given by way of introducing a
resolution, on November 10, to the UN Security Council urgirgthe Chinese
Communists to withdraw also their personnel from Korea and by way of
^^'See McLellan (1966), p. 24; Goodrich, p. 136; and Tsou, pp. 579,
588.
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President Truman's public statement on November 16, saying, "we have
never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China. "
On the question of whether MacArthur's forces should continue to
advance toward the Yalu, since his mission had been kept under review, the
basic policy decision v/as made on November 21, 1950 that they should. How?
This was treated as a military matter for the theater commander to conduct. ^^8
Especially after the spectacular success of Inchon, the Joint Chiefs hesitated
to challenge quicldy MacArthur's strategy. Though the military and
civilian leaders in Washington were "deeply apprehensive" about MacArthur's
dispositions of UN forces, they did not feel that they were in a position to
direct him to take a particular course of action other than his own.
In retrospect, it is easy for other observers to ask the question as to
why MacArthur's forces had not taken better defensive positions, such as
withdrawing to Korea's narrow "neck, " or even just stopped advancing. But
the problem at that time was not seen in this perspective. Rather the issue was
presented as how best to advance v/ith least risks. The military leaders in
Washington did not come up with any alternative military course that they








forces advanced closer to the Yalu he should hold the high terrain to make way
for a buffer




Since the continual advance of MacArthur's forces to the Y^Uu was
treated as a military question, Acheson "was unwilling to urge on the President
a military course that his military advisers would not propose. "l^O
^^^^
clear what military course Acheson had thought of. Perhaps militarily it
too late to change any course of action witliout involving tactical withdrawal
pause, which would then run counter to the basic policy decision of November
21 to advance. From the military point of view, once the 38th parallel was
crossed, there seemsd to be no better place to stop than at the Yalu and as
quickly as possible.
The discussion must inevitably switch back to the political implications
and risks of America's military drive to the Yalu. To what extent were America's
policy decision-makers aware of the military risks of Chinese intervention?
Wliy had not Chinese intervention been tal^en more seriously?
In addition to the previous discussion on this subject, the U. S.
intelligence estimate of the Chinese troops in North Korea prior to November
24, 1950, was less than one-fourth the number actually there. Without America's




of the CCF Fourth Field Army
,
with 18 divisions of infantry (180,000 men),
was concentrated in front of the U. S. Eighth Army, and the IX Army Group of
the CCF Third Field Army
,
with 12 divisions of infantry (120,000 men), was
concentrated in front of the U. S. X Corps. A total of approximately 300, 000
Chinese infantry troops were thus actually deployed in North Korea^^^ against
the UN front-line strength of about 100, 000 out of a command numbering al-
together about 377,000 of which 200, 000 were South Koreans. It would have
required a clear indication of large-scale Chinese military presence in North
Korea to convince America that MacArthur's forces had better stop at the
narrow ''neck" of Korea where they might be able to hold in face of possible
Chinese attacks. But U. S. leaders did not find any such evidence.
The failure of America's intelligence with regard to the strength, the
position and the movement of Chinese Communist forces in Korea was due
partly to the "perfect camouflage discipline" of the Chinese. According to
Appleman, the CCF march discipline and performance in Korea at this time
"equaled the best examples of antiquity. " This capability in large part
accounted for the secrecy with vv^hieh the Chinese Commiinisis entered and
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See Appleman, pp. 766-69. Also Rees, p. 136.
^^^Rees, p. 148. In terms of divisions, Collins writes: "Thus, as the
United Nations forces prepared to renew the attack in late November, the
Eighth Army of four United States divisions, three ROK divisions, and a
British and a Turkish brigade was actually confronted by eighteen divisions
of the CCF XIII Army Group. Similarly, the X Corps of three United States
divisions and two ROK divisions was taking on twelve divisions of the CCF IX
Army Group. " Collins, p. 218.
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and deployed in North Korea. The UN aerial observers did not see them nor
did the aerial photographs reveal their presence.
On the part of the Chinese, they did have a need for secrecy. Open
deployment of troops over the Yalu would have exposed them to An^ rican air
power. Secrecy could also obtain the element of surprise in case of attacks. ^'^^
"They really foded us when it comes right down to it, didn't they?" asked
Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Secretary Acheson during the MacArthur
hearings. 'Tes, sir, " replied Ache son.. "''^^
What was the effect of America's policy of reassurance to Communist
China that the Chinese frontier with Korea would not be violated? It was
viewed with suspicion. The attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the
United States had been hostile since July 1, 1949, when Mao Tse-tung proclaimed
his policy of leaning toward one side, the Soviet Union, in a speech on People's
Democratic Dictatorship. ''^^ Soon after the People's Republic of China was
proclaimed in October, 1949 Mao went to Moscow and concluded a Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union on February
14, 1950. Article I of the Treaty provided:
^^^Appleman, pp. 769-70. Also Rees, pp. 133-34.
^^^See Zelman, p. 14.
^^^Hearings, Pt. 3, 1835.
"^^^See U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The United
States and Commimist China in 1949 and 1950: The Question of llapprochement
and Recognition, A staff study, (Washington, 1973), pp. 11-12.
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Both High Contracting Parties i-uidertake jointly to tal^e
aU the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of
preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on
the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with
Japan, directly or inchrectly, in acts of aggression. In the
event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by
Japan or states allied by it, and thus being involved m a state
of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately
render military aad other assistance with all the means at its
disposal.
The High Contracting Parties also declare their readiness
in the spirit of sincere co-operation to participate in all inter-
national actions aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout
the world, and will do all in their power to achieve the spe3diest
implementation of these tasks. ''"'^'^
As Harold Vinacke analyzes the article, "Since the United States played
the dominant role in the military occupation of Japan, and since Japan had been
completely disarmed and was inacapable of attack, this article necessarily must
be viewed as being actually directed against the United States rather than against
Japan. That fact, however, was put in the indirect language of diplomacy. "
At any rate this alliance between the People's R,epublic of China and the Soviet
139Union was a key element in the Communist alignment against the free world.
The hostile attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the United States
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Soviet Monitor, issued by Tass Agency, London, No. 11, 311, Feb.
15, 1950. "Reprinted in John M. Maki, Conflict and Tension in the Far East,
Key Documents, 1894-1960 (Seattle, Univ. of Wasliington Press, 19G1), pp. 172-73.
''^^Harold M Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics in the Postwar Period (N.Y. ;




received the strongest reinforcement from President Truman's announcement
on June 27, 1950 to neutralize the Formosa (Taiwan) Strait with the U. S.
Seventh Fleet. They would link this move, in their interpretation, with America's
action in Korea to distrust the intentions of the United States in Asia, particularly
with respect to Communist China. As Ambassador Wu Hsiu-chuan of the People's
Republic of China declared in his address before the UN Security Council on
November 28, 1950, when the Chinese Communist units in North Korea began
their massive counterattack upon MacArthur's forces:
The Chinese people have witnessed with their own eyes
Taiwan fall prey to aggTession and the flames of the United
States war of aggression against Korea leap towards them.
Thus stirred into righteous anger
,
they are volunteering in
great numbers to go to the aid of the Korean people.
. . .
In malving Japan its main war base in the East, launching
armed aggression against Korea and Taiwan, carrying out
active intervention against Viet-Nam and tightening its control
over other countries in Asia, the United States Government is
systematically building up a military encirclement of the
People's Republic of China, in preparation for further attack
on the People's Republic of China, and to stir up a Third World
War. 140
In a speech on December 16, Ambassador Wu addressed himself more
specifically to the issue of assurances on non-violation of Manchurian border
with Korea. Wu said in part:
I have heard much empty talk in the Security Council to
the effect that the troops now fighting in Korea have no intention
of committing aggression against the northeastern [Manchurian]
territory of China. Moreover, it is said that the majority of the
members of the Security Council are ready to put such assurances
^'^^UN Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, 527th Meeting, No.
69, pp. 22-23.
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into a resolution. It seems that the Chinese people should now
rest assured. This is taking the Chinese people for idiots.
It is to be noted that those countries which wish to assure
us that the United States troops in Korea would not violate the
territory of China are precisely those which mamtain that the
United States Seventh Fleet should remain in the Taiwan Straits
and continue its aggression against China.
... the United States Government has invaded the
territory of China, Taiwan, while its armed forces threaten
to approach the border of China from another direction. Yet
the United States Government and its accomplices are demanding
that the Chinese people believe in their assurances that the
armed forces which are approaching China's border would not
invade China's territory.
What the United States had failed to recognize was that MacArthur's
military drive to the Yalu would appear to the Chinese as a serious threat. ^"^^
As A,Doak Barnett writes, "Peking genuinely feared tlie consequences of complete
control of the strategic Korean Peninsula by unfriendly military forces. "-'^'^^
Louis J. Halle also reviews China's and Japan's views of the sensitivity to them
of Korea's position.
Perhaps if we Americans had been steeped in Far
Eastern history we would have understood that, by its geogTaphy,
the Korean peninsula had been for centuries, and was bound to
be, a strategic point of the utmost sensitivity, at least as much
so as the Rhtneland or the Turkish Straits.
Important Documents Concerning the Question of Taiwan (Peking,
Foreign Languages Press, Oct, 1955). An extract from the speech is printed
in Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz, Remaldng China Policy (Cambridge
Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 90-91.
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... The endless contest between Chinese and Japanese
over the Korean peninsula goes back to the beginnings of
Japanese history, and it continues today with the Americans
in the place of the Japanese. ... Of what this long history
meant, however, we Americans were unaware when we made
ourselves the successor power in Japan and, at the same time
occupied the southern half of Korea. One may doubt that the
subsequent clash with China over the Korean peninsula, for
which we were unprepared, was altoge1:]:er accidental. ^'^'^
Just as America had to intervene in June 1950, partly to prevent the
passing of all Korea into hostile hands for the salce of Japan's securitjs so
the Chinese must have felt the same way.when they intervened in October and
November, partly to deny their border to U. S. forces and to protect the center
of Chinese industry in Manchuria, especially since they had the means to do so.
David McLeUan finds, "The importance of North Korea as a historic
invasion, route into Manchuria and North China seems to have figured scarcely
at all in Acheson's deliberations with his staff. "-^'^^ On November 21, 1950,
Ache son finally realized this point but he did not attempt to stop MacArthur from
driving to the Yalu, partly because he doubted that the Communists believed
that the United States would use Korea as an invasion route. More important
was the military's view that MacArthur 's advance should not be halted short
of the Korean frontier. The Army's top planning officer in the Pentagon,
-^^%alle, pp. 192-93.
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'See Osgood (1957), p. 184. For views and speculations on Peldng's
other calculations and reasonings in Korean intervention, see Wliiting, pp. 151-
62;Rees, p. 113, Tsou, pp. 576-79.
MoLellan, "Acheson and War, " (1968), p. 21.
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Major General Charles Bolte
,
was strongly opposed to any buffer zone on the
Korean-Manchurian frontier. In preparation for the meeting of November 21
between officials of the Departments of Defense and State, Bolte told Army
Chief of Staff Collins in a memo that the drive to the border would no doubt
increase the tenseness of the situation to some extent, but he emphasized tliat
the decision to cross the 38th parallel was based on the consideration that all
of Korea should be cleared of Communist forces, and that an attack from
Manchuria should be recognized as an open act of military aggression. Further,
the United Nations would actually have a better chance of localizing the conflict
by driving all Communist forces from North Korea. A show of strength might
well discourage further aggression where wealmess vv^ould encourage it. ^^'^
As mentioned earlier , the final decision of November 21 was to allow MacArthur
to push forward while merely suggesting to him that he might want to stop at
the high terrain south of the Yalu.
Acheson seemed also to have been betrayed into discounting Communist
148
China's capacity for action by his preoccupation with Moscow. It was
strongly felt that unless the Soviet Union had decided to start a global war,
Chinese intervention in Korea was improbable since "mainland China was
dependent on the Russians. " It was thought that if Moscow did not want a
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Memo, G-3, DA for Cof S USA, 21 Nov 50, sub: Statc-Defhise
High-Level Mtg on Korea, with Annex A. Sec Sclmabel, pp. 2(37-68.
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general war; the Chinese, then, would have to show restraint.
Neustadt, pp. 141-42- H. A. DeWeerd, "Strategic Surprise in the
Korean War,'^ Orbis, VL (Fall 19G2), p. 446.
CHAPTER VI
AMERICA'S REACTIONS TO CfflNESE ATTACKS
Discussions in Washington and Defensive Stand
in Korea
President Truman held a news conference on November 30, 1950. Among
other matters, he stated:
Recent developments in Korea confront the world with
a serious crisis. The Chinese Communist leaders have sent
their troops from Manchuria to launch a strong and well-
organized attack against the United Nations forces in North
Korea. . . .
The Chinese attack was made in great force, and it
still continues. It has resulted in the forced withdrawal of
large parts of the United Nations command. The battlefield
situation is uncertain at this time. We may suffer reverses
as we have suffered them before. But the forces of the United
Nations have no intention of abandoning their mission in
Korea. ^
When Trimian was asked by a reporter whether there was active consideration of
the use of the atomic bomb to meet the military situation, Truman replied that
"there has always been active consideration of its use. " Later on, in the same
day, a separate "clarifying statement" was issued emphasizing that "by
law,
only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no
such
Hearings, Pt. 5, 3496.
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authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given,




The news reports of the President's press conference immediately aroused
great anxiety and tension among British leaders. At the end of the afternoon,
British Am.bassador Sir Oliver Franks presented a telegram from Prime
Minister Clement Attlee, who wanted as soon as convenient to discuss with
President Truman three items: the possible extension of the war in the Far
East; raw-material supplies and their effect upon U. S. -British joint ability to
play their respective parts; and Western European defense. The talks were
subsequently arranged to begin on December 4 in Washington.
As a result of powerful Chinese attacks, MacArthur's forces continued to
retreat and suffered heavy casualties throughout later November and early
December. According to Collins, the battle casualties ui tlie "ill-fated"
campaign of the X Corps in North Korea during the period from November 27
to December 19, totalled approximately 11, 500, of which 705 were lulled in
action and 4,779 were missing (the rest were presumably wounded in action).
2
Acheson, pp. 478-79; Truman, H, 395-96; Dept. of State Bulletin
(Dec. 11, 1950), p. 925.
\cheson, p. 479; Truman, 11, 396.
"^Collins, p. 227.
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This figure did not include those suffered by the Eighth Army in the western
sector. A check was made on December 1 of the 2nd Division of the Eighth
Army. It had lost almost 5, 000 officers and men, about one third of its
authorized strength, in the last few days of November. Heavy casualties and
severe military reverses constituted the necessary background against which
Washington had to consider ways to react to Chinese attacks throughout
December.
On Dece Tiber 1, a State -Defense meeting was convened at the Pentagon.
Ache son pointed out that the failure of MacArthur's attack was now "hard
upon" the United States. The first questions were whether and where it was
possible to hold a line, what political measures would help to stabilize the
situation, and whether or not they should be started at this stage. If it was not
possible to hold a line a whole set of questions arose that America should begin
to examine, such as either extending the conflict or seeking for a way to end
it. Here, military and political measures "must march together.
"
The result of a "very full and frank" discussion was that it was not
possible to answer Acheson's questions yet. The reports were confused and
confusing. United Nations forces m.ight have to fall much farther back. As






. . .unless the Eighth Army and X Corps could be
imited and regrouped, we might not be able to hold a line at
all, but be forced into beacliheads at Inchon, Wonsan, and
Pusan. In such an eventuality, the possibility of holding the
beaclAeads against possible Chinese and Russian bombing
was doubtful. The use of nuclear weapons by us could lead
to incalculable consequences. For the present, and unless
the preservation of our troops required it, the balancing
of the pros and cons of bombing Manchurian territory,
including air and other bases, was against doing so. On
this the Chiefs of Staff and civilian secretaries were
7unanimous. '
At this State-Defense meeting on December 1, two other measures
—
blockading the China coast and using Nationalist troops from Formosa—were
examined again and ruled out for both a tactical and strategic reason.
At best they could be of only peripheral value.
Furthermore, until we laiew whether our forces would have
to be evacuated from Korea or moved about by water, the
Navy's fighting ships and transports should not be sent off
on secondary missions. But even more basically the peripheral
gain from these measures would put us on our own and lose
us the great advantage of our Ul^I position, leadership, and
support. ^
At this meeting it was felt.
Of the various political aids to battle—cease-fire,
demilitarized zones, and so on--the only practicable and
usefid one seemed to be holding the United Nations to a
condemnation of the Chinese, useful in itself and as a counter-









On this day the Joint Chiefs told MacArthur that after his withdrawal of
the X Corps to the Hamliimg-IIungnam area, as planned, the operations and
positioning of the Eighth Army and the X Corps "shoidd be sufficiently
coordinated to prevent large enemy forces from passing between Uiem or
outflanking either of them. " The Joint Chiefs authorized MacArthur to ignore
the entire region northeast of the narrow waist of the country except for such
operations as v/ere necessary for the military security of his command.
December 2 was a busy day for U. S. foreign policy decision-makers
in Washington. "Suggestions of approaching the Chinese or the Russians witli
proposals for a cease-fire, either through Sir Senegal Rau or Sir Girja
Bajpai of India or the Russians directly through our embassy, were vetoed.
Toward the end of the day, some briefing notes and an intelligence paper were
produced. Acheson took them to Secretary of Defense Marshall's apartment
to "concert" recommendations with him. Marshall raised the dilemma that
evacuation of Korea would pose bet-vveen saving U. S. troops and America's
national honor. Then with General Bradley they went to the President about
eight o'clock, received Presidential instructions, with which Acheson relumed
13
to a group awaiting him in the State Department.










The intelligence paper, with the conclusions of which Acheson, Marshall
and Truman were all in agreement, made the following points:
Chinese deployment and action in Manchuria and Korea
were aimed to make the U. S. -UN position in Korea untenable.
The attitude of the regime and the magnitude of military
preparations in China itself indicated an appreciation of the risk
of general war with the United States that this effort entailed.
It was unlikely that the Chinese would have run this risk without
some assurances of support from the Soviet Union. Support
would probably include, in ascending order: continued provisions
of materiel, teclmicians, and perhaps, if necessary, "volimteers";
air units and anti-aircraft batteries for defense of targets in
Manchuria should U. S. -UN air attack them; appropriate military
support under the Sino-Soviet treaty in the event of U. S. -UN
operations against other Chinese territory. Furthermore, the
Soviet Union must have appreciated and decided to risk the
increased danger of both general U. S. -Chinese war and global
war, which Chinese intervention on the then existing scale might
cause.
Finally, the Kremlin probably saw advantages to it in the
U. S. -Chinese war flowing from the diversion, attrition, and
containment of U. S. forces in an indecisive theater; the creation
of conflict between the United States and her European allies
and the obstruction of NATO plans; the disruption of UN unity
against the original aggression in Korea, thus also aiding Communist
objectives in Southeast Asia. If, however, the United States
should decline the gamble of war with China and withdraw from
Korea, the USSR might be counting on collecting the stal^es in
Korea and Indochina. Iq any event, the United States Government
should expect aggressive Soviet pursuit of its attack on the world
position of the United States. Other aggressions in Asia and
Europe were not to be counted out.
Truman accepted some recommendations for U. S. course at the United




We were directed to put immediately on the agenda of
the General Assembly an item with an accompanying memorandmn
raising the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. It should
leave open the action that we would urge after consultation with
Attlee, who was arriving in thirty-six hours. We should, however
propose to him to renew in the General Assembly under the
"Uniting for Peace" doctrine the resolution that the Soviet Union
had vetoed in ttie Security Council and which com.bined assurance
to China concerning its "legitimate interests" with an urgent
appeal to desist from interference in Korea. Its provisions were
not wholly appropriate to the changed fortunes of war, but it
had the advantage of keeping our own position steady and calm
and holding our UN allies together for a while, at least. The
President wished us to meet with the Chiefs of Staff first thing
the next morning to consider latest developments and report to
him again immediately afterward.
On December 3, MacArthur reported to the Joint Chiefs, calling for
ground reinforcements, or else his command would be forced to take up "beach-
head bastion" positions. MacArthur remained firmly against any junction of the
Eighth Army and X Corps at this time. After explaining the reasons for his
objection, he went on to state:
I do not believe that full comprehension exists of the
basic changes which have been v/rought by the undisguised entrance
by the Chinese Army into the combat. Already Chinese troops to
the estimated strength of approximately 26 divisions are in line
of battle with an additional minimum of 200, 000 to the enemy
rear and remnants of the North Korean Army are being reorganized
in the rear and there stands, of course, behind all the entire





'"^Truman, H, 392; see also Schnabel, p. 281.
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MacArthur said that because of the nature of the terrain and the distance from the
sea where the major fighting was taking place the effectiveness of his superior
air power and the potentials of naval gunfire support were greatly reduced. Thus,
"the comparison more and more becomes one of relative combat effectiveness
of ground forces. " He continued:
It is clearly evident, therefore, that unless ground
reinforcements of the greatest magnitude are promptly
supplied, this Command will be either forced into successive
withdrawals with diminished powers of resistance after each
such move, or will be forced to take up beachliead bastion
positions which, while insuring a degree of prolonged resistance,
would afford little hope of anything beyond defense.
This small command actually under present conditions
is facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war and
unless some positive and immediate action is tal^en, hope for
success cannot be justified and steady attrition leading to
final destruction can reasonably be contemplated.-'-'^
In the face of strong Chinese counterattacks, MacArthur still wanted the
kind of "success" which would require substantial ground reinforcements speedily
supplied to defeat Chinese troops and achieve military victory in Korea. Thus
he used such exaggerated terms as "This small command. . . facing the entire
Chinese nation, " to emphasize his need and demand. He pictured the alternative
course as ignominious v/ithdrawals to the beachhead positions for defense only.
The Joint Chiefs obtained Truman's approval on December 3 and replied
to MacArthur on December 4: "We consider that the preservation of your forces
^"^Truman, H, 392. See also Schnabel, pp. 281-82. For the full text
of
MacArthur 's message of Dec. 3, see Truman, II, 391-33.
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is now the primary consideration. Consolidation of forces into beachheads is
concurred in. " Truman took the position, he later wrote, that "we must not
sacrifice men. Until the United Nations decided to support a major move, it
seemed best to concentrate our strength on beachheads that we might be able
to hold.
Obviously the United States Government in Washington did not share
MacArthur's desire to win a decisive victory over the Chinese forces under the
new circumstances. Originally the policy of allowing MacArthur to push to the
Yalu had an opportunistic aspect. Washington had thought it could be easily
done. But if it did not turn out as expected, Washington was neither willing nor
prepared to devote additional resources to get it done. For, in comparison,
the defense of Japan was much more important than the action in Korea, the
defense of Europe in turn was more vital than that of Asia; and America's
resources were not without limitation and could not be spent too much on Korea.
Therefore preservation of MacArthur's current forces, at least to defend
Japan, became the primary consideration.
In early December, Army Chief of Staff Collins was directed to fly to
the Far East at once to get some firsthand information and to obtain
directly
from MacArthur his estimate of the capabilities of the forces then available
to
him and his views about a possible cease-fire, as well as to consult with
his
'^Truman, 11, 393. See also Schnabel, p. 282.
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principal field commanders.
During the course of discussions at the Pentagon between officials of
the State and Defense Departments on December 3, Acheson opposed efforts
to obtain a cease-fire until Mr. Attlee had arrived and been consulted, and
until the need for it had become unmistakably clear. It was agreed again that
the United States could not in good conscience abandon the South Koreans to
their Chinese-North Korean enemies. This made evacuation from Korea a
last-ditch "resort. " Acheson urged that the bombing of Manchurian airfields
and territory also be considered as a last-ditch operation to be undertaken
only if necessary to save American forces, and that the decision should not be
left to MacArthur but retained by the President and General Marshall with
General Collins remaining at the front to report the facts. Acheson later
20
wrote: "I had lost all faith in MacArthur's judgment. "
The meetings at the Pentagon were then reported to the White House.
Acheson finally urged the President to declare the existence of a national
emergency. His reasons: "Only in this way could the public be made aware
of the seriousness of the situation and that the Government was fully alive to
it. Furthermore, the President might soon need the powers the proclamation
Truman, H, 393; Collins, p. 229.
'Acheson, p. 475.
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would bring him to control prices and wages and to establish far-reaching
production controls. " Truman indicated agreement.
As the discussions continued within the State Department on December 4,
Dean Rusk told Acheson that the military men were too dejected and that they
needed some do-or-die spirit. George Kennan advised, "In international, as
in private, life what counts most is not really what happens to someone but how
he bears what happens to him. " Kennan added that the worst possible time to
negotiate with the Communists was from a position of defeat. They would
correctly interpret it as weakness; threats would only make them refuse altogether
to negotiate. Kennan 's feeling was:
If we could prove that we could hold some sort of line
or beachhead in central or southern Korea, which would piu
down a large number of enemy forces, I was not sure that the
prospect of continuing such a contest in the face of air attacks
on their lines of communications would prove attractive to the
enemy.
Under Secretary James Webb contributed the thought that the best way to start
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Acheson telephoned Marshall at once. He said that the Korean campr.'.gn
had been "cursed by violent swings between exuberant optimism and the deepest
depression and despair, " Both seemed to Acheson unwarranted. 'We had ha.d
enough logic and analysis; what we needed was dogged determination to find a
place to hold and fight the Chinese to a standstill. This was a far better stance
for the United States than to talk about withdrawing from Korea or going off on a
policy of our own of bombing and blockading China, " Acheson recalled his
conversation.
Marshall replied that he agreed, with two conditions: first, he must see
with what success MacArthur got the X Corps out of the east coast area; second,
the United States must not dig itself into a hole without an exit. Acheson accepted
the "amendments" and sent Rusk and Kennan to see Marshall. Marshall repeated
the two conditions for making a stand in Korea. Kennan told Marshall that the
State Department was not trying to determine military policy. If it was really
true that an attempt to hold a beachhead would mean the loss of entire American
forces or any other exorbitant price, that was that, and had to be accepted. But
the State Department must point out the political implications of this decision
and make sure that they were borne in mind in whatever decision might be
26







Lovett, on joining the group, said that he had just come from Capitol
Hill, where he and Admiral Sherman had been briefing the House Armed Services
Committee. The prevailing feeling there seemed to him to have been that
America's entry into Korea had been a mistalce and that the United States ought
to pull out as rapidly as possible. Marshall was not impressed. This sort of
fluctuation of congressional opinion was not new to him. The present mood
might not last for long.
By midday of December 4, Truman-told Acheson that his decision was to
stay in Korea and fight as long as possible. Truman had no patience with tlie
suggestions that the United States abandon Korea.
Consultation with British Prime Minister Attlee
In preparation for the British Prime Minister's visit to Washington, the
State Department drafted recommendations on December 3, consulted the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and submitted them to the President. The State Department
proposed that President Truman discuss with Attlee two possible courses of
action in Korea. The first of these involved a withdrawal of UN forces to a line
on the 38th parallel in conjunction with a possible cease-fire agreement. The
29
second course was the evacuation of all of Korea.
27ibid.; Keiman, 11, 32-33.
^^Kennan, 1.1, 33.
^^JCS 2176/1, 3 Dec 50, Incl. B. ; see Schnabel, p. 290.
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With regard to the first course of action, the State Department's proposal
held:
Before the Chinese Communists have reached the 38th
Parallel in strength we should try to establish a cease-fire on
the basis of the 38th Parallel with the armies separated by a
demilitarized zone. The principal purpose of this effort would
be to deny success to aggression and to consolidate aii over-
whelming majority of the United Nations members behind the
cease-fire effort. Arrangements for a cease-fire on the basis
of the 38th Parallel would not, however, be conditioned on agTee-
ment to other issues, such as Formosa and the seating of
Communist China in the United Nations.
During the cease-fire effort, the United Nations would retire to the Seoul-Inchon
area, but would not begin any evacuation until the results of the cease-fire were
determined. The State Department also held that the X Corps should withdraw
from Korea to Japan in the event of military necessity.
The second course of action assumed the failure of a cease-fire effort
and the possible necessity of evacuating Korea. In such a case, the State Depart-
ment's position
, . . [did] not exclude the possibility of some military
action which would harass the Chinese pending their acceptance
of a United Nations settlement for Korea and would not exclude
any efforts which could be made to stimulate anti-Communist
resistance within China itself, including the exploitation of
Nationalist capabilities,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted about the recommendations of the







tageous for the United Nations Commajid under conditions then obtaining, they
wanted to be sure of two things: first, the considerations offered the Chinese
in exchange for a cease-fire agreement must not be too great, and secondly,
the United Nations commander must not be operationally restricted. Such a
plan as the State Department proposed, dictating not only the area into which
the Eighth Army would retire but also restricting the conditions under which
MacArthur might evacuate his troops, was unacceptable. The Joint Chiefs in
revising the State Department proposals, cut out any reference to the evacuation
of the X Corps. "Arrangements for this cease -fire must not impose conditions
which would jeopardize the safety of United Nations forces, " the Joint Chiefs
maintained. They also objected to the provision that would have compelled
the Eighth Army to withdraw to the Seoul-Inchon area.
In the second case of the possible evacuation of all of Korea, the Joint
Chiefs seized upon the State Department's discreetly worded hint of retaliatory
measures and reworded it, not only in stronger terms, but by adding several
possible retaliatory measures later proposed by MacArthur, to include a
naval blockade of China and bombing of Chinese lines of communication outside
of Korea.
As a result of these recommendations and revisions, Truman read a





later wrote that the memorandum had been agreed on by the State and Defense
Departments and to which I had given my approval. " It read:
1. It would be militarily advantageous in the immediate
situation if a cease-fire order could be arranged provided that
considerations offered were not so great as to be unacceptable.
This might insure full support of the United Nations. Arrange-
ments for a cease-fire must not impose conditions which would
jeopardize the safey of United Nations forces nor be conditioned
on agreement on other issues, such as Formosa, and the
Chinese seat in the United Nations.
2. If a cease-fire should be effected which permits a
stabilization of the situation, United Nations shoiild proceed
with the political, military and economic stabilization of the
Republic of Korea while continuing efforts to seek an independent
and unified Korea by political means.
3. If the Chinese Communists reject a cease-fire and
move major forces south of the 38th parallel, the United Nations
may face a forced evacuation of Korea. The consequences of a
voluntary abandonment of our Korean allies would be such that
any United Nations evacuation must be clearly the result of
military necessity only.
4. If the situation in the preceding paragraph develops,
the United Nations must talce immediate action to declare
Communist China an aggressor and must mobilize such political
and economic measures as are available to bring pressure upon
Peiping and to affirm the determination of the United Nations
not to accept an aggression. Also, there is the possibility of
some militai7 action which would harass the Chinese Communists
and of efforts which could be made to stimulate anti-communist
resistance within China itself, including the exploitation of
Nationalist capabilities. "^"^
At the end of the third point, Truman later wrote, "I paused in the reading of
the memorandum a3id emphatically repeated that it was out of the question that
we should get out volimtarily. All the Koreans left behind who had been loyal
"^^Truman, H, 400.
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to the United Nations would face death. The Communists cared nothing about
human life. "^'^
The memorandum also included other steps about which the United States
and the United Kingdom should consult immediately to strengthen non-communist
Asia.
The talks between Truman and Attlee were held daily from December 4
through December 8, and included their advisers, principally Acheson, Marshall
and British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks. Regarding the Far East, both sides
came to an ag^reement on two major points: (a) the avoidance of a generid war
with Communist China; (b) the determination to remain in Korea.
Acheson expressed the U. S. position, at Truman's request, on December
4, that the central opponent was not China but the Soviet Union. The talk for all-
out war against China was foolish and irresponsible. It had been repudiated by
the Administration. Acheson assured the British leaders that not many of the
President's advisers would urge him to follow that course with the involvement
it implied. On the other hand, Acheson pointed out, the moment seemed the
worst one for negotiation with the Russians since 1917. They saw themselves
37
holding the cards and would concede nothing.
Ibid.
3^See Truman, E, 400-401.
^
^Ibid. , 409.
^^Acheson, p. 482; Truman, H, 397-98.
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La the course of discussion on December 7, the British side suggested
the consideration of the admission of Communist China into the United Nations
and then negotiations witli the Chinese Communists within the framework of the
principles of the United Nations. The American side disagreed strongly.
Though admitting that "there was not very much that we could do to Communist
China unless we wished to engage in all-out war, " Acheson emphasized:
We should not get into negotiations until we knew where
we were going. If we had a cease-fire now, we would be
negotiating from weakness. If we could hold on and perhaps
improve our position, we could approach a cease-fire quite
differently. Of course if we got thrown out of Korea there
would be no negotiations, but we would have made our point.
Truman added that "we would face terrible divisions among our people here at
home if the Chinese Communists were admitted to the United Nations. " The
President could not see any gain that would offset this loss in public morale. If
the Chinese were admitted to the United Nations "would they be any different
from the Russians?" Truman asked. He expected them to behave just like the
38
other satellites of Russia.
The talks helped both sides to understand better where they agreed and
disagreed. As to the use of the atomic bomb, the final communique stated:
The President stated that it was his hope that world
conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb.
The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his
Trumtui, 11, 406-07.
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desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of
developments which might bring about a change in the
situation.
Army Chief of Staff Collins arrived in Tokyo on Decmeber 4, 1950.
After a brief meeting with General MacArthur, he flew to Korea, visiting the
headquarters of the Eighth Army and X Corps. He returned to Tokyo on
December 6 and conferred with Generals MacArthur, Stratemeyer, Hickey,
Wright, and Willoughby and Admiral Joy for a thorough review of actions that
might be taken in Korea. As a framework for their discussion, they projected
three hypothetical situations covering the next few weeks or months. The first
two assumed a continuance of an all-out attack by the Chinese Communist
forces; the third was based on a possible Chinese agreement not to advance
south of the 38th parallel. As Collins later wrote:
The first case was examined under the assumption that
existing restrictions against allied bombing north of the Yalu
would be continued, that there would be no blockade of China,
that there would be no reinforcements to the United Nations
^
Command from Formosa, that there would be no substantial
reinforcements from the United States imtil April 1951, when
four National Guard divisions might be available and, finally,
that the atomic bomb might be used in North Korea. General
MacArthur protested strongly that any such limitations would
be tantamount to surrender. Under these conditions an
armistice might be helpful for political purposes but would
not be essential militarily, since the United Nations forces
would have to be withdrawn from Korea and this could be done
safely from Hungnam and Pusan with or without an armistice.
S^Dept. of State Bulletin (Dec. 18, 1950), p. 961. For greater details
of Attlee's visit to Washington, see Truman, H, 396-413 and Acheson,
pp„ 480-85.
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In the second situation it was assumed that an effective
naval blockade of China would be established, air reconnaissance
and bombing of the Chinese mainland would be permitted, Chinese
Nationalist forces would be exploited to the maximum, and the
atomic bomb might be used if tactically appropriate. General
MacArthur said that under such conditions he should be directed
to hold in Korea as far north as possible and that he would move
the X Corps overland to join the Eighth Army in the Pusan
bridgehead.
In the third case, General MacArthur felt that, if the
Chinese agreed not to cross the 38th Parallel, the United Nations
should accept an armistice. The NK forces as well as the CCF
forces should remain north of the 38th Parallel, NK guerrillas
in the south should be withdrawn, the Eighth Army should continue
to cover Seoul-Inchon while the X Corps withdrew to Pusan, and
a United Nations Commission should oversee the implementation
of the armistice. MacArthur felt that this would be the best
course to follow, unless the United Nations should decide to act
as assumed in the second case. In any event Chiang Kai-shek
should be permitted to send troops to Korea without delay, and
the participating United Nations powers should increase their
fighting contingents to at least 75, 000. He concluded by saying
that unless substantial reinforcements were sent quicldy, the
United Nations Command should pull out of Korea.
I agreed that if the United Nations did not support fully
the operations in Korea in the face of continued all-out Chinese
attack, General MacArthur should be directed to take the necessary
steps to safeguard his command and prepare plans for evacuation
from Korea. Wliile I did not presume, to argue the point with
General MacArthur, I did not feel that, even with the limitations
likely to be placed upon the United Nations Command, the Chinese
could force its \vithcb:avv^al from Korea. I based this judgment
primarily on the views expressed by the field commanders,
Walker and Almond.
General Collms returned to Washington on December 8. After reporting
to the Joint Chiefs, Collins and Bradley went to the White
House at the invitation
^^Collins, pp. 231-32. See also Schnabel, pp.
283-84.
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of Truman to brief the British-American conferees. Collins pointed out that
if the Chinese continued i^eir all-out attack it would not be possible to hold the
Seoul-Inchon area. However, Collins quoted General Walker's conviction that
the Eighth Army could retain a sizable bridgehead based on Pusan, particularly
when reinforced by the X Corps—a reinforcement that by then MacArthur had
agreed to—when that Corps was withdrav/n from Hungnam on the east coast.
Collins concluded by expressing his personal judgment that, although the military
41
situation remained "serious, " it was no longer "critical. "
MacArthur's views on the three possible courses of action were reported
to Truman in secrecy by Collins. Truman later wrote that his conclusion was:
"General MacArthur was ready to risk general war. I was not. " "
On December 12, 1950, the Secretary of State informed General MacArthur
about the conclusions of the talks between the President of the United States and
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom: a cease-fire and peaceful solution
of the conflict in Korea was desirable in the immediate future, if they coidd be
secured on honorable terms. However, such a solution would not be bartered
with the Chinese Communists in exchange for the United States withdrawal of
protection from Formosa or Indochina. If no solution could be obtained, the
American and British troops would fight on in Korea unless they were forced
out.
43
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Preparedness in America and the Cease-Fire
Attempt at the United Nations
Follomng the Chinese Communist attack in late November and U. S.
retreat in North Korea, President Truman and his principal political and military
advisers all felt the need to take drastic action to strengthen U. S. Military
forces and to build up industrial mobilization potential for meeting U. S.
commitments to the newly-created NATO and for faciag a possible major war
44
against China.
On December 13 and 14, the President met with two different groups of
members of the Congress to discuss the proclamation of national emergency
and economic allocations and control.
On December 14, the National Security Council approved a plan to
accomplish the expansion of the U. S. Army to eighteen combat divisions- -with
comparable increases in the Navy and Air Force—by June 1952. This represented
an accelerated rate. The original plan, approved on November 22, 1950, called
for the achievement of such an expansion by June 30, 1954. As a result of
this acceleration policy. President Truman in December called two more
National Guard divisions, the 31st and the 47th, to active Federal service,
46
beginning in January 1951.
'^^Collins, p. 233; Truman, II, 417; Sclmabel, p. 299;
Acheson, pp. 475-76.
4"^
See Truman, n, 420-26.
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Collins, p. 233; Schnabel, p. 299.
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On December 16, 1950, Truman proclaimed the existence of a national
emergency which required:
. . .
the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of
this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end
that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our
national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts
being made through the United Nations and otherwise to bring
about lasting peace. ^''^
The United States also decided to initiate a blockade of trade with
Communist China. On December 14, Trimian authorized the Departments of
State and Treasury to work out the application of controls over Chinese Communist
assets in the United States. On December 17, these assets were brought under
control by a blocking order from the Department of the Treasury. On December
16, the Department of Commerce had issued orders prohibiting United States
ships and aircraft from visiting Chinese Communist ports. But economic sanctions
without the cooperation of other nations, including members of the United Nations
48
with forces in Korea, could not be fully effective.
At the United Nations in December, 1950, the Soviet Union and Communist
China, whose representative had been invited by the Security Council to participate
49
in the discussion of the complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa),
Hearings , Pt. 5, 3520.
'^^Schnabel, p. 318.
'^^See Security Council resolution of Sept. 29, 1950.
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were attacking the United States for its stand on Korea and Formosa. The United
States was trj'ing to rally its friends to vote a condemnation of Chinese aggres-
sion in Korea, while the Indians and others were stTiving for a cease-fire
C A
resolution.
According to Acheson, "Since the United Nations was one of the belligerents,
a cease-fire resolution was obviously an appeal by the weaker to the stronger side.
For this reason the United States Government in the current military situation
51
would neither participate in the effort nor block it. "
On December 14, 1950 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a
resolution which had been sponsored by thirteen Asian powers. The General
Assembly "requests the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group
of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory
cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the
General Assembly as soon as possible. "^^ The President of the General Assembly,
Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, accordingly constituted a group consisting of Lester





^^See Report to the General Assembly from Group on Cease-fire in Korea,
January 2, 1951. U.N. doc. A/C.l/643. Reprinted in Dept. of State Bulletin
(Jan. 15, 1951), pp. 113-16. Also reprinted in Hearings , Pt. 4, 3505-13.
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consulted the representatives of the Unified Command, on December 15, as to
what they considered to be a satisfactory basis for a crease-fire. The Unified
Command was established by the UN Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950
to place military forces and other assistance, offered by members of the United
Nations in support of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27 to assist
the Republic of Korea, under the United States. Thus the consultation was, in
effect, with the United States Government, which insisted on the following
conditions as the basis for a cease-fire: •
(1) All governments and authorities concerned, including
the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of
China and the North Korean authorities, shall order and enforce
a cessation of all acts of armed force in Korea. This cease-
fire shall apply to all of Korea.
(2) There shall be established a demilitarised area
across Korea of approximately twenty miles in depth with the
southern limit following generally the line of the 38th parallel.
(3) All ground forces shall remain in position or be
withdrawn to the rear; forces, including guerrillas, within or
in advance of the demilit arised area must be moved to the rear
of the demilitarised area; opposing air forces shall respect the
demilitarised zone and the areas beyond the zone; opposing
Naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the land
areas occuped by the opposing armed forces to the limit of 3
miles from shore.
(4) Supervision of the cease-fire shall be by a United
Nations Commission whose members and designated observers
shall insure full compliance with the terms of the cease-fire.
They shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea.
All governments and authorities shall co-operate with the
Cease- Fire Commission and its designated observers in tlie
performance of their duties.
(5) All governments and authorities shall cease promptly
the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing or replacement
units or personnel, including volunteers, and the introduction
of additional v/ar equipment and material. Such equipment and
2G5
materi^ will no mclude supplies required for the maintenanceof health and welfare and such other supplies as may b7
authorized by the Cease-Fire Commission.
(6) Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-forone basis pending final settlement of the Korean question
(7) Appropriate provision shall be made in the ceasefire arrangements in regard to steps to insure (a) the security
o 1. V""^
the movement of refugees; and (c) the handllgf other specific problems arising out of the cease-fire
mcluding civil government and police power in the demilitarised
zone.
(8) The General Assembly shall be asked to confirm the
ceasc-lire arrangements, which should continue in effect until
superseded by further steps approved by the United Nations. 53
It is interesting to note that the ideas of conditions (1), (3), (5), and (7)
were later included in the final armistice agreement of 1953. The comparable
paragraphs were: 12 for condition (1); 13(a), 13(b). 14. 15, and 16 for condition
(3); 13(c) and 13(d) for condition (5); 5, 6, 7. 8, 9, and 10 for condition (7) (c).^^
Even though condition (8) was not incorporated into the final agreement, the UN
General Assembly, soon after the armistice agreement was signed on July 27,
_
1953 by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand.
and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander
of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, adopted a resolution on
August 28, 1953, having received a special report of the UN Command on the
53
See Hoarings. Pt. 5, 3505-06. Also Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 15,
1951), p. 113. For the discussion of U. S. position on cease-fire terms at the
Nitional Security Council meeting on Dec. 11, see Truman, II, 417-19.
For the text of the agreement, sec U. S. Department of State, Armistice
in Korea; Selected Statements and Documents
,
Publication 5150, Far Eastern
Scries 61. Released August 1353.
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armistice in Korea, "Notes with approval the Armistice Agreement concluded
in Korea on 27 July 1953, the fact that the fighting has ceased, and that a major
step has this been taken towards the full restoration of international peace and
security in the area. "^^
The General Assembly Group on Cease-fire also communicated with the
Peking Government. Cta December 23, 1950, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister
of Communist China, replied to the President of the General Assembly trans-
mitting his statement of December 22 concerning the same subject of a cease-
fire in Korea. In his statement, Chou argued that the General Assembly re-
solution of December 14, 1950 was illegal since his government neither participa-
ted in nor agreed to its adoption. "Therefore, the Government of the People's
Republic of China and its Delegates are not prepared to make any contract with
the above mentioned illegal 'three-man committee. '"^^ Chou maintained:
When the invading troops of the United States arrogantly
crossed the 38th parallel at the beginning of the month of
October, the United States Government, recklessly ignoring
warnings from all quarters and following the provocative
crossing of the border by Syngman Rhee in June, thoroughly
destroyed, and hence obliterated forever this demarcation
57
line of political geography.
^^See UN General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supple-
ment No. 20B (A/23G1/Add. 2), p. 2.
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Hearings , Pt. 5, 3510.
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Chou could not accept America's sincerity in the cease-fire. He explained:
It is not difficult to understand that, when the American
invading troops were landing at Inchon, crossing the 38th
parallel or pressing toward the Yalu River, they did not favouj?
an immediate cease-fire and were not willing to conduct
negotiations. It is only today when the American invading
troops have sustained defeat, that they favour an immediate
cease-fire and the conducting of negotiations after the cease-
fire. 58
The Peldng Government regarded it an "intrigue" of the U. S. Govern-
ment to want a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards. Chou's statement
of December 22 concluded:
:
We firmly insist that, as a basis for negotiating for
a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, all foreign
troops must be withdrawn from Korea, and Korean domestic
affairs must be settled by the Korean people themselves. The
American aggression forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan.
And the Representatives of the People's Republic of China
must obtain a legitimate status in the United Nations.
. . .
To put aside these points would make it impossible to settle
the Koresn problem and the important problems
In these circumstances, the three-man Group reported to the General
Assembly on January 2, 1951:
The gToup regrets that it has been unable to pursue
discussion of a satisfactory cease-fire arrangement. It
therefore feels that no recommendation in regard to a







Which Strategy; Resistance, Evacuation
or Retaliation?
On December 7, 1950, General MacArthur decided to evacuate the X Corps
from the Hungnam area on the east coast of North Korea and sea-Mft it to Pusan
and then put it under the command of the Eighth Army. By December 25, the
evacuation of the X Corps had been completed. The Chinese made no concerted
effort to overrun the Hungnam beachhead or to disrupt the evacuation operation. ^2
The Eighth Army had abandoned the North Korean capital of Pyongyang by
December 5 and continued to pull back toward the 38th parallel in mid-December.
These displacements had not been forced by the Chinese Communist forces, which
failed to press a pursuit. American intelligence agencies were puzzled by the
lack of aggressive Chinese follow-up,
On December 23, General Walker, Commanding General of the Eighth
Army, was killed in a vehicle accident. He v/as succeeded by Lieutenant General
Matthew B. Ridgway, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration
in the Department of the Army.
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Collins, p. 234; Sclmabel, pp. 300-01.
^^Collins, p. 235; Schnabel, pp. 303-04.
^•^Ridg-way, pp. 72-73; Collins, pp. 235-36; Sclinabel, p. 304.




Eighth Army halted uneasily near tiie38th ParaUel, awaiting its new commander and the new enemy
Signs were increasing that the Chinese were closing the gap and
were advancing down the peninsula in a co-ordinated effort to
feel out the Eighth Army's defenses before launching another
major attack. A tense calm hung over the battle area. ^5
Under these circumstances, President Truman summoned Secretary of
State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Bradley and Secretary of the Treasury Snyder to a strategy meeting at Blair
House on the day after Christmas. It was a long meeting. Acheson proposed a
rewriting and clarification of MacArthur's directives. Acheson later recalled:
The stakes in Korea were so high that the United Nations
should not withdraw until we had tested Chinese strength fully
and found that dire military necessity required it. General
MacArthur should not be required to defend any particular line
but to inflict the maximum losses on the enemy by the use of
air, sea, and land power
,
including Korean forces (the strategy
later adopted by General Ridgway). He should not risk the
destruction of his troops, since on them lay the ultimate re-
sponsibility for the defense of Japan. The generals saw an
increased threat of general war and were clear that it should
not be fought in Korea. They agreed to the rewriting of the
directive, and the President authorized it.
The next day a draft was discussed by Marshall and Bradley with Truman
and Acheson, On December 29, 1950, the Joint Chiefs sent the following message
to MacArthur:




It appears from all estimates available that the ChineseCommunists possess the capability of forcing United Nationsforces out of Korea if ^ey choose to exercise it. The execution
of this capability might be prevented by maldng tlie effort so
costly to the enemy that they would abandon it or by committino-
substantial additional United States forces to that theatre thus''
seriously jeopardizing other commitments including the safety
of Japan. It is not practical to obtain significant additional
forces for Korea from other members of the United Nations Webelieve that Korea is not the place to fight a major war. Further
we believe that we should not commit our remaining available
ground forces to action against Chinese Communist forces in
Korea in face of the increased threat of general war. However
a successful resistance to" Chuiese-North Korean aggi^ession at'
some position in Korea and a deflation of the military and
political prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of gTeat
importance to our national interest, if they could be accomplished
without incurring serious losses.
The Joint Chiefs further stated:
Your basic directive.
. . requires modification in the
light of the present situation. You are now directed to defend
in successive positions.
.
.. subject to the primary consideration
of the continued threat to Japan, [and] to determine in advance
our last reasonable opportunity for an orderly evacuation.
The message concluded:
It seems to us that if you are forced back to positions in
the vicinity of the Kum River and a line generally eastward there-
from, and if thereafter the Chinese Communists mass large
forces against your positions with an evident capability of forcing
us out of Korea, it then would be necessary, under those
conditions, to direct you to commence a withdrawal to Japan.
Your views are requested as to the above outlined
conditions which should determine a decision to initiate evacuation.
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MacArthur, pp. 377-78. See also Whitney, pp. 429-30.
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Whitney, p. 430. See also MacArthur, p. 378. Whitney is more diligent
than MacArthur in indicating any deletion of words from the original message.
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particularly in light of your continuing primary mission of
defending Japan for which only troops of the Eightli Army are
available
.
Following the receipt of your views we will give you a
definite directive as to the conditions under which you should
initiate evacuation. ^9
According to Collins and Schnabel, this message from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff also directed MacArthur to damage the enemy as much as possible,
"subject to the primary consideration of the safety of your troops, " and to
MacArthur 's continuing responsibility for the defense of Japan. "^^ hi the para-
phrase of the summary of this message, presented by the Joint Chiefs to the
Senate Committees during the MacArthur hearings, the pertinent passage
concerning MacArthur 's modified directive contained additional and somewhat
different phrases from Whitney's (or MacArthur' s) version.
Therefore in light of present situiition your basic
directive, of [sic] furnish to ROK assistrmce as necessary to
repel armed attack and restore to the area security and peace,
is modified. Your directive now is to defend in successive
positions, subject to safety of your troops as your primary
consideration, inflicting as muchdainage to hostile forces io.
Korea as is possible.
In view of continued threat to safety of Japan and
possibility of forced withdrawal from Korea it is important to
make advance determination of last reasonable opportunity^ for
71
orderly evacuation.
Collins, p. 247. See also Schnabel, p. 311; Whitney, p. 430;
MacArthur, p. 378.
"^^Colliris, p. 247; Schnabel, p. 311.
"^Hearings, Pt. 3, 2179.
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This directive to MacArthur made it abundantly clear that the problem of
Korea was secondary to the importance of the defense of Japan. In view of the
fact that the United States could not commit substantial additional American forces
to Korea and Japan, the defense of Japan would require the preservation of
MacArthur's present troops in Korea. For this reason evacuation from Korea
would be preferable to a decisive action against Chinese forces at the expense of
the safety of American troops, especially in view of the heavy casualties these
troops had suffered. No attempt would be made to achieve a victory in Korea
while the security of Japan might be thereby threatened. According to Acheson and
the JCS report to the Senate Committees, this message was dated December 29,
72
1950. But Collins and Schnabel give the date of December 30, 1950.'^'^
MacArthur and Whitney do not mention the date of this message ia tlieir books.
Later on, in MacArthur's message of January 10, 1951, he made reference to
this JCS message and identified it by the date of December 30, 1950. '^'^
Late in the evening of Decem.ber 30, MacArthur sat down to compose his
reply to the Jomt Chiefs' message. "This reply, " Wliitaey writes, "is probably
75MacArthur's most important single comment on the Korean war. " It outlined
7?
"Acheson, p. 514; Hearings, Pt. 3, 2179.
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four specific measures that MacArthur advocated to turn the tide:
Any estimate of relative capabilities in the Korean campaign
appears to be dependent upon political- military policies yet to be
formulated vis-a-vis Chinese military operations being conducted
against our forces. It is quite clear now that the entire military
resource of the Chinese nation, with logistic support from the
Soviet, is committed to a maximum effort against the United
Nations command. In implementation of this commitment a
major concentration of Chinese force in the Korean-Manchurian
area will increasingly leave China vulnerable in areas whence
troops to support Korean operations have been drawn. Meanwhile,
under existing restrictions, our naval and air potential are being
only partially utilized and the great potential of Chinese
Nationalist force on Formosa and gxierrilla action on the mamland
are being ignored. Indeed, as to the former, we are preventing
its employment against the common enemy by our own naval
forces.
Should a policy determination be reached by our govern-
ment or through it by the United Nations to recognize the state
of war which has been forced upon us by the Chmese authorities
and to take retaliatory measures within our capabilities, we
could: (1) blockade the coast of China; (2) destroy through naval
gun fire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to
wage war; (3) secure reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison
in Formosa to strengthen our position in Korea if we decided to
continue the fight for that peninsula; and (4) release existing
restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action,
possibly leading to comiter -invasion, against vulnerable areas
of the Chinese mainland.
I believe that by the foregoing measiu'es we could severely
cripple and largely neutralize China's capability to wage ag;:pres-
sive war and thus save Asvd from the cn-xiilfment otherwise facing
it. I believe furthermore that we could do so with but a small
part of our overall military potential committed to the purpose.
There is no slightest doubt but that this action would at once
release the pressure upon our forces in Korea, whereupon
determination coidd be reached as to whether to mamtain the
fight in that area or to affect a strategic displacement of our
forces with the view to strengthening our defense of the littoral
island chain while continuing our naval and air pressure upon
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China's military potential. I am fully conscious of the fact that
this course of action has been rejected in the past for fear of
provoking China into a major war effort, but we must now
realistically recognize that China's commitment thereto has
already been fully and uncquivocably made and that nothing we
can do would further aggravate the situation as far as China is
concerned.
Whether defending ourselves by way of military
retaliation would bring in Soviet military intervention or not is
a matter of speculation. I have always felt that a Soviet decision
to precipitate a general war would depend solely upon the Soviet's
own estimate of relative strengths and capabilities with little
regard to other factors. ... If we are forced to evacuate Korea
without taking military measures against China proper as
suggested in your message, it would have the most adverse [sic]
affect upon the people of Asia, not excepting the Japanese, and a
material reinforcement of the forces now in tills theater would be
mandatory if we are to hold tlie littoral defense chain against
determined assault .
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that evacuation of
our forces from Korea under any circumstances would at once
release the bulk of the Chinese forces now absorbed by that
campaign for action elsewhere
—
quite probably in areas of far
greater importance than K^orea itself .
MacArthur went on:
On the other hand, the relatively small command that we
have in Korea is capable of so draining the enemy's resources
as to protect the areas to the south which would in itself be
possibly a gxeater contribution to the general situation than could
be made by such a force disposed in other areas for purely defense
purposes, but not possessing the power to pin down and localize
so massive a part of the enemy's potential as now committed in
77
Korea.
Wliitney, pp. 432-34. Emphasis is Wliitney's.
'^'^Schnabel, p. 316. MacArthur also told the JCS that if a general evacuation
took place, the ROK Army w^ould disintegrate or become of negligible value; Japan
itself would become eirtremely vulnerable following the loss of Korea. Ibid .
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I understand thorouglily the demand for European security
and fully concur in doing everything possible in that sector, but
not to the point of accepting defeat aaiywhere else-an acceptance
which I am sure could not fail to insui-e later defeat in Europe
itself. The preparations for the defense of Europe, however,
by the most optimistic estimate are aimed at a condition of
readiness two years hence. The use of forces in the present
emergency in the Far East could not in any way prejudice this
basic concept. To the contrary, it would ensure thoroughly
seasoned forces for later commitment in Europe—synchronously
with Europe's own development of military resources.
So far as your tactical estimate of the situation in Korea
is concerned, under the conditions presently implied, viz: no
reinforcements, continued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist
action, no military measures against China's continental
military potential, and the concentration of Chinese military
force solely upon the Korean sector, would seem to be sound.
The tactical plaji of a successively contracting defense line
south to the Pusan beachhead is believed the only possible way
which the evacuation could be accomplished. In the execution of
this plan it would not be necessary for you to make an anticipatory
decision for evacuation until such time as we may be forced to
that beachliead line. '^8
Essentially MacArthur did not like the idea of evacuation from Korea,
as was being considered by Washington. He regarded it as accepting a defeat
and thus adversely affecting attitudes of the people of Asia, including the
Japanese. He further argued that this defeat in Asia "could not fail to insure
Whitney, p. 434. See also Selmabel, pp: 31G-17; MacArthur, pp. 378-
80; the paraphrase of MacArthur's reply in Hearings , Pt. 3, 2180-81. On the
possibility of Soviet military intervention, Gen. MacArthur also stated that
his recent request for reinforcements by four divisions had as its purpose the





later defeat in Europe itself, " which he Imew was the focus of Washington's
concern.
His contention was that the action in Korea could so drain the enemy's
(Chinese) resources as to protect the areas to the south, such as Indochina.
In order to hold in Korea, he was prepared to recommend four retaliatory
measures not only to release at once the pressure upon American forces in
Korea, but to "severely cripple and largely neutralize China's capability to
wage aggressive war.
"
On New Year's Eve, the Chinese launched a major offensive and advanced
across the 38th parallel toward the south. Seoul was evacuated on January 3,
1951. The next day it was taken by the Communists.
On January 9, 1951, the Joint Chiefs, with the approval of the Secretary
of Defense and the President, replied to MacArthur's recommendations on
retaliatory measures:
The retaliatory measures you suggest have been and
continue to be given careful consideration. There is little
possibility of policy change or other eventuality justifying the
strengthening of our effort in Korea. Blockade of China coast,
if undertaken, must await either stabilization of our position
in Korea or our evacuation from Korea. However, a naval
blockade off the coast of China would require negotiations with
the British in view of the extent of British trade with China





Communist China probably can be authorized only if the
Chinese Communists attack United States forces outside of
Korea and decision must await that eventuality. Favorable
action cannot be taken on the proposal to obtain Korean re-
inforcements from the Chinese Nationalist garrison on
Formosa, in view of improbability of their decisive effect on
the Korean outcome and their probable greater usefulness
elsewhere.
In the light of the foregoing and after full consideration
of all pertinent factors, defend in successive positions as
required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's message, inflicting
maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to
primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your
basic mission of protecting Japan. Should it become evident
in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid severe
losses of men and materiel you will at that time withdraw from
P -1
Korea to Japan.
Thus Washington did not accept MacArthur's proposals. But MacArthur "shot
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a query right back, " in his own phrase, asking for clarification. He sent
the following message to the Joint Chiefs on January 10, 1951:
Personal for J CS.
This refers to your message of January 9. Clarification
requested of your directive in the light of its qualified require-
ments that (1) I continue to defend in successive positions
^\lacArthur, p. 380. See also Wliitney, pp. 434-35; Sclinabel, pp.




"In event stabilization in Korea not feasible,
security ot
Japan must be served by portion of the forces which
may be evacuated
from Korea. If stabilization in Korea without commitment
of addtionai
forces can be accomplished, deployment of two
National Guard divisions
partly trained may be expected. Intensification of
economic blockade
of Chinese trade being pressed. "
, • , nl^o
See Marsh^ul's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 1.
333. The Joint Ch
^^^^^^^^^^
that any blockade of the China coast required
the concurrence of the United




subject to my basic mission of protecting Japan and to primary
consideration of the safety of my troops; and (2) that if in my
judgment it becomes evident that evacuation is essential to
avoid severe loss of materiel and men that I withdraw from
Korea to Japan.
In view of the self-evident fact that as presently con-
stituted my command is of strength insufficient to hold a
position in Korea and protect simultaneously Japan against
external assault, strategic dispositions taken in the present
situation must be based upon overriding political policy
establishing the relativity of American interests in tlie Far
East. That a beachhead line can be held by our existing forces
for a limited time in Korea, there is no doubt, but tliis could
not be accomplished without losses. Whether or not such
losses were regarded as "severe, " would to a certain extent
depend upon the connotation one gives the term. The command
was committed to the Korean campaign to fight the North
Korean invasion army which in due course was effectively
destroyed. It was not the intent that it engage the armies
of the Chinese nation and had there been foreseeable prospects
that it would find it necessary to do so in its own defense,
doubtless it would not have been committed at all. The troops
are embittered by the shameful propaganda which has falsely
condemned their fighting qualities and courage in misunderstood
retrograde maneuver, are tired from a long and difficult
campaign, and unless the political basis upon which they are
asked to trade life for time is clearly delmeated, fully under-
stood, and so impelling that the hazards of battle are accepted
cheerfully, their morale will become a serious threat to their
battle efficiency.
I am in full agreement, as I stated in my message of
December 30 in reply to your message of the same date, with
your estimate that the conditions and limitations, namely: no
reinforcements, no measures permissible against China's
continental military potential, continued restrictions upon
Chinese Nationalist military action, and the concentration in
the Korean-Manchurian sector of China's military force, will
eventually render untenable the military position of the
command in Korea. In the absence of overriding political
considerations, under these conditions the command should
be withdrawn from the peninsida just as rapidly as it is
feasible tactically to do so. If, on the other hand, Uie
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primary political interests of the United States in the Far East
lies in holding a position in ICorea and thus pinning down a large
segment of the Chinese military potential, the military course
is implicit in political policy and we should be prepared to
accept any attendant hazard to Japan's security and whatever
casualties result.
The issue involves a decision of highest national and
international importance, far above the competence of a theater
commander guided largely by incidents affecting the tactical
situation developing upon a very limited field of action, and
really boils down to the question of whether or not the United
States intends to evacuate Korea. Nor is it a decision which
should be left to the initiative of enemy action which would in
effect be the determining criterion under a reasonable inter-
pretation of your message. Therefore my query amounts to
tliis: Is it the present objective of United States political
policy to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be
accomplished, or to maintain a military position in Korea
—
indefinitely, for a limited time?
Under the extraordinary limitations and conditions
imposed upon the command in Korea, as I have pointed out,
its military position is untenable, but it can hold, if overriding
political considerations so dictate, for any length of time up
to its complete destruction. Your clarification requested.
Army Chief of Staff Collins later \vrote:
I must admit that I personally, and I believe, the JCS as
a group, had considerable sympathy for MacArthur in the dilemma
presented to him by this directive [of December 30, 1950]. In
our regular periodic mettings with representatives of the State
Department the Chiefs constantly tried to pin down at any
particular time after the Chinese intervention, just what our
remaining political objectives were in Korea, but our diplomatic
colleagnies would always counter with the query 'What are your
military capabilities?" The discussion v^^ould almost invariably
come down to the age-old question of the chicken and the egg.
The Chiefs could only deduce that our State Department co-
^^Quoted in Hearings , Pt. 2, 906, testimony of General BracUey.
also Whitney, pp. 435-36; Schnabel, pp. 322-23.
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workers, torn as they were by the often conflicting domestic
and international political considerations, wanted us to attain
the maximal military results within our military capabilities.
But the military would have to assume all the responsibility if
things went \vrong. ^'^
The same dilemma would again arise on February 13 and Februarj^ 23,
1951, when tlie State and Defense Departments both took the position that each
department could not make definitive recommendatiais in its own field without
conclusions of the other. The Joint Chiefs commented on a State Department
memorandum of February 23 as "an unsound approach, " since State should
first formulate the political objectives before the Chiefs could devise the
85
military means to achieve them.
Both Truman and Acheson were "deeply disturbed" by MacArthur's
message of January 10, 1951.^^ There followed a hasty series of meetings,
including one of the National Security Council on January 12. It was decided
that the Joint Chiefs would send a message to MacArthur dealing mainly with
the military aspect of the Korean situation, while President Truman would
send a separate personal message bringing him up to date on political and
87
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Vandenberg, were dispatched to Korea and Tokyo to report back on what the
actual situation was.
Thus the Joint Chiefs sent a message to MacArthur on January 12, 1951,
repeating their current operating directive:
We are forced to the conclusion, based upon all the
factors knowm to us, including particularly those presented by
you in your present message, that it is infeasible under existing
conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist
China, to hold the position in Korea for a protracted period.
It would be to our national interest, however, and also
to the interest of the UN, before you issue firm instructions
for initiation of evacuation of troops from Korea, to gain some
further time for essential military and diplom.atic consultations
with UN countries participating in Korean effort.
It is important also to future of UN and NATO organi-
zations to the United States prestige world-wide, and to
efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in Asia that
maximum practicable punishment be inflicted on Communist
aggressors and that Korea not be evacuated unless actually
forced by military considerations.
In Washington it is not possible to evaluate present
state of morale and combat efficiency of UN forces.
[Deleted]
In your messages of December 30, 1950 and January 4,
1951, you had indicated that it would not be necessary to mal^e
an anticipatory decision to evacuate until our forces had
arrived at the old Pusan beachhead.
Including consideration of factors outlined above, your
estimate is desired as to timing and conditions under which
you will have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea.
Directions contained in paragra|)h C our message of
January 9 meanwhile remain in effect.
SSparaphrase. testimony of General Bradley, Hearrngs..
Pt. 2 907.
Deletion is in original in the published records
of the HearmS£. See also
Collins, p. 252; Sclmabel, pp. 323-24.
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In this same message, the Joint Chiefs were quite concerned about the
effect on MacArthur' s forces, especially on ROK soldiers, if news of imminent
evacuation should reach them. In the Joint Chiefs' opinion, aay instructions
to evacuate would become known almost at once, despite security measures,
and any resulting collapse of ROK resistance could seriously endanger the
Eighth Army's ability to reach a secure beachhead about Pusan and hold it
long enough for actual evacuation.
Immediately after this JCS message of January 12, 1951, was
approved by President Truman, Generals Collins and Vandenberg left that
evening for Korea, carrying with them a copy of the JCS memorandum or
study of the same date, to be shown to General MacArthur by Collins in
person. The Joint Chiefs' memorandum was transmitted by Secretary of
Defense Marshall to the National Security Council for its consideration on
January 17. The entire document was later sent to MacArthur for his




^^Testimony of General Bradley, Hearings , Pt. 2, 907-08. See also
Ache son, p. 516. For the background of the preparation of this memorandum,
see Secretary Marshall's testimony, Hearings, Pt. 1, 331.
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Hearings, Pt. 1, 332, 334.
^^Testimony of General Bradley, Hearings, Pt. 2, 908. Also,
Hearings, Pt. 1, 330.
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In the JCS memo of January 12, 1951, the Chiefs discussed what might
be done should the situation worsen and the UN Command be forced to evacuate
Korea. Sixteen possible actions, including MacArthur's four, all or some of
which might be taken after evacuation, were put forward for staidy in preparation
for military and diplomatic consultations. The Joint Chiefs had "tentatively"
approved them for this purpose.
Marshall stated some of these actions in his testimony before the Senate
Committees during the MacArthur hearings:-
A. With the preservation of the combat effectiveness of
our forces as an overriding consideration, stabilize the situation
in Korea or evacuate to Japan, if forced out of Korea.
[Deleted. ]




Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and
place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized,
or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon the
circumstances then obtaining.
G. Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of
China coastal areas and of Manchuria.
H. Remove now the restrictions on operations of the
Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those
forces as will contribute to effective operations against the
Communists.
I. Continue to bomb military targets in Korea.
J. Press now for United Nations action branding Communist
China as an aggressor.
Send a military training mission and increase MDAP to
Chinese Nationalists in Formosa.




Initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in
Commimist China at such time as the Chinese Communists attack
any of our forces outside of Korea. [Deleted. ] I omitted one.
The Joint Chiefs also agreed, in their memo of January 12, that the
United States should support the South Korean Government as much and as long
as practicable, even an exile government, if the United Nations Command were
forced to evacuate Korea. In the same memorandum, the Joint Chiefs recommended
that major U. S. ground forces in the Far East should not be increased, but limited
to those already engaged. If, however, the Chinese should prove unable to force
the United Nations Command out of Korea, two of the recently mobilized National
Guard divisions might be sent to Japan for defense of that nation. The Chiefs
further recommended that the United States furnish logistic support not only to
the Chinese Nationalist forces in their operations against the Communists, but also
to Nationalist guerrillas in China.
It may be noted that the Joint Chiefs did not specify that the naval blockade,
if imposed, should be a UN blockade. Neither did they recommend that Chiang
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Kai-shek's troops be used in Korea.
^'^Hearings, Pt. 1, 333-34. The rest of the sixteen possible actions were
either omitted by Marshall or deleted in the published records of the Hearings .
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Schnabel, pp. 328-29. These items may be used to supplement the
missing part of Marshall's testimony mentioned above.
^^See Schnabel, pp. 328-29.
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President Truman sent his personal message to General MacArthur on
January 13, 1951, setting out authoritatively "our basic national and international
purposes in continuing the resistance to aggression in Korea. " The idea of a
Presidential message was urged by Acheson, Marshall and Bradley, for other-
wise, MacArthur would argue with the Joint Chiefs.^''' As Acheson later wrote:
The President listed ten specific purposes to which
continued resistance to aggression would contribute; stressed
the necessity of consolidating and holding support for America
in the United Nations as a .strong deterrent to Soviet intervention
and, for the same reason, of avoiding widening the war; and
referred to the adverse possibilities against which the President
was urgently increasing U. S. military strength.
The complete text of President Truman's personal message follows:
I want you to know that the situation in Korea is receiving
the utmost attention here and that our efforts are concentrated
upon finding the right decisions on this matter of the gravest
importance to the future of America and to the survival of free
peoples everywhere.
I wish in this telegram to let you have my views as to our
basic national and international purposes in continuing the
resistance to aggression in Korea. We need your judgment as to
the maximum effort wliich could reasonably be expected from the
United Nations forces under your command to support the
resistance to aggression which we are trying rapidly to organize
on a world-wide basis. This present telegram is not to be taken
in any sense as a directive. Its purpose is to give you something
of v/hat is in our minds regarding the political factors.




^Partial summary by Acheson, see Acheson, p. 516.
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(a) To demonstrate that aggression will not be
accepted by us or by the United Nations and to provide a rallying
point aroimd which the spirits and energies of the free world can
be mobilized to meet the world-wide threat which the Soviet
Union now poses.
(b) To deflate the dangerously exaggerated political
and military prestige of Communist China which now threatens
to undermine the resistance of non-Communist Asia and to
consolidate the hold of Communism on China itself.
(c) To afford more time for and to give direct
assistance to the organization of non-Communist resistance in
Asia, both outside and inside China.
(d) To carry out our commitments of honor to the
South Koreans and to demonstrate to the world that the friend-
ship of the United States is of inestimable value in time of
adversity.
(e) To make possible a far more satisfactory peace
settlement for Japan and to contribute gTeatly to the post-treaty
security position of Japan in relation to the continent.
(f) To lend resolution to many countries not only in
Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East who are now living
within the shadow of Communist power and to let them know
that they need not now rush to come to terms with Communism
on whatever terms they can get, meaning complete submission.
(g) To inspire those who may be called upon to fight
against great odds if subjected to a sudden onslaught by the
Soviet Union or by Communist China.
(h) To lend point and urgency to the rapid build-up
of the defenses of the western v^/orld.
(i) To bring the United Nations tlirough its first
great effort on collective security and to produce a free-world
coalition of incalculable value to the national security interests
of the United States.
(j) To alert the peoples behind the Iron Curtain that
their masters are bent upon wars of aggression and that this
crime will be resisted by the free world.
2. Our course of action at this time should be such as
to consolidate . the great majority of the United Nations. This
majority is not merely part of the organization but is also the
nations whom we would desperately need to count on as allies
in the event the Soviet Union moves against us. Further, pending
the build-up of our national strength, we must act with great
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prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is
concerned. Steps which might in themselves be fully justified
and which might lend some assistance to the campai"ii in
Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan
or Western Europe m large-scale hostilities.
3. We recognize, of course, that continued resistance
might not be militarily possible with the limited forces with
which you are being called upon to meet large Chinese armies.
Further, in the present world situation, your forces must be
preserved as an effective instrument for the defense of Japan
and elsewhere. However, some of the important purposes
mentioned above might be supported, if you should think it
practicable, and advisable, by continued resistance from off-
shore islands of Korea, particularly from Cheju-do, if it
becomes impracticable to hold an important portion of Korea
itself. In the worst case, it would be important that, if we
must withdraw from Korea, it be clear to the world that that
course is forced upon us by military necessity and that we
shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the
aggression has been rectified.
4. In reaching a final decision about Korea, I shall
have to give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet
Union and to the need for a rapid expansion of our armed forces
to meet this great danger.
5. I am encouraged to believe that the free world is
getthig a much clearer and realistic picture of the dangers
before us and that the necessary courage and energy will be
forthcoming. Recent proceedings iti the United Nations have
disclosed a certain amount of confusion and wisMul thinking,
but I believe that most members have been actuated by a
desire to be absolutely sure that all possible avenues to peaceful
settlement have been fully explored. I believe that the great
majority is now rapidly consolidating and that the result will
be an encouraging and formidable combination in defense of
freedom.
6. The entire nation is grateful for your splendid
leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea and for the superb
performance of your forces under the most difficult circumstances.
[s] Harry S. Truman^S
^^Truman, 11, 435-36. See also Sclmabel, pp. 324-25; Collins, pp.
250-51; MacArthur, pp. 381-82; Whitney, pp. 437-38.
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MacArthur replied at once: "We will do our best. " And he told his staff: "That,
gentlemen, finally settles the question of whether or not we evacuate Korea.
There will be no evacuation. "-^^^
Army Chief of Staff Collins did not agree with this simple interpretation
by MacArthur of no evacuation and told him so in Tolcyo. The problem would
not be solved until the military situation in Korea was stabilized later in January
1951.
MacArthur had seen no middle ground between evacuation and no evacua-
tion. His concept of no evacuation was such that losses of men in fighting to hold
in Korea were inevitable, which would weal^en the defense of Japan. That was
why he treated this question as a political decision and demanded clarification.
Wasiiington did not want to evacuate unless the safety of American troops made
it necessary to do so. Thus the question was treated as a military decision with
MacArthur making the judgment. Washington wanted MacArthur to inflict as
much damage on enemy forces in Korea as possible and to try to hold some
positions without sacrificing the safety of his forces. If this could not be done,
then evacuation would follow. How this could be done and at what stage evacua-
tion should be initiated were all left to MacArthur. MacArthur did not want to
accept this kind of responsibility, especially after his proposals of retaliatory
measures were not accepted. Under the circumstances he tended to favor
10*^MacArthur, p. 382.
^^-^See Collins' report to the JCS, in Collins, pp. 254-55.
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evacuation. In order to urge him to try to hold in Korea, Truman's personal
letter of January 13, 1951 emphasized the advantages of a successful resistance
in Korea while maintaining his basic mission of the defense of Japan.
The "Five Principles, " the Stabilization of the Fighting
Situation, and the Finding of Chinese Aggi-ession in
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution
When President Truman wrote to General MacArthur, about ccnfusion
in the United Nations, he apparently was referring to the "Five Principles" in
the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.
On January 11, 1951, Lester B. Pearson of Canada, on behalf of the
Group on Cease-Fire in Korea, submitted a supplementary report to the First
Committee, suggesting five principles as a basis for a cease-fire and the peace-
ful settlem.ent of the Korean problem and other Far Eastern problems. If
approved by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, these principles
would be transmitted to the Government of the People's Republic of China for
its consideration of acceptance. The five principles were as follows:
1. In order to prevent needless destruction of life
and property and while other steps are being fallen to restore
peace, a cease-fire should be immediately arranged. Such an
arrangement should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring
that it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive.
2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as
a result of a formal arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a
^^^See UN General Assembly, Official Records , Fifth Session, First
Committee, 422nd Meetmg, Jan. 11, 1951, p. 475.
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lull in hostilities pending some such arrangement, advantage
should be taken of it to pursue consideration of further steps
to be taken for the restoration of peace.
3. To permit the carrying out of the General Assembly
resolution that Korea should be a unified, independent,
democratic, sovereign State with a constitution aad a government
based on free popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces
will be withdrawn, by appropriate stages, from Korea, and
appropriate arrangements, in accordance with United Nations
principles, will be made for the Korean people to express
their own free will in respect of their future government.
4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in
the preceding paragraph, appropriate interim arrangements,
in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for
the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and
security there.
5. As soon as an agreement has been reached on a
cease-fire, the General Assembly shall set up an appropriate
body which shall include representatives of the Governments
of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic
of China with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in
conformity with existing international obligations and tlie
provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern
problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan)
and of representation of China in the United Nations. ^^^^
The choice of v/hether to support or oppose this peace plan was a
"murderous" one for the U. S. State Department, threatening, on one side, the
loss of the Koreans and the fury of Congress and press and, on the other, the
loss of America's majority and support in the United Nations. Acheson later
wrote ;
^^"^UN Doc. A/C.1/645, Jan. 11, 1951. Reprinted in Dept. of State
Bulletin (Jan. 29, 1951), p. 164.
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We chose, after painful deliberation in the Department--
and after I recommended to the President what may well have
been even without hindsight, the wrong alternative—to support
the resolution. We did so in the fervent hope and belief that the
Chinese would reject it (as they did) and that our allies would
then return (as they did) to comparative sanity and follow us
in censuring the Chinese as aggressors. The President—bless
him- -supported me in even this ajiguishing decision. ^^"^
On January 13, the First Committee, with U. S. support, approved the
five principles and decided to transmit them to the Peldng Government for its
consideration. "At once the political roof fell in, " and a tremendous blast of
public and congressional disapproval in America followed the UN decision. Even
Democrats joined with Republicans in stigmatizing Secretary Acheson as an
appeaser or worse. -^"^
Collins and Vandenberg arrived in Tokyo on January 15, 1951. During
their visit, Collins read the JCS memorandum of January 12 to MacArthur.
MacArthur later claimed that he and the Joint Chiefs had been in agreement on
actions to be taken against the Chinese. It is true that his recommended
actions were included in the JCS memo of January 12. However, there was an
essential difference which lay in the timing of some of the recommended
measures. MacArthur wanted all the military actions against the Chinese to
'^^Acheson, p. 513.
^^^Ibid. ; Lichterman in Stein, p. 624. See also Goodrich, p. 175.
^^^Hearings, Pt. 1, 13.
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take place at once in order to halt the Chinese drive in Korea. The Jomt Chiefs
did not want to take some of the recommended actions, such as a naval blockade
of China, until the United Nations Command's position in Korea was stabilized
or until after the UN forces were forced out of Korea. Neither did the Joint
Chiefs want to initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist
China until the Chinese attacked U. S. forces outside of Korea.
After the initial conference with MacArthur, Collins and Vandenberg flew
to Korea for two days of inspections and observations. As soon as they returned
to Tokyo from Korea on Jajiuary 17, Collins radioed to General Bradley, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Just returned Tokyo from Korea. Eighth Army in good
shape and improving daily under Ridgway's leadership. Morale
very satisfactory considering conditions. ROK forces lack
confidence and instinctively fear Chinese but are still capable
of resistance against NK troops. No signs of disaffection or
collapse though tliis could change quickly in event of serious
reverses.
Barring unforseen development, Ridgway confident he
can obtain two to three months' delay before having to initiate
evacuation. Does not want to do this before Army is back in old
beachhead.
Chinese have not made any move so far to push south
from Han River. Wlien counterattacked they have usually fled.
They are having supply difficulties and there are many indications
of low morale.
Ridgway taldng steps to check NK infiltration on front
of X Corps.
On the whole, English [sic Eighth] Army now in position
and prepared to punish severely any mass attack.
^^'^An Extract, Collins, pp. 253-54. See also Schnabel, pp.
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This cheering message from Collins was quickly shown to Truman.
Collins and Vandenberg had a second conference with MacArthur in
Tokyo before leaving for the United States on January 19. Collins read to
MacArthur the message that he had just sent to Bradley. Vandenberg outlined
the results of his inspection of Air Force activities, which he had found highly
satisfactory. After some discussion, MacArthur stated that in his opinion tlie
UN forces could now hold a beachhead in Korea indefinitely. MacArthur felt
that with continued domination of the sea and air by the United Nations, Chinese
forces would never be able to bring up adequate supplies, over their lengthening
lines of communications, to enable them to drive the UN forces from Korea.
But he reiterated his belief that a decision to evacuate Korea was a political
matter and should not be decided on military grounds.
When both members of the Joint Chiefs arrived back in Washington, they
reported to the Joint Chiefs and briefed the President. Collins later wrote:
The President and his chief advisers, who had access
to our reports, were reassm*ed. For the first time since the
previous November responsible authorities in Washington were
no longer pessimistic about our being driven out of Korea and,
though it was realized that rough times were still ahead of us,
no longer was there much talk of evacuation. General Ridgway
alone was responsible for this dramatic change.
^^^Collins, p. 255; Truman, H, 436-37.
^^^For a summary of the report by Collins and Vandenberg to the
JCS,
see Collins pp. 254-55. Also Schnabel, p. 327.




On January 17, 1951, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the PRC
replied to the latest United Nations cease-fire proposal.. Chou reiterated the
principles of Ms statement of December 22, 1950. He regarded the five
principles of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly as essentially
still a procedure of "a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards. " There-
fore his government "cannot agree to this principle. "
Instead, Chou submitted to the United Nations the following proposals:
A. Negotiations should be held among the countries
concerned on the basis of agreement to the withdrawal of all
foreign troops from Korea and the settlement of Korean
domestic affairs by the Korean People tliemselves, in order
to put an end to the hostilities in Korea at an early date.
B. The subject-matter of the negotiations must include
the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Taiwan
and the Taiwan Straits and Far Eastern related problems;
C. The countries to participate in tlie negotiations should
be the following seven countries: the People's Republic of
China, the Soviet Union, the United IQngdom, the United States
of America, France, India and Egypt, and the rightful place
of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic
of China in the United Nations should be established as from
the beginning of the Seven-Nation Conference;
D. The Seven-Nation Conference should be held in
China, at a place to be selected.
Chou concluded: ''If the above-mentioned proposals are agreed to by the countrie
concerned and by the United Nations, we believe that it will be conducive to the
prompt termination of the hostilities in Korea and to the peaceful settlement of
Asian problems to hold negotiations as soon as possible.
"^^^
^^^U.N. doc. A/C. 1/653, dated Jan. 17, 1951. Reprinted in Dept. of
State Bulletin (Jan. 29, 3 951), pp. 165-66.
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In Washington, Secretary Acheson released a statement, on January 17,
commenting on Chou's reply:
. . .
Their so-called "counterproposal" is nothing
less than an outright rejection. . . . There can no longer be
any doubt that the United Nations has explored every possibility
of finding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Now,
we must face squarely and soberly the fact that the Chinese
Communists have no intention of ceasing their defiance of the
United Nations. I am confident that the United Nations will
do that. The strength of the United Nations will lie in the
firmness and unity with which we now move ahead.
On January 19, 1951, the U. S. House of Representatives passed a
resolution which stated: "Resolved , That it is the sense of the House of
Representatives that the United Nations should immediately act and declare
the Chinese Communist authorities an aggressor in Korea. " The resolution
was introduced by Rep. Jolm M. McCormack of Massachusetts, Democratic
leader of the House, with the collaboration of the Republican leader, Rep.
Joseph W. Martin, Jr. , of Massachusetts, on January 19 and adopted by the
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House on the same date.
The next day, tlie United States introduced a draft resolution before the
First Committee of the UN General Assembly which would "find" that the
Chinese Communist government had engaged in aggression in Korea. Tlie text
of the U. S. draft resolution of January 20 foUows:






NOTING that the Security Council, because of lack of
unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise
its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist inter-
vention in Korea;
NOTING that the Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China has rejected all United Nations
proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with
a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue
their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon
United Nations forces there;
Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those
in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself
engaged in aggression in Korea;
Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to
cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to with-
draw from Korea;
Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue
its action in Korea to meet the aggression;
Calls upon all states and authorities to continue to lend every
assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;
Calls upon all states and authorities to refrain from giving
any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;
Requests a committee composed of the members of the
Collective Measures Committees [sic] as a matter of urgency to
consider additional measures to be employed to meet this
aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly;
Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United
Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the
achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful
means, and Requests the president of the General Assembly to
designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any
suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.
U.N. doc. A/C. 1/654, dated Jan. 20, 1951; see Dept. of State Bulletin
(Jan. 29, 1951), p. 167. The Collective Measures Committee v/as set up under the
"Uniting for Peace" Resolution of the General Assembly on Nov. 3, 1950 to study
and report on methods to maintain and strengthen international peace and security.
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Domestically in the United States there was continued pressure toward
the same goal. On January 23, the U. S. Senate passed the following two
resolutions, introduced by Senator John L. McClellan:
Resolved
,
That it is the sense of the Senate that the
United Nations should immediately declare Communist China
an aggressor in Korea.
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the
Communist Chmese Government should not be admitted to
membership in the United Nations as the representative of
China.
In the course of the debate in the First Committee of the UN General
Assembly, twelve Asian-Arab states urged that further efforts be made toward
worldng out a peaceful settlement before considering the U. S. draft resolution.
The United States finally accepted, on January 30, two amendments, submitted
by Lebanon, to its draft resolution of January 20. The first amendment would
replace ihe words "has rejected all United Nations proposals" by the words "has
not accepted United Nations proposals" in the second paragraph of the draft
resolution. The second amendment would insert the following words at the end
of the eighth paragraph: "it being understood that the Committee is authorized
to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee, referred to in the following
paragraph, reports satisfactory progress in its efforts. " The purpose of the
second amendment was that the results of the work of the Committee envisaged
ll^See Dept. of State Bulletin (Feb. 5, 1951), p. 208.
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in the eighth paragraph would be brought to the attention of the General Assembly
only if the conciliation efforts envisaged in the ninth paragraph did not meet
with success.
When the First Committee came to a vote in the evening of January 30,
1951, the British delegate, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, made it clear, "if the Lebanese
amendment to the eighth paragraph was not carried, his delegation would be
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compelled to vote against the United States draft resolution as a whole.
Sir Gladw^m had pointed out earlier, on January 25, that the United Kingdom was
broadly in agreement with the first five paragraphs of the United States draft
resolution; but when the question arose of considering further measures before
the intentions of the Peking Government had been fully and exliaustively explored,
the United Kingdom delegation entertained the gravest doubt on the wisdom of
any such action.
The Lebanese amendments were carried, and the amended U. S. draft
resolution was adopted by the First Committee on January 30 by a vote of 44
to 7, with 8 abstentions.
ll'^UN General Assembly, Official Records , Fifth Session, First
Committee, 435th Meeting, Jan. 29, 1951, at 3 p.m. , p. 577. For the final
version of the UN General Assembly resolution of Feb. 1, 1951, see Hearings,
Pt. 5, 3513-14.
^^'^
Official Records, First Committee, 438th Meeting, Jan. 30, 1951,
p. 602.
^^^Official Records, First Committee, 431st Meeting, p. 547.
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The United Nations General Assembly met in plenary session on February
1, 1951 and adopted, without debate, the First Committee resolution by a vote of
44 to 7, with 9 abstentions. The seven negative votes were cast by Burma,
Byelorussia, Czechoslovalda, India, Poland, the Ukraine, and the Soviet Union.
Abstaining were Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden,
Syria, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.
Acheson wrote that America's allies "rather grudgingly" voted for the
General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951 and "dragged their feet until
May in taking any action to punish the aggressor. ^^^^^
The retaliatory measures which had been recommended by the Joint
Chiefs in their memorandum of January 12, 1951, encountered opposition in the
National Security Council and were not approved, although discussion of the
various courses continued. On January 24, 1951, President Truman met with
the National Security Council and reviewed the recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs and the counterrecommendations of the National Security Council Senior
staff. But no decision was reached. Truman then directed a continuation of the
study by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in connection with a
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Secretary of Defense Marshall testified that, after the encouraging report
of January 17 from Army Chief of Staff Collins in Tolcyo, the situation of the
American forces in Korea continued to improve and during the latter half of
January the enemy forces did not take the offensive. Marshall further stated:
Throughout February and March our forces maintained
the initiative against the enemy.
As a result of this radical change in the military situation
from that which prevailed in the early part of January, it was
not considered -wise to put into immediate effect all of the courses
of action outlined in the Joint Chiefs' memorandum of January
12.121
Toward the end of January 1951, America's foreign policy was perceived
by President Truman in the following way, as recorded in his memoirs:
From the very beginning of the Korean action I had always
looked at it as a Russian maneuver, as part of the Kremlin's plan
to destroy tlie unity of the free world. NATO, the Russians Imew,
would succeed only if the United States took part in the defense of
Europe. The easiest way to keep us from doing our share in
NATO was to draw us into military conflict in Asia. We could
not deny military aid to a victim of Communist aggression in Asia
unless we wanted other small nations to swing into the Soviet
camp for fear of aggression which, alone, they could not resist.
At the same time, it served to weaken us on a global plane and
that, of course, was Russia's aim.
Our policy was to maintain our position in Asia, promote
the defense and unity of Europe, and prepare America. As I
saw it then, and as I see it now, these three purposes depended
upon each other, and one could not be attained without all three
parts of our policy being vigorously pursued.
^^^Hearings, Pt. 1, 332.
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I had occasion to malce my position clear when the French
Prime Minister, M. Rene Pleven, visited Washington at the end
of January. -'^^^
The Choice of Limited War in Korea; An Assessment
After the Chinese Communist forces intervened in full strength, what were
some of America's policy choices to deal with the new situation? mat alterna-
tive did the United States finally choose and why? What consequences followed
America's decision in reaction to Chinese attacks in late November 1950 through
January 1951?
Militarily, the United States had, at least, three policy alternatives:
(1) take additional, strong, and retaliatory military measures against the
Chiaese Communists both in Korea and in China; (2) evacuate voluntarily from
Korea; (3) resist the Chinese m Korea without taking retaliatory measures
against them outside of Korea.
In the non-military field, America also had at least three choices:
(1) seek United Nations condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor in
Korea; (2) undertal<.e economic embargo by the free world against China;
(3) negotiate at once to obtain peace ia Korea, with some necessary and inevitable
concessions to China, siace China possessed relatively favorable military
advantages at the time.
Truman, II, 437.
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To take additional, strong and retaliatory military measures would
include General MacArthur's recommendations concerning the use of Chiang
Kai-shek's Nationalist forces both in Korea and on the Chinese mainland, the
bombing of Manchuria, and the application of a coastal blockade against China.
The United States finally decided to resist militarily the Chinese offensive
in Korea without expanding the war to Manchuria or the Chinese mainland, but
with a contingency plan of taldng retaliatory measures against China if Americaa
troops were forced out of Korea. Diplomatically, America decided not to
negotiate unless no concessions were made, but rather to seek UN condemnation
of Chinese aggression.
It is easier to understand why no voluntary evacuation from Korea was
contemplated, unless the safety of U. S. forces and the UN Command necessitated
it; since it would be a military defeat and damage considerably America's world-
wide prestige and leadership, while a successful resistance in Korea would
serve many important purposes for the United States, such as enumerated in
President Truman's personal letter of January 13, 1951 to General MacArthur.
Butj in view of the fact that American troops were suffering severe and
even humiliating reverses in Korea at the time, why did the United States decide
not to take additional retaliatory military measures, as recommended by
MacArthur? This issue would later become one of the major items in the
Truman-MacArthur controversy.
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Basically there were four considerations from the viewpoint of the
Truman administration. First of all, it was believed that immediate retaliatory
measures, such as the bombing of Manchuria, would expand the war and lead
to a general war with Communist China. This consequence was deemed
undesirable. As General Bradley explained at the MacA.rthur hearings: 'In
the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the
wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy
pRed China]. "'•^•'^ "It would necessarily tie down additional forces, especially
our sea power and our air power, while the Soviet Union would not be obliged
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to put a single man into the conflict. " The Truman administration was
afraid of allowing the war in Korea to expand to such an extent as to render
the United States incapable of meeting aggression in any of a half-dozen other
potential trouble -spots, such as Western Europe, Japan, Berlin, Yugoslavia,
Iran, and Indochina. '^^^
The second consideration in the decision against expanding the war was
the fear of provoking Russian intervention in the wake of a general war with
China and starting a third world war. Secretary of Defense Marshall argued
during the MacArthur hearijigs: "Russia possesses a very valuable ally in
^^•"^








Now m view of their treaty with the Chinese Communist regime or
government, if it appears that they have failed to support that government, in its
fight in Korea, we have a very special situation because it affects every other
satellite of tiio Soviet Government. "^^^
The Sino-Soviet alliance of February 14, 1950 stipulated in Article I:
"In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or
states allied by it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High
Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with
all the means at its disposal. " Since the United States was using Japan as the
base to support the war in Korea, it could be easily construed by the Soviet Union,
if it so desired, that the United States was allied with Japan, even though no
formal treaty of alliance or security had been signed. And if America took such
retaliatory measures as the bombing of Manchuria, it would make the Sino-Soviet
alliance automatically operative for the Soviet Union to render immediately
military and other assistance to China with all the means at its disposal. This
v/ould increase the danger of a major war in the Far East with the involvement of
the Soviet Union, Communist China and the United States, which would entail
further world-wide complications. America's estimate of the risk of Russian
intervention, if additional military actions were taken against China, was based
upon judgment about Russia's self-interest, prestige, and obligations under the
'Hearings, Pt. 1, 594.
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Sino-Soviet treaty. ^27
The third consideration was the effectiveness of the measures as compared
to the risks they would entail. Wliile the Joint Chiefs recognized the military
advantages that might accrue to the United Nations' position in Korea and to the
United States position in the Far East by these additional measures, risk
of global war would be increased without any commensurate assurance of a
quicker, less costly military decision. ^29
The fourth consideration was the support and unity of Western allies.
Once the Chinese intervened in full strength, America's European allies were
opposed to any furtlier expansion of the war since they were worried by the
possibility that United States resources might be committed to a war in Asia,
that programs of economic and military assistance to them might be curtailed,
and that the North Atlantic Treaty might become a mere paper treaty.
America's additional measures with regard to Korea would lose the support of
her allies and might even disrupt the NATO coalition and Western unity in the
United Nations. "^^^
-^^^Osgood (1957), p. 175.
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Osgood (1957), p. 174. For arguments in favor of taking some of the
additional measures, such as the use of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces,
extending operations beyond the Yalu River, see Alvin J. Cottrell and James E.
Dougherty, "The Lessons of Korea War and the Power of Man,"" Orbis , n




See Acheson, pp. 472-73.
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In the diplomatic field, as early as December 1, 1950, Secretary
Acheson expressed the desirability of holding the United Nations to a condemna-
America's allies and friends, who insisted on exploring the means of peaceful
settlement first. As long as no concessions were made, especially with regard
to Formosa, to the Chinese seat in the United Nations, and to the diplomatic
recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, the United States did not object
to the efforts of her allies and friends in seeking ways for peaceful settlement.
of domestic political considerations. One way to interpret the administration's
reverses in the congressional elections of 1950 was, "the electorate had
apparently listened attentively to those who attributed the 'loss' of China and
other gains of Communism to a conspiracy within the American government and
voted for candidates who advocated a more vigorous anti-Mao policy, a reduction
of economic aid, less deference to our allies in Western Europe.
"^^^ Wlien the
United States painfully decided to vote for the "Five Principles" in the United
Nations on January 13, 1951, America's policy-makers were aware that this
"
action would awal^en the fury of Congress and the press. Shortly afterwards,
the U. S. Congress passed resolutions to the effect that the United Nations
tion of Chinese aggression. 132 But this action required cooperation from






should immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea. The
U. S. Senate also adopted a resolution on January 23, 1951 that the Communist
Chinese Government should not be admitted to membership in the United Nations
as the representative of China.
With the United States having no intentions to concede because of
domestic pressures, there could be little possibility of fruitful negotiations for
a peacefxil settlement. Thus the efforts in the United Nations by America's
European allies and some neutral nations failed. It was only after these nations
felt that they had exhausted the means of peaceful settlement that many of them
reluctantly supported the U. S. proposal in the UN General Assembly to
condemn Chinese aggression. Moreover, America's allies refused to tal^e
economic sanctions against Communist China mtil May 1951. Thus, U. S.
unilateral measures of an economic embargo against China could not be
effective during the critical period of December 1950 - January 1951.
The fact that the United States did not take additional, strong, retaliatory
military measures against Comm^jnist China (for whatever reasons) enabled
the Chinese to attack initially with as much power and consequent damage as
occurred. This produced two results: (1) the Chinese had no desire to
negotiate either, until they could obtain a favorable military position; (2) the
United States was all the more in need of a strong diplomatic counterattack,
such as UN condemnation of Chinese aggression, to balance military reverses.
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Epilogue
To carry out the policy of limited war, Lieutenant General Matthew B.
Ridgway, in command of the Eighth Army, adopted the strategy of attrition and
began to launch limited counteroffensives starting in late January, 1951. On
March 15, Seoul was recaptured from the Communists and never lost again.
The Eighth Army gradually pushed northward to the vicinity of the 38th parallel.
General MacArthur was strongly opposed to the principle of limited
war, which he regarded as prolonged indecision, even "appeasement. " lie
insisted that the object of war should be victory. His conviction was: "There
is no substitute for victory. " He did not hesitate to express in public or
through his communications with Republican members of U. S. Congress his
disagreement with the war policy of the Truman administration.
On April 11, 1951, President Truman decided that MacArthur was unable
to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government
and of the United Nations, and relieved him of all his commaiids. Ridgway
succeeded MacArthur.
After two spring offensives <Iie Chinese had failed to gain an upper hand
over Ridgway's forces. By June a military stalemate emerged.
On June 23 the Soviet Union proposed that discussions should be started
for a cease-fire in Korea. The United States responded readily. Truce
negotiations were opened on July 10, 1951, between two sides of the belligerents;
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but they proved to be extremely difficult and frustrating and lasted for two years
while bit-ter fighting continued for local advantages. It was not until after the
Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower had replaced Truman's
Democratic one and after the death of Stalin that the Korean armistice agreement
was finally signed on July 27, 1953, with a military demarcation line near the
38th parallel.
Though the fighting came to an end, a political conference at Geneva in
1954, participated in by the 16 member states of the UN which had aided the ROK
during the war and the representatives of South Korea, North Korea, PRC and
USSR, failed to solve the problems of the method of bringing about a united and
independent Korea by peaceful means. Korea remained divided. North and
South Korea were hostile to each other in the midst of the cold war.
Shortly after the Korean armistice agreement was concluded, a Mutual
Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea was signed
on October 1, 1953.
American forces under the United Nations Command stayed in Korea. The
Chinese withdrew their forces from Korea in 1958.
In the wake of President Richard Nixon's visit to Peldng in 1972, South and
North Korea made official contacts with each other and agreed in a joint communique
of July 4 on principles to reunify Korea by peaceful means. A telephone hot line
linldng Seoul and Pyongyang was opened. Political talks for reunification on the
governmental level of North-South Coordinating Committee were held. North
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Korean-South Korean Red Cross talks were also started for arranging reunions
of families dispersed across the border. Both kinds of dirJogue proceeded
slowly and were subsequently suspended.
In the latter part of 1973, a delegate from North Korea attended and
addressed for the first time the UN General Assembly as an observer, along
with South Korea's observer. The Political Committee of the UN General
Assembly agTeed in November to dissolve the United Nations Commission for
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which all parties believed had
outlived its usefulness. The effort by friends of North Korea, particularly
Algeria, China (now represented by PRC in the UN since 1971) and USSR,
to liquidate the United Nations Command in Korea, and thus pressure the
United States to withdraw its forces from Korea, was opposed by the United
States, Great Britain and Japan. The debate in the Political Committee ended
without voting on the status of the UN Command. The effect was to leave
matters as they stood.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Shortly after the outbreak of the Koreaa War, the United States decided
to intervene by fighting a limited war under a United Nations command. This
was a new experience for America, at least in two respects. Prior to the Korean
War, America never fought a war on behalf or with the support of world-wide
international organization. U. S. initiative and leadership in the UN Security
Council to adopt the resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950, with the key
absence of the Soviet delegate from the Council meetings , meant that U. S.
military action in Korea became teclmically and legally a United Nations action,
even though American interest and prestige were as much at stake in Korea as
those of the United Nations. The United States was willing to provide military
means to honor its firm commitment to the United Nations as a world body for
maintaining international peace and security, when North Korean forces attacked
South Korea. Moreover, the United States had been committed to the support of
the Republic of Korea since its creation in 1948.
The experience was also new to America in terms of the nature of war.
America had always fought its wars in a total maimer, devoting its full resources
to go all-out to crush the enemy and win a total victory as
rapidly as possible.
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In Korea, however, this traditional pattern of war was not followed. Though a
formal declaration of war was not made, it was a war in the real sense of the
word, i.e.
,
regular forces of all arms (air, sea and gro\md) were engaged in
conventional battles against enemy forces for the control of specific territory.
But the initial objective of both the American and the United Nations action in
Korea was to assist the Republic of Korea to repel the armed attack from North
Korea and to restore peace and security in the area. As understood at the time
by members of the UN which supported the UN resolutions and which provided
military assistance, including the United States, this was merely to push the
North Korean forces back behind the 38th parallel and restore South Korea's
border at this line.
In America's traditional approach to war, the objective should have been
to crush the North Korean forces totally, meaning to force their surrender not
only in South Korea but also in North Korea. This might have necessitated
conducting military operations into North Korea to destroy those enemy forces
that refused to surrender.
Why did the United States accept or even initiate the kind of limited
objective in Korea, which was alien to its military tradition? For one tiling,
this was partially affected by America's commitment to United Nations approach
to the Korean problem which had been initiated in 1947. It was inconceivable
that at the early stage of the war other members of the UN would support the
313
goal, even if the United States desired it strongly, to defeat the North Korean
forces completely and thus eliminate the North Korean regime eventually. For
they all understood that behind the North Korean Communists stood the Soviet
Union and possibly the Chinese Communists, too. Any such attempt to crush
the North Koreans totally would have to consider the possibility of Soviet or
Chinese intervention and the attendant consequences. The United States would
not have intervened even for the limited objective if it had calculated that this
would immediately induce Soviet military involvement. Thus the more important
consideration in the formulation of a limited objective in Korea was possible
Soviet reaction not only in Korea but elsewhere in the world.
Ironically, the real enemy of the United States in the Korean War, as
seen by the policy-malcers in Washington, was the So\'iet Union, even though
American forces could not, and did not want to, engage Soviet forces. To fight
against the troops of a Soviet satellite in their plan to conquer a weak non-
Communist area was intended to contain Soviet aggressive ambitions and threats
elsewhere. The dominant context was the world-wide struggle between the
United States and the Soviet Union for power, prestige and alliances since 1945.
Thus it was to contain the Soviet Union that the United States intervened
not only to assist South Korea, but to protect the security of
Japan, to discourage
further Soviet moves elsewhere and to uphold the principle of
collective security
through the United Nations. Not to act in Korea, so ran the
United States
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argument, woidd adversely affect America's position of leadership in the free
world against the Soviet bloc. But it was also with the Soviet Union in mind
that the objective in Korea was limited, so that the war would not be expanded
into a major war in Asia with Soviet involvement, leading eventually to World
War in. It was decided that to fight either a major war or a third world war
over Korea was not worthwhile, as far as America was concerned. The United
States would rather preserve necessary resources to defend other areas, such
as Europe, which were considered more vital than Korea, against Soviet
threats.
Thus the policy of limited war emerged. Tlie objective of the war was
0
limited to the restoration of South Korea's border at the 38th parallel without
attempting to defeat the North Korean forces completely. The area of
hostilities was limited to the Korean peninsula, even though the enemy forces
might receive supplies from Siberia or Manchuria. The enemy was limited
to the North Koreans, with precaution talcen to reduce the chances of Soviet
or Chinese entry.
Since the policy of limited war was a new experience for America,
especially since it was put in the framework of the United Nations, it had to
face many problems. One was how a general of one nation in command of an
international force was to be held accountable to the United Nations for the
conduct of tactical and strategic operations in the field. Obviously the
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commander of such a force had to be an American general, since the United
States had contributed the great bulk of personnel, arms and assistance. The
United States Government rejected any proposal to have a UN committee inter-
fere with the direct channel of control between American authorities in
Washington and the American general in command of such an international
force. The United States insisted on an arrangement in which the commander
would be directly responsible to the United States Government, and through
it, be responsible only indirectly to the United Nations. This was worked
out and formalized in the UN Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950,
adopted again in the absence of the Soviet delegate from the Council. All the
military forces, offered by members of the UN for Korean action, were placed
in a "unified command under the United States. " Thus the United States
retained much freedom in field operations. The initiative rested with the
United States Government to report to the United Nations, or to consult other
members of the UN on a particular tactical issue such as hot pursuit. Only
the resolutions and decisions by the UN would serve as the guiding principles
for America's day-to-day operations in Korea. Subsequently, the crucial
drive to the Yalu became a mat1;er within America's discretion without
adequate influence for restraint from other m.embers of the UN.
Another problem for U. S. policy of limited war in Korea was the
effort of America's allies and friends at peaceful settlement. Though tliey
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had supported UN action in Korea, they were also quick to mal^e proposals
for negotiations which were not to America's liking, but which could not be
totally ignored, since allied unity was necessary to continue the collective
natTire of the UN action in Korea. For example, the United States was not
prepared to accept a British proposal to link the issue of Formosa and that
of Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations with the peaceful
settlement of the Korean War. America's allies and friends abroad had a
tendency to desire peace at a high price to the United States.
A third problem was the influence of Am.erica's traditional approach
to war. As noted, total victory over the enemy in war was a deep-rooted
concept among American military officers. As soon as there was an opportunity
for them to voice such a desire, they were not hesitant to challenge the policy
of limited war with respect to the North Koreans. Initially it was because
of the fear of Soviet reaction that no thought had been given to the objective
of winning a total victory over the North Korean forces. But as the war went
on, the Soviet Union continued to give no mdication of any intention to inter-
vene. At an early date General MacArthur urged strongly that the objective
should be the destruction of the North Korean forces. He was later supported
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this attempt. It was subsequently decided
by the
United States Government that the policy of limited war would be strictly
maintained with respect to the Soviet Union, loosely applied to Chinese
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Commimist forces in Korea, but not applied at all to the North Korean troops.
The tradition had reasserted itself to form the policy of competely crushLag the
North Korean enemy. This policy produced two major moves under the
circumstances: (1) crossing the 38th parallel to pursue tlie remaining and
retreating North Korean troops; (2) driving to the Yalu to destroy them.
The policy toward China in the Korean fighting was less cleas-cut. At
first America had a genuine fear of Chinese intervention mainly because they
could tip the balance by helping the advancing North Korean forces push American
and UN forces out of Korea. But China alone did not and could not pose as great
a threat to America as the Soviet Union, which could strike elsewhere, particularly
in Europe. When the victory at Inchon turned the tide of the war, tlie United
States was confident that Chinese entry, however undesirable, would no longer
be able to force American and UN forces out of Korea. So the fear of Chinese
intervention was reduced to such an extent that China's official warning, when
it came, was not taken seriously and America was prepared to fight against
Chinese units in Korea with an overconfidence in the decisive effectiveness
of
air power.
The appearance and disappearance of powerful Chinese units
in North
Korea in late October and early November complicated the
mission of pursuing
and destroying North Korean forces. The mission was
re-examined but not
changed. One big problem was the lack of precise
knowledge of Chinese strength
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and whereabouts in North Korea. The United States chose to believe that Chinese
intentions were merely a limited-scale intervention in Korea, even though Chinese
troop deployment in Manchuria indicated clearly their capabilities to intervene in
full strength. IvIacArthur argued strongly that he should advance to destroy
whatever enemy forces there were until he reached the Yalu. Washington finally
decided that on the condition of the non-violation of the Manchurian border
MacArthur would be allowed to do what he wanted on the assumption that he could
and should defeat both the North Korean remnants and the Chinese forces in
North Korea. America's estimate of Chinese strength in North Korea turned out
to be less than one-fourth of the actual number there. So this policy of defeating
Chinese forces in North Korea by advancing to the Yalu without extending
hostilities to Manchuria resulted in military disaster for the United States.
The overwhelming strength of the Chinese in North Korea was a surprise to her,
since they had been skillful and successful in secretly deploying and hiding their
major troops in Korea.
Could MacArthur have made better preparations against the Chinese
attack? Perhaps he was filled with an arrogance of power—air power— with
respect to China. But, unless the United States had had more accurate Imowledge
of China's real strength in North Korea before the UN forces passed beyond
the
narrow "neck" of Korea, it was unlikely that MacArthur, or even
the Joint
Chiefs, would be willing to withdraw to the narrow "neck" to
defend against
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possible Chinese attacks. It would have been regarded as a sign of wealmess
in face of the Chinese. Moreover, Chinese power standing alone, without
Soviet assistance, was not taken seriously nor was it respected at the time by
the United States. Once the 38th parallel was crossed, military and political
circumstances seemed to drive MacArthur to push his forces to the Yalu.
The UN General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950 also contributed
to tlie climate supporting MacArthur 's northward drive. The resolution re-
stated the goal of Korean unification without explicitly making it a war aim, but
it implied that MacArthur was thereby authorized to conduct military operations
anyv/here in Korea. Here the collective wisdom of the United Nations still
could not avoid the mistake of giving the United States and MacArtliur a blank
check for conquering North Korea. Only India, excluding the enemy side of the
Communist bloc, challenged and opposed the assumptions of the UN resolution.
India had expressed the fear that the result might be to prolong North Korean
resistance, and even to extend the area of conflict. But the opportunity to stop
at the edge of the original policy objective of a limited war with respect to
North Korea was lost largely because of the political -military climate of
optimism and overconfidence on the part of both American leaders and most
members of the United Nations about easy victory in the waive of the Inchon
success.
After the Chinese intervened in full strength, America's
commitment
to UN action asserted its influence on the policy of limited
war through the
320
pressures of America's allies, which were now strongly opposed to any expansion
of the war. Not only would they abandon the goal of a total military victory in
Korea, which seemed impossible unless the war was extended to China and
perhaps still more broadly, but they were eager to obtain peace even at a high
price to the U. S.
,
e.g., concessions on Formosa, Chinese representation in the
UN, and U. S. recognition of the People's Republic of China. As it turned out,
the United States resisted making concessions because of domestic opposition
and opinion, which even resulted in her insistence on branding China an aggressor
in the UN General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951 to balance military
reverses in Korea. But the commitment to a limited war in Korea with respect
to China and North Korea became more urgent, since allied unity v/as necessary
to continue collective UN action in Korea.
More importaat was America's new realization in the midst of military
retreat and heavy casualties that the Chinese could not be easily defeated in
Korea without expending substantial additional resources and exioanding the war
into Manchuria or other parts of China. This would probably provoke Soviet
intervention and involvement in viev^ of the newly concluded Sino-Soviet aJliance.
The result might be a major war in the Far East. The United States did not
think that Korea was worth such an eximnded war, especially in view of America's
limited resources in the context of a global antagonism between U. S. A. and
U. S. S. R. The United S1;ates did not, nor was it willing to, devote all of its
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available resources to the war in Korea, even though America's overall military
strength had been rapidly and massively increased as a resiilt of the outbrealc of
the Korean War. Consequently the policy of limited war in Korea was insisted
upon and maintained: i. e. , without attacldng Manchuria or other parts of China,
the resistance against the Chinese and North Korean forces in Korea would be
made without immediate troop reinforcements and without any attempt to destroy
the enemy totally, since MacArthur's more basic and more important mission,
the defense of Japan, required the preservation and safety of his forces in Korea.
In summary, the major problems surrounding the policy of limited war
in Korea and its maintenance were: (1) America's exclusive control of the
international force for field operations, which reduced the restraining influence
of other members of the UN in some important tactical moves; (2) America's
allies, whose cooperation and support were needed to continue the collective
UN action in Korea, but who were eager to seek peace at a high price to the
United States, even tliough their influence was significant in opposing
the
expansion of the war to China; (3) General MacArthur, who demanded a
total
victory over, first, the North Kovam forces, then, over the Chinese
troops in
Korea, even advocating extending hostilities to China after
their full-scale
intervention in Korea; (4) America's traditional approach to war,
which once





Because of these problems, U. S. policy of limited war in Korea had to
go through various stages before it was finally worked out and maintamed. At
first the war was limited with respect to the Soviet Union and Communist China
in terms of geography and military contact: non-violation of Siberian and
Manchurian borders and no provocation to bring their forces into Korea. With
respect to North Korea, the war was also limited in its objective: to restore
South Korea's border at the 38th parallel with no intention of destroying enemy
forces completely. Soon, due to the lack of any indication of Soviet intention to
intervene and due to American military tradition, the objective was changed to
a total victory over North Korean forces with the consequent necessity of
crossing the 38th parallel and driving to the Yalu. The change of policy also
produced Chinese reaction and limited military contact with China in Korea.
Now there were two enemies in Korea to fight against: the North Koreans
and the Chinese. The policy objective further became the destruction of all the
enemy forces, including the Chinese, in Korea, but without attacldng Manchuria.
Finally, China's full-scale intervention and attacks in Korea forced Ainerica to
abandon the goal of a total victory over North Koreans or a victory^ over the
Chinese in Korea, since this would necessarily expand the war to involve the
Soviet Union. First and foremost, the United States wanted to prevent Soviet
intervention in Korea and over Korea, and managed to do so throughout the war.
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In retrospect, one wishes that the initial policy of limited war coiild
have been maintained without any change with respect to North Korea and China,
or that the change of policy elements could have been prevented by the influence
of other members of the United Nations. But this would be tantamount to
disregardj.ng American military tradition, the passions of war, the wealaiess
of human nature and the feUibility of human judgment. Nevertheless, the policy
of limited war did succeed in preventing a general war and preventing North
Korea from achieving military victory.
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